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Methodology 
The Devolved Service Delivery Study (DSD) i s  the product o f  an agreement between the W o r l d  
Bank, ADB, and DfID, in response to a request f r o m  the Government o f  Pakistan that the agencies 
review progress toward improving service delivery through decentralization. The government has 
emphasized that it i s  looking for  feasible, practical recommendations that add value to a devolution 
process that i s  w e l l  advanced. I t  requested a range o f  robust technical analyses that provide a 
summary o f  the emerging lessons and implications for both po l icy  and operational practices. The 
government made the point strongly that t h i s  should not  be an assessment o f  larger legal o r  pol i t ical 
arrangements, rather that the focus o f  the review must b e  on  pragmatic actions for service delivery 
improvements at district (zila) and tehsil level, based o n  reasonable assumptions about the l ike ly  
preconditions for service delivery. 
The authors have drawn comprehensively o n  the fol lowing data in the preparation o f  this three- 
volume report: 
Extensive published outputs f rom the NRB and a range o f  informal outputs including presentations 
and conference notes. 
Dis t r ic t  Studies-new, 
largely qualitative, data 
gathered f r o m  six districts 
(and a selection o f  tehsils 
within them) o n  their 
experiences to date 
gathered through the use o f  
a series o f  sector-specific 
templates systematically 
reviewing experience to  
date with sectoral concerns 
including public 
expenditure, c i v i l  service, 
politics, water and 
sanitation, health, education, and access to  justice issues (see Table 1). The districts identif ied by 
government for t h ~ s  tudy were Faisalabad and Bahawalpur (Punjab); Karachi and Khairpur (Sindh); 
Bannu (NWFP); and K i l l a  Saifullah (Balochstan). 
Fieldwork was conducted between June and August 2003 by a seven-member team in these six 
districts. Detailed socioeconomic data for the districts are available in a separate work ing paper 
(Qadir: 2003). The team included Shehryar Sanvar, Saj j id Siddique, Al i  Murtaza, Syed A t a  ur 
Rehman, Masroor Ahmad, Nasi r  Jamy, Rehana H a s h ,  Fareeha Zafar, Mohammed Saboor and 
Sanvar Ban.  
Table 1: Districts and TMAs Studied 
The qualitative data f r o m  this f ieldwork are cited in this report as “ADBIDfIDIWB D S D  Dataset 1 .” 
Intergovernmental Flows of Funds-a model  o f  f iscal f lows underpinned by a comprehensive 
database o f  revenue and expenditure for district governments and tehsils. The model  allows: 
0 Some analysis o f  the overall f iscal architecture and in particular the combined effect o f  the 
Provincial and National Finance Commission Awards under altemative scenarios-illustrating 
the impact o f  revenue reassignments or o f  any changes in funding assumptions; 
An assessment o f  the impact o f  any “lumpiness” in revenue, assessing the cash f l o w  problems 
that the provinces are flagging as the major reason for their slow movement towards the 
devolution o f  c i v i l  service pay; and 
A comparison to  be drawn between the intended and the actual behavior o f  provinces in 
transferring funds and assessing h o w  predictably districts received their anticipated funds. 
0 
0 
V 
Fieldwork and analysis was conducted between June 2003 and January 2004 by Abdul Wa j id  
Usmani, M i r z a  I r f an  B e g  and Adeel Sattar. 
T h e  fiscal data f r o m  this f ieldwork are cited in this report as “ADBIDflDIWB D S D  Dataset 2.” 
Background to  the dataset and the methodology used to construct it are provided in the appendix to  
this volume. 
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Executive Summary 
CONTEXT 
Pakistan’s far-reaching devolution initiative has been designed with three broad and inter-related 
objectives in mind: 
0 
0 
0 
To inject new blood into a polit ical system considered to be the domain o f  historically 
entrenched interests; 
T o  provide positive measures enabling marginalized citizens-women, workers, 
peasants-to access formal politics; and 
To introduce a measure o f  stability into a turbulent polit ical scene by creating a stronger 
l ine o f  accountability between new politicians and local electorates. 
Underpinning the polit ical strategy were other technical objectives: improved delivery o f  social 
services; better determination and enforcement o f  property and labor rights and regulation o f  
economic activities; and access to justice in the form o f  improved performance by local 
administrations, courts and police, with greater awareness o f  basic human rights protected under 
devolution. 
Remarkable progress has been achieved. N e w  local institutions with new structures for local 
government, new arrangements for intergovernmental sharing o f  resources, new electoral 
arrangements, new rules for government formation and dismissal and new opportunities for 
citizens to  participate in the affairs o f  government have a l l  been created. Installing this array o f  
new structures and accountability arrangements i s  an achievement that can hardly be overstated. 
The process i s  a l l  the more remarkable given the other far reaching reforms that government 
undertook in parallel. At the same time as the devolution initiative was being implemented, the 
government also implemented significant reforms in tax, trade, deregulation and privatization, the 
banking sector, anticorruption, restructuring federal and provincial legislatures and responding to  
gender concerns. 
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Table 2: Progress to Date in Political, Administrative, and Fiscal Reforms 
Pre August 2001 
Post August 2001 
Cross-cutting reforms. 
Emerging issues. 
Pre August 2001 
Post August 2001 
Constitution entrenches the Federal and Provincial govemments only. 
The four provinces were divided into three deconcentrated levels for administration and service delivery. 
Unstable and unpredictable local govemment system without commitment o f  the higher tiers to strengthen or sustain it. 
6,458 new, directly and indirectly elected Local Governments. 
Methods established for both the intemal and extemal recall o f  the nuzimeen in local government. 
Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) conceived with a broad govemance mandate. 
Responsibilities for regulating the activities o f  civi l  society devolved to district govemments. 
Particular emphasis on access to justice 
New institutional framework for checking police conduct introduced. 
Power triad o f  local politicians, district commissioner and head o f  district police abolished. 
O f  the 126,462 new union councilors, 25 percent o f  the reserved (one-third) seats for women were filled. Elected positions 
have in the main been won b y  people with previous political backgrounds, although some new blood i s  evident. 
Slow progress in the new oversight bodies. 
Progress in establishing the District Public Safety Commissions (DPSCs) has been patchy. 
District, province, and federal political representatives want greater control over administration and the police. 
Significant presence o f  federal civi l  servants in the provincial administrations. 
Local administrations largely led by  federal staff from the District Management Group. 
Mismanagement o f  the police by  the executive authority o f  the state at every level. 
The District Deputy Commissioner role combined magisterial and administrative powers. 
Cross-cutting reforms 
District govemments divided into 11 departments. 
District Coordination Officer (DCO) established as the highest-ranking civil servant in the district. 
Some federal staff remain in the districts, but former rural district council employees now are district employees. However, 
some ambiguity persists about reporting arrangements for the large numbers o f  staff from provincial employment groups. 
Particular emphasis on access to justice. 
Office o f  deputy commissioner abolished: powers divided between District and Sessions Judge, District Nazim and the 
DCO. 
Judicial powers exercised only by the judiciary. 
Emerging issues. 
Shifting the employer function to coincide with the new levels o f  functional responsibility i s  proceeding slowly, resulting in 
some competing lines o f  control. 
Determination o f  the wage envelope takes place at the provincial level when salaries are still paid from the provincial 
Account I rather than the district-controlled Account N. 
Useful preparatory steps have been taken toward transfemng employer functions to the school level, but this remains more 
an ambition than a reality. 
Autonomy o f  the police enhanced without establishment o f  the new systems o f  accountability. 
Need to review allocation o f  quasi-judicial powers to make local administration more effective. 
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Pre August 2001 
Post August 2001 
Cross-cutting reforms. 
Constitution specifies the functions o f  the federal govemment and the areas o f  shared responsibility, primarily treated as 
federal responsibilities. Centralization o f  taxes by agreement with the provinces. 
Most  buoyant taxes with significant revenue potential assigned to the federal govemment or ceded by the provinces on 
efficiency grounds. 
M a i n  source o f  provincial revenues is a transfer based on a share of federal tax collections determined by the National 
Finance Commission. 
The importance o f  federal transfers to provinces has significantly increased over time. 
District govemments given responsibility for delivering services related to elementary and secondary education, primary 
and secondary health, agriculture, and so forth. Towns and tehsils have relatively unchanged responsibilities. Union 
administrations have not been assigned any significant service-delivery responsibilities. 
Local  govemments given the rights to raise some additional revenues. 
Provincial Finance Commissions established which have made awards for the distribution o f  provincial resources to local 
govemments . 
NB: No shifts o f  responsibility f rom the federal to the provincial govemments. 
Particular emphasis on access to justice. 
Additional funding provided to subordinate courts and police services. 
Progress in creating the necessary secretariats and establishing the required analytic support for the PFCs has been slow. 
For  the major i ty o f  districts, the provincial finance departments support budget-making. 
Budget execution procedures made i t  d i f f icul t  for  the district govemments to control general development expenditures. 
The cash f low position o f  the province has become a factor obstructing the smooth f low o f  funds to the districts. 
Emerging issues. 
THIS STUDY 
Based o n  an empirical study o f  6 districts and 12 TMAs, this paper evaluates the extent to which 
the new structure has succeeded in creating the incentives necessary for local governments to 
achieve at least some o f  the service delivery objectives. 
The study uses a framework drawn from the Wor ld  Development Report 2004 to integrate the 
analysis o f  fiscal, administrative and polit ical dimensions o f  devolution with sectoral concerns: 
health, education, water and sanitation and access to justice. 
The paper addresses three notional readers. First, the “nazim o f  good intention”-the recently 
elected local politicians who are keen to make improvements in service delivery despite the 
ambiguities in their present situation. It invites them to  comment o n  a set o f  new incentives and 
challenges and opportunities that devolution appears to have introduced. Second, govemment- 
inviting senior officials who have worked long and hard in introducing these radical reforms to  
agree, or not, with the views expressed, the lessons learned and the recommendations offered for  
the next key steps. Third, donors-who, whi le overwhelmingly sympathetic t o  devolution and 
frequently strongly supportive, can nevertheless by their actions occasionally undermine the 
process. 
SERVICE-DELIVERY IMPROVEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL 
Cross-country comparisons illustrate that, in Palustan, growth i s  associated with fewer 
improvements in key health and education outcomes than in comparable developing countries. 
The link between increased funding and better education or health indicators i s  equally weak. 
Thus, as devolution began, Palustan faced a dilemma. I t s  public institutions for social service 
delivery were demonstrably failing, and the evidence suggested that neither economic growth nor  
increased public expenditures were l ikely to  have significant remedial impact. 
The Social Action Program represented an earlier attempt to  find a way through. Ultimately S A P  
failed-perhaps overwhelmed by the deteriorating macroeconomic position that squeezed public 
expenditures in the social sectors, but more l ike ly  because it did not  adequately prioritize 
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institutional reform and did not tackle the thorny issues related to the incentives for  staff t o  
improve outcomes either at the policymaking level or at the service-provider level. 
WHY MIGHT DEVOLUTION OFFER A W A Y  FORWARD? 
The changes introduced by devolution were summarized in Table 2 above. This report puts into 
perspective what these imply for service delivery. 
Devolution changes the accountability relationships between the actors involved in service 
delivery. The study focuses on the changed situation that nazimeen find themselves in - and the 
degree to which this provides incentives for malung services work at the district and TMA level. 
Whether the incentives really will in turn lead to better services in health, education, 
infrastructure, and access to justice across local governments remains an empirical question. 
Figure 1 summarizes these assumptions in a simplified framework for  thinking about the prospect 
for making services work under Pakistan’s devolution, centered on the nazimeen and their senior 
staff. 
Figure 1: Key Incentives in Devolution 
Nazimeen and I 
The incentives to  make services 
work under devolution can be 
grouped under two broad 
headings. 
First, there i s  the set o f  
incentives that might make 
nazimeen want to see service 
delivery improvements for 
citizens at reasonable cost. The 
report considers whether 
Nazimeen are influenced by 
citizen power, in the form o f  
“voice, ” so that they have an 
incentive to direct those providers to achieve service delivery improvements (although as Figure 
1 illustrates, this assumes that they are in a position to direct the behavior o f  the staff that provide 
the services-motivated nazimeen with n o  abil ity to direct their front l ine staff will not  be able to 
improve services). I t  also considers whether voice i s  accompanied by provincial eficiency 
incentives, so that service-delivery improvements are not simply obtained through increased 
spending. 
Second, the report reviews the incentives o n  those who provide the services-for example, the 
staff o f  schools and clinics-addressing the question o f  whether they are l ike ly  to  want to see 
improvements. More specifically, it looks at managerial power, the arrangements that ensure that 
the nazimeen and senior staff have authority over the front l ine workers and, again, citizen power 
(this time in the form o f  “clientpower”) that provides providing potential service recipients with 
some direct means to have an impact o n  the conduct o f  service providers. 
The methodology used in this report i s  t o  identify the components o f  these four sets o f  incentives 
and to track changes that can be attributed to  devolution. Box 1 summarizes these incentives. 
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If, o n  balance, these changing incentives are in fact having some impact o n  service delivery, then, 
in principle, improvements could be measured directly. However, there are two difficulties. First, 
devolution i s  recent and it would be premature to attribute any change (positive or negative) in 
social sector outputs to new arrangements for  service delivery. Second, in Pakistan there i s  n o  
consensus on which data sources to  use to  measure intermediate and outcome indicators and litt le 
robust district disaggregated data, and it would be dangerous to judge the utility o f  devolution on 
the basis o f  any apparent trends in these indicators. 
Box 1: T h e  Sets o f  Incentives T racked  in th is  R e p o r t  
[ncentives o n  nazimeen a n d  senior staff: 
Provincial efficiency incentives derive f rom the structure o f  the revenue base, including transfers and 
own source revenues available to meet the new local expenditure responsibilities. If w e l l  structured, 
these fiscal arrangements promote the efficient use o f  resources in meeting local preferences. Since 
nazimeen will typical ly face expenditure demands that exceed available resources, budgetary certainty 
in the f o r m  o f  predictable resource flows and a hard budget constraint, coupled with adequate 
autonomy in resource allocation, wil l encourage them to use public resources responsibly and 
efficiently. With these arrangements in place, nazimeen will more l i ke l y  attempt to  make the best 
trade-offs, for example, in allocations between sectors, between recurrent wage and development 
expenditures, and attain value for money (for example, through effective procurement arrangements). 
Voice offers a channel for citizens to make their demands for better services heard-the most obvious 
f o r m  i s  elections. However, voting may  b e  based o n  other criteria than service delivery, as owing to  
years o f  bitter experience voters may not  see commitments o n  the part o f  polit icians to  provide broad- 
based public goods over time as credible. Hence, voters and polit icians m a y  emphasize directly visible 
and narrowly targeted projects such as school infrastructure. These schools may no t  be staffed or 
maintained, but voters have leamt that they cannot h o l d  polit icians to  their promises beyond the short 
term. 
Voice i s  l ike ly  to  b e  stronger, with councilors motivated to  l isten to  citizens, if there i s  publ ic 
assignment o f  credit o r  blame and if there are obstacles to  councilors providing private goods targeted 
at a few influentials rather than public goods that benefit many. To influence nazimeen, citizen voice 
must compete with the pressures f r o m  the provinces o n  nazimeen t o  serve their pol i t ical interests. That 
“pull” f r o m  the provinces is reduced when the councilors have independent pol i t ical legitimacy and 
when provinces themselves have fewer incentives to  intervene in local affairs. 
[ncentives on the providers: 
The local governments, as represented by the nazimeen, engage with service delivery providers (for 
example, schools and contractors) through managerial power, w h c h  reflects their abi l i ty t o  require 
service providers to  adhere to  particular standards o f  behavior and service. Again, as i s  explored in 
more detail in the second volume (Annex 1-Recent History), managerial power is strengthened if the 
staff that work in the district are employed by the district, with hire and fire authority available to  local 
managers, subject to suitable safeguards. Recognizing that this i s  un l ike ly  to  be the case for senior 
staff, nazimeen need distinctive authority over their behavior including input in to their performance 
evaluations, and a credible threat t o  transfer them if the relationship i s  no t  productive. Managerial 
power i s  strengthened by the external oversight provided by bodies such as Accounts Committees, 
Moni tor ing Committees and Distr ict Public Safety Commissions. I t  also assumes that staff with 
appropriate s l u l l s  are available in sufficient numbers and that those staff have the skil ls and sufficient 
technical sanction powers to  undertake their tasks. 
A shorter route o f  accountability, client power, directly connects citizens with service provides, such 
as schools. Client power includes more formal mechanisms as functioning agencies that assist in 
dispute resolution (Departmental Grievances Redressal and Complaint Cells and Cit izen Police Liaison 
Committees) and bodies that provide direct cit izen inputs in to the management o f  facilities (Citizen 
Community Boards and School Management Committees). 
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KEY FINDINGS 
N e w  Incentives for Nazimeen and Senior Staff 
Provincial efficiency incentives 
The study assumes that devolution would be providing district and tehsil nazimeen with greater 
incentives for  efficiency in fiscal management if it achieved positive movement in three key 
categories: 
0 Budgetary certainty-the degree to which they must l ive within hard constraints and the 
predictability o f  the budgetary transfers that they depend on; 
0 Autonomy in preparing the budget-specifically the development, the non-salary recurrent 
and the salary budgets; 
0 Incentives for  local revenue-raising-the buoyancy and potency o f  taxes assigned, the clarity 
o f  revenue assignments and other incentives for  revenue raising. 
The scorecard o n  the creation o f  provincial incentives for  fiscal efficiency i s  mixed. On budgetary 
certainty, as the report shows, most funding for local government i s  in effect negotiated rather 
than formula-based. All negotiated revenues provide opportunities for gamesmanship-basing 
current pol icy decisions on their l ikely impact o n  future resource transfers, rather than on their 
merits. The proportions o f  the Provincial Consolidated Fund that ultimately are transferred o n  
formula basis are small. Less than 25 per cent o f  a l l  transfers mandated by the Local  Government 
Ordinances (LGOs) are calculated o n  a formula basis.’ However, while these transfers are 
negotiated, the data also reveal that there i s  considerable predictability in the transfers at the 
district level, with in most cases districts receiving only slightly less than what was budgeted. 
The district studies also revealed that local governments have l imi ted autonomy in preparing their 
budgets. Vertical programs are the main constraint o n  district and TMA autonomy in preparing 
the development budget, with often the volume o f  funds channeled through vertical programs 
dwarfing the district’s own Annual Development Plan (ADP) for particular sectors. In the study 
districts, more than ha l f  o f  the ADP i s  under the effective control o f  the federal and provincial 
agencies controlling the vertical programs. Local  govemments also have l imi ted freedom in 
preparing the salary budget. Neither local nor provincial govemments are able to  determine pay 
scales, which are de facto set at the federal level. In addition, in Sindh and NWFP, districts must 
seek approval f rom the province for the release o f  the funds f rom Account I (the provincial 
account) for their salary payments.’ 
Local  govemments are hugely dependent on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. T h i s  degree o f  
vertical imbalance can lead to inefficiencies in both the levels and quality o f  public expenditure- 
specifically, it creates incentives for local govemments to overspend as wel l  as reduces the 
incentives to spend these resources efficiently. The logic in both cases i s  that intergovemmental 
transfers lower the costs to local residents o f  getting services. Arguably, the disconnection 
between expenditure and taxation encourages “free-riding,” as wel l  as reducing the incentives to 
monitor public expenditures, as resources are collected f rom distant taxpayers not  l ike ly  to be 
using the services produced by the local government. 
Thus it i s  at least arguable that local revenues contain intrinsic incentives for efficiency, as local 
taxpayers might be more vigilant than distant ones and so efforts to  improve own source revenues 
’ 
’ 
It  i s  important to note that transfer has a precise meaning and refers to funds that are non-lapsing and within the 
re-appropriation authority o f  the district or TMA. 
In Punjab and Balochistan, the salary budget i s  transferred directly in District Account 4. 
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can imply incentives for efficiency. Incentives for local revenue effort are l inked to  the buoyancy 
and potency o f  taxes assigned to local government, and the clarity o f  such assignments. Ef fort  
will be deterred if there i s  n o  credible connection to likely revenue results and if it i s  not evident 
which level  o f  government i s  to benefit f rom which tax. Whi le districts have been given rights to 
raise additional revenues, their tax base i s  weak, and some district taxes and user charges are very 
diff icult to impose in practice. In the six study districts, for  example, for 2003/04 own source tax 
revenues ranged from 0 percent to 8 percent o f  total revenues. Therefore, even a large tax effort 
may bring only modest results in total revenue. 
In addition, although the district and TMA taxes are clearly assigned in theory, administrative 
confusions in the collection arrangements blur the assignments in practice, further reducing 
incentives to increase collections. Administrative complexity i s  most clearly evident in the case o f  
property tax (UPT). 
Citizen Power (Voice) 
This study argues that there are two  necessary conditions for the local polit ical leadership to have 
incentives for service delivery improvements. First, local councilors themselves must have an 
interest in serving the needs o f  their constituents and in particular the poor. Second, since the 
relationship between nazimeen and councilors i s  a critical intermediate step in the linkage to  
citizens as nazimeen are indirectly elected by councilors, nazimeen must find the pull f rom the 
councilors more demanding than the pull f rom other polit ical powerbrokers, particularly the 
provincial governments. 
On this basis, devolution has, o n  balance, created distinct incentives for  nazimeen to listen to  
citizens. However, jurisdictional overlap makes it diff icult for politicians to seek credit for  
improved services. When multiple levels o f  government are involved in delivering the same 
services, the public i s  unable to assign credit or  blame effectively for  that particular service to a 
particular politician. This overlap weakens incentives to perform wel l  o n  service delivery and 
could encourage politicians to target services to  their core supporters. Jurisdictional overlap i s  
particularly an issue in the education and health sectors, as federal and provincial vertical 
programs remain principal tools in promoting national pol icy priorities and represent a significant 
proportion o f  local-government expenditures o n  service delivery. 
The anecdotal evidence from the study districts also suggests the strong incentives workmg o n  
councilors to focus o n  private goods, such as patronage or locality-specific projects. However, 
the evidence from the study districts suggests that whi le the pressures to focus on private goods 
are strong, devolution has at least not exacerbated this problem. For  example, the data shows that 
there i s  n o  obvious reduction in operations and maintenance expenditures between the allocations 
in 2003/04, the f i rst  year local governments prepared their own budgets, and that o f  earlier years. 
Similarly, the data suggests that there has not been a significant shift f rom large to  small 
development schemes, or  that councilors are abandoning existing schemes to gain polit ical glory 
by starting new ones. 
The importance o f  the polit ical relationship between the nazim and the ruling provincial polit ical 
coalition emerges strongly fi-om the study. In two  o f  the six districts visited-Bahawalpur and 
Faisalabad-the District Nazim i s  allied to the Chief  Minister and the ruling provincial polit ical 
coalition, while in the other four the District Nazim i s  in opposition. This relationship has a 
This paper's references to private goods include both pure private goods (that is, individual-specific) as well as 
narrow public goods (for example, locality-specific projects). Local infrastructure projects often encompass 
both- that is, only the local community benefits, and the contractors for the projects reap the private rewards. 
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significant impact on the f low o f  funds between the province and local governments, on the 
implementation o f  local development schemes and on the manipulation o f  appointments and 
transfers o f  personnel. Effectively, the relationship with the province determines the extent o f  
polit ical control that the District Nazim can exercise within local government as wel l  as the 
freedom local policymakers have to act to meet their constituents’  demand^.^ 
N e w  Incentives for the Service Providers 
For service delivery to  improve, the service providers-and not just their elected superiors-must 
want to see improvements. This motivation i s  provided either by ensuring that the service 
providers have an incentive to listen to the policymakers-managerial p o w e r - o r  by providing 
potential service recipients with some direct means to have an impact on the conduct o f  service 
prov iders-c l ient  power, in the terminology o f  the Wor ld  Development Report (World Bank: 
2003~) .  
Managerial power over service providers 
In reviewing the changed incentives for front l ine staff and other service providers to “listen to 
Nazimeen,” the study examines three key dimensions: 
0 
0 
0 
The extent t o  which staff workmg in the district are employed by the district. 
The adequacy o f  the nazim’s authority over senior staff, including inputs into the 
performance evaluations for senior staff and abil ity to require their transfer. 
The extent o f  external oversight, including a review o f  the effectiveness o f  bodies, such 
as Accounts Committees, Monitor ing Committees, and District Public Safety 
Commissions, which are mechanisms for the monitoring o f  front l ine staff. 
Managerial power over service providers i s  weak. Administrative devolution remains incomplete 
and, as yet, has given district staff few reasons to respond to the authority o f  the nazimeen. The 
transfer o f  functions and the physical relocation o f  staff have no t  been fully matched by the 
transfer o f  the employer role. Whi le  the LGO provides for a sophisticated sharing o f  control over 
posting o f  c iv i l  servants based o n  norms which clearly delineate responsibilities, informal 
provincial controls are clearly evident in the area o f  Appointment, Promotion and Transfer (APT) 
authorities. The result i s  that although physically located in the districts, most senior district staff 
do not  consider themselves as district employees and therefore are l ikely to  accommodate 
provincial pressures to transfer subordinate staff. This attitude has considerably weakened the 
accountability o f  senior staff to local elected representatives. In fact, polit ically motivated inter- 
and intra-district staff transfers are a main area o f  confl ict between. provincial and local 
governments and are most severe in districts that are not polit ically aligned with the province. 
Since TMA staff largely belong to  local government cadres or  are the council’s own employees, 
the problem o f  l o w  institutional allegiance and weak accountability i s  less acute. 
These problems o f  accountability were clearly evident in the relationship between the District 
Nazim and the senior staff in the district, particularly the Distr ict  Coordination Officer (DCO) and 
the District Police Officer (DPO). I t  was generally observed that the authority o f  the nazim t o  
write the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) o f  DCOs was an insufficient mechanism for 
enforcing accountability since it was an ineffective tool  for  measuring the performance o f  an 
officer and tended to  be viewed as a routine matter to be placed o n  an officer’s f i le at the time o f  
promotion to fulfill a legal or administrative requirement. Officers tended to be given postings 
See the second volume (Annex I-Recent History) for a full treatment o f  the political relationships between the 
provinces and local govemments. 
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regardless o f  their performance in previous tenures. Nazimeen also have very l itt le authority over 
the DPO. Formally, at the time o f  the study, only in Punjab had the District Nazim been given the 
init iating authority for  the A C R  o f  the DPO, although i t  has been reported that this authority will 
be extended to  the nazim in al l  provinces. However, in practice in none o f  the districts studied 
were these performance evaluation reports completed in this manner. Some nazimeen, in fact, 
considered that removing the authority o f  the former district magistrate in completing the ACR o f  
a former district Superintendent o f  Police had contributed to deterioration in law  and order in 
general .5 
The LGOs provide for a number o f  institutional arrangements-Monitoring Committees, and 
District Public Safety Commissions-for the oversight o f  service providers by elected 
representatives.6 However, it was generally observed that thesebmechanisms have either not been 
established, or have been introduced to only a l imited degree. For  example, the field visi ts 
revealed that, with some notable exceptions and for several reasons, Monitor ing Committees were 
not  performing as the regulations envisioned. Similarly, Public Safety Commissions where 
formed, were generally unable to elicit compliance from the police in i t s  investigations. 
Citizen power (client power) 
Service delivery can also be improved by improving client power, that is, strengthening the direct 
linkage between citizens and service providers. In principle, such an approach can be more 
effective than focusing on efforts to make service providers more accountable to  policymakers 
and then making policymakers, in turn, more accountable to citizens. The LGOs and Police 
Orders call for  the creation o f  various bodies, such as Citizen Community Boards and Citizen 
Police Liaison Committees, which can serve to  improve this client power. The overall conclusion 
f rom the f ie ld visi ts i s  that it i s  too early to tell whether or not  devolution has had any impact o n  
client power for  the better or the worse. Whi le in general participatory mechanisms, such as 
Citizen Community Boards and School Management Committees (a pre-devolution initiative) 
have yet t o  achieve their full potential, there are numerous examples that suggest that innovative 
local leadership has had a positive impact on community mobil ization and in turn o n  service 
delivery. 
ASSESSMENT 
A Milestone Passed 
Devolution has brought a decisive break with the past in two important respects. First, local 
government n o w  has unambiguous constitutional protection. The agreed changes to  the 
constitution enacted on 30 December 2003, has placed the local government system, as 
prescribed by the provincial LGOs, in the sixth schedule o f  the 1973 Constitution and thus they 
cannot be altered, repealed or amended without the sanction o f  the President. Second, as a result 
o f  the LGO provisions, the reservation o f  33 percent o f  local council seats for  women in a l l  three 
levels o f  local government has proven the most strategic step ever undertaken by government 
toward women’s polit ical empowerment. Mos t  directly, despite the significant number o f  vacant 
seats, it has enabled over 30,000 women to enter into formal polit ics at the local government level 
(see Table 3). 
Press reports o f  a high level meeting held on 14 April 2004 involving the Prime Minister, Provincial Chief 
Ministers, the NRB and other federal and province officials indicate that significant changes will be introduced to 
the Police Order 2002 and that a new target date o f  December 2004 has been set for complete implementation of 
these new arrangements. Until these are officially confirmed and clarified, this report will make only passing 
reference to what has been reported, but will not speculate on their likely impact. 
I t  i s  noted that the DPSCs include non-elected members, but that these are appointed from a l i s t  provided by the 
nazimeen. 
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Province Women Women union Total union Women union 
nazimeen councilors council seats councilors as a 
percentage o f  total 
Devolution marks a decisive departure f rom the previous arrangements that became associated 
with persistent failures in service delivery. This study reaffirms the government’s v iew that 
devolution offers the best prospect for  improved service delivery and access by the poor to public 
entitlements, including not just health, drinlung water and education, but much needed 
improvements in policing and local justice. Whi le  i t i s  too soon for the proponents o f  devolution 
to  point  to an overall improvement in service delivery, the study does reveal significant 
achievements. For  instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that doctors and teachers are now more 
l ike ly  to be at their post and drugs are more often available in clinics. Citizens undoubtedly 
appreciate the improved access they have to  their polit ical representatives. Councilors, both 
directly and through new dispute resolution arrangements at local level, are n o w  seen to be 
responding to people’s needs and concerns. This change suggests that devolution may deliver o n  
i t s  larger polit ical objectives to  create a better match between what governments do and the 
public’s abil ity to ho ld them accountable for performance. This study i s  therefore modestly 
optimistic about the future o f  devolution. 
Punj ab 
Sindh 
NWFP 
Balochistan 
TOTAL 
The transformation underway through devolution nevertheless faces significant challenges. 
Detractors argue that in fact devolution has made matters worse. In some respects opponents o f  
devolution are in the same position as proponents; the evidence i s  indeed mixed. Yet, whi le 
morale has deteriorated for some c i v i l  servants, and law  and order i s  thought by many to  have 
worsened due to  a failure to reestablish oversight o f  the police, n o  one consulted during this study 
saw any merit in a return to the o ld  systems. Moreover, whi le many are concerned about the 
possible re-emergence o f  “private goods strategies” under which local politicians resume the 
time-honored practice o f  rewarding their constituents with private benefits at the expense o f  
public goods the study suggests this i s  not  in fact a fair representation o f  what i s  occurring. 
9 20,007 72,513 27.6 
2 5,878 22,974 25.5 
- 3,963 20,097 19.7 
- 2,374 10,878 21.8 
11 32,222 126,462 25.4 
The key variable in promoting successful devolution would appear to be the strength o f  the 
provincial incentives to intervene in the districts. The province has few incentives to intervene 
when: 
0 
0 
0 
The Chief  Minister andor  the main provincial coalition and the district nazim are f rom 
the same polit ical alliance. 
The Provincial Assembly constituencies within the district are f i l led with politicians f rom 
the same polit ical alliance as the nazim. 
The nazim has sufficient independent polit ical standing to resist provincial interventions. 
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When the province has few incentives to intervene, the nazim gains a fairly free hand to direct 
district staff and, despite the inevitable resource constraints, can achieve results. However, when 
the provincial incentives for intervention are high, nazimeen often finds their hands tied. 
The  Glass i s  M o r e  than H a l f  Full 
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the degree to which the incentives for the key actors are 
changing. Dark  cells indicate l itt le progress; lighter cells suggest more forward movement. 
Overall, the study finds that some appropriate new incentives have indeed been created and that 
they are undoubtedly promising as they directly address the institutional weaknesses that the 
failure o f  S A P  highlighted-weak inter-sectoral allocation o f  expenditures, l o w  emphasis on non- 
salary recurrent expenditures and few incentives for efficient utilization o f  these expenditures 
(World Bank: 2002a). 
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Devolution i s  undoubtedly a fact o f  l i fe  in Pakistan. It i s  implausible that there will be a major 
return to  a discredited set o f  institutional arrangements with a proven track record o f  failure. 
Equally, however, n o  certainty exists that devolution will n o w  be developed and entrenched to 
maximize i t s  potential returns. The risk i s  that by fail ing to deliver visible service delivery 
improvements in the short term, the devolution project wil l fa l l  short o f  completion and the 
present hybrid arrangements-part new, part old-will become permanent. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The government emphasized the need for a robust technical analysis o f  emerging lessons and 
feasible, practical recommendations that add value to a devolution process that i s  we l l  advanced. 
With the principle o f  practicality very clearly in mind, the study sets out an agenda for furthering 
devolution. It suggests both a strategy and some practical actions that will offer some rel ief  n o w  
to hard-pressed nazimeen and senior s ta f f  in local govemments who are attempting to  make the 
system work. 
Key elements of  the Suwested Strategy 
1. Seize the opportunity presented by the NFC Award to conduct a well-targeted, strategic 
information campaign using a variety of media-print and electronic media 
Note the successes. N o w  i s  the time for a public information campaign, setting out both 
progress and challenges. 
Look for opportunities that are offered to local governments fo l lowing the N F C  award and 
the improved financial position that this gives to  provinces. Ensure that citizens understand 
what this means for local govemment budgets and priorities. 
Take advantage of the opening up of the electronic media to the private sector-in particular 
local radio. 
2. Enforce the core principles-and accommodate local differences. NRB, whilst ensuring that 
the core principles o f  devolution are not diluted, should be willing to  al low some marginal local 
variations to meet the needs o f  different areas. 
Implementation requires new strategies that recognize Pakistan’s diversity while keeping 
devolution on track. The March  2000 announcement o f  the devolution plan and the 
subsequent August 2000 Local  Government Plan presented a broad strategic vision. Since 
then, the focus has been o n  the technical, fiscal and administrative aspects o f  implementation, 
superintended by the NRB. Underlying this emphasis has been concern to  ensure compliance 
with the local government and associated ordinances. N o w  might be the time to  reassert the 
broad goals o f  devolution. 
Allowing diversity wouldpromote wider support. The range o f  actors has grown 
exponentially. The basic structures for  devolution have been put in place. Some local 
diversity in implementation i s  n o w  feasible, and accepting marginal differences will avoid 
needless federal-provincial conflict. I t  would demonstrate that the federal govemment will 
ho ld fast to the core principles, whi le at the same time allowing local institutions to reflect 
local circumstances. 
3. Transmit national pol icy priorities more effectively. 
Move from an over-reliance on vertical programs. A large share o f  financing for health, 
education, water supply and sanitation i s  delivered in ways that systematically undermine 
local government accountability. Vertical programs represent attempts by higher tiers o f  
government to influence the pol icy and behavior o f  lower levels o f  govemments by direct 
intervention. Retaining some influence over sub-national pol icy i s  sensible. Federal and 
provincial governments need some levers to influence local performance to support national 
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objectives. In practice, though, vertical programs have a poor track record and they now risk 
damaging the credibility and nascent accountability o f  local governments. 
Create incentives to encourage local governments to buy into national priorities. Grants 
coordinated through the mechanism o f  N F C  and PFC and conditioned o n  outputs, outcomes 
or processes are an important part o f  a strategy through which to  promote nationwide 
standards and priorities. Conditional grants can interfere with the accountability o f  local 
representatives to their constituents. They must not be used excessively. But they do offer a 
pragmatic instrument through which federal and provincial governments can maintain a 
legitimate interest in the institutional reforms and service-delivery arrangements at the sub- 
national level. 
0 
Strategic Goals and Practical Actions 
The study identifies 7 strategic goals and practical steps that are achievable given the impressive 
progress made to date. The goals, along with the immediately operational, implementing 
measures, include: 
1. Achieve public consensus that completing devolution i s  inevitable 
2. Demonstrable federal government commitment to strengthened role o f  the provinces 
0 
Issue a White Paper o n  strategic options for adjusting legal, administrative, political, and 
fiscal arrangements in support o f  devolution. 
Timetable for the PRSP commitment on functional devolution with a review o f  the 
relative roles and responsibilities o f  Federal and Provincial levels in the context o f  
service delivery. 
0 Set preparations in mot ion for the 7th N F C  Award now. 
3, Demonstrable provincial government commitment to strengthening local government 
0 Complete reassignment o f  province-administered functions to  local governments. 
0 Incorporate the Lessons o f  Transition in Revisions to the LGOs. 
0 Major  Commitment to Capacity Development. 
0 Undertake provincial-local tax reassignments. 
4. Local  governments challenged to demonstrate that they meri t  confidence. 
0 Reduce development throw forward. 
0 Increase coverage o f  user charges. 
0 Strengthen inter-jurisdiction planning and coordination. 
0 Local  governments to regulate and engage with private sector service providers. 
5, Judicious Selection f rom a M e n u  o f  Conditional Grants in PFCNFC Transfer Systems 
0 Use conditional grants-cautiously. 
0 
0 
6. H o l d  local governments to account 
0 
0 
7. Clarify the separation o f  executive and judicial powers. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Review existing vertical programs and redesign proposals. 
Broaden available array o f  social indicator data and capture district data. 
Districts employ their own staff. 
Districts maintain their own accounts. 
Restructure reporting obligations between the District Police Officer and the District 
Nazim . 
Assign non-adjudicatory powers to the local government executive. 
Train judicial magistrates in new jurisdictions under criminal and local laws. 
Provide High Court protection for  judges interdicting unlawful  action by officials. 
Establish separate c i v i l  and criminal courts, and appoint Senior Judicial Magistrates in 
each district 
Establish independent prosecution service at district level. 
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Tab le  7 suggests the sequence with w h i c h  these steps might b e  init iated. 
~ 
FY05 
* Issue a W h i t e  Paper on strategic options for 
adjusting legal, administrative, political and 
fiscal arrangements in support o f  devolution.' 
Establish High Level Expert Group on federal- 
provincial tax reassignment (including possible 
debt-for-performance swaps). 
PFC announcements o f  framework under which 
I 8 2 E 
3 
ir 
I Table 7: Timetable of Proposed Key Actions I 
FY06 
Review of the Rules o f  
FY07 
the provincial govemments might use 
conditional grants, selectively, within the PFC 
awards, to achieve overarching policy goals. 
Develop and promulgate local government 
public-private partnership ru les  (as under LGO 
Schedule 5, Part A). 
Provide districts with full APT authority over all 
staff at grades 19 and below. 
Make three major policy announcements: 
a) Proposed reassignment o f  province- 
administered functions to local governments 
complete. Might reasonably include: 
- TMA debt-for-performance swaps 
- Transfer of PHED staff and budgets to the 
b) Formal reviews of provincial-local tax 
reassignment, to report within 2 years. 
c) Major commitment to capacity 
development. 
TMAs 
Reduce development throw-forward. 
Increase coverage of user charges. 
Empower the Mushawarat Committees to 
provide a platform for district-wide, medium- 
t e r m  planning. 
Train judicial magistrates in new jurisdictions 
under criminal and local laws 
1. Such a White Paper might reasonably include: 
Business, the constitution o f  
the Local Government 
Commission and the facilities 
and authorities provided to the 
local government Monitoring 
Committees. 
Prepare and notify the Rules of 
Business detailing the 
reporting obligations between 
the Dis t r ic t  Police Officer and 
the District Nuzim. 
powers and supervision of 
pretrial detention' to the local 
government executive. 
Establish the Independent 
Prosecution Service and ensure 
i t s  extension to the district 
level. 
, 
Assign non-adjudicatory 
Enhance High Court protection Establish separate 
for subordinate judges criminal and civil 
interdicting unlawful action by courts established 
officials. at district level 
and appoint 
Senior Judicial 
Magistrates in 
each district 
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SUPPORTING MATERIAL 
The appendixes to this volume set out details o f  the fiscal dataset that was prepared for the study, 
and describe three “assessment frameworks” that were developed. These frameworks (for 
assessing: institutional changes within local government; the location o f  the employer function; 
and the “verticalness” o f  conditional grants) could provide the basis for extended studies and for 
more regional comparisons. 
This assessment and recommendations i s  accompanied by two other volumes: 
Annex I-Recent History has two parts. The f i rst  part sets out the detailed history o f  the initiative, 
and the political, fiscal, and administrative changes that have been made to date. It then provides 
a detailed assessment o f  the impact o f  these institutional changes o n  the key actors, particularly 
the nazimeen and senior staff o f  the districts and the TMAs. 
Annex 2-Technical Considerations provides a more in-depth review o f  a series o f  contentious 
topics that contribute to the intensity o f  the debates o n  devolution. I t  examines: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Options for reducing the throw-forward o f  ongoing ADP Schemes in devolution 
Developments and limitations in monitoring data. 
Provincial-local fiscal transfers including a review o f  the weightings used in PFC formulae. 
An examination o f  the vertical fiscal imbalances, and the implications f rom a possible change 
in the NFC award. 
Reforming access to justice under devolution. 
K e y  considerations in administrative decentralization. 
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1. Service Delivery and Devolution 
Indicators 
SERVICE-DELIVERY IMPROVEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL 
The track record o f  social sector service delivery in Pakistan i s  so poor that it i s  tempting to assert 
Actual 
values for 
Pakistan 
(2001/02)a 
that almost any reform in governance 
arrangements would produce better 
results. M a n y  reports, including the 
government’s PRSP, point out that 
Palustan’s social indicators lag behind 
those o f  countries with comparable 
per capita incomes. According to one 
estimate, Pakistan’s gross female 
primary enrollment rate i s  33 
percentage points below and i t s  infant 
mortality rate 20 per thousand above 
that o f  countries with the same per 
capita income (see Table 8). 
Predicted 
values for 
countries 
w i th  
similar 
incomes 
(2002)b 
3.8 
29 
35 
98 
94 
62 
91 
As devolution began, Palustan faced a 
double dilemma o f  long standing. I t s  
public institutions for social service 
delivery were demonstrably failing, 
and the evidence suggested that 
neither economic growth nor 
increased public expenditures were 
l ikely to have significant remedial 
impact. Cross-country comparisons 
illustrate that, in Palustan, growth i s  
associated with fewer improvements 
in key health and education outcomes 
Difference 
between 
actual and 
predicted 
0.7 
20 
27 
-26 
-33 
20 
14 
Table 8: Pakistan’s Social Indicators in International 
Perspective 
idult illiteracy‘ 
idult illiteracy-female 
boss primary enrollment 
koss primary enroll- 
emale 
nfant mortality rate 
Jnder-5 mortalityd 
49.5 
62 
72 
61 
82 
105 
:ertilitv I 4.5 
a. PIHS 2001102, unless otherwise indicated. 
b. The predicted values column i s  derived from a cross-country 
regression aimed at explaining the indicator in question by per capita 
GDP (PPP). Data are from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank). 
c. PRSP, based on 1998 Population Census. 
d. Ministry o f  Health. 
than in comparable developing countries. For example, the female-male literacy gap increased in 
Palustan with growth whi le it declined in a sample o f  comparator countries (Figure 2); infant 
mortality declined by 56 percent in the comparator counties, compared to  only 27 percent in 
Palustan (Figure 3).’ 
’ The comparator countries are 22 low- and middle-income countries that on average had the same growth rate as 
Pakistan. I t  should be noted that these are 30-year growth averages and may mask modest year-to-year progress at 
the country level. 
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Figure 2: Growth and Female-male Literacy Gap 
in Pakistan and Comparison Sample, 1970-2000 
Figure 3: Growth and Infant Mortality in 
Pakistan and Comparison Sample, 1970-2000 
1 0 -  
0 8 -  
0 8 -  
0.4 - 
0 2  4 1  
0 0 4  
1970 1985 2000 
1 - t  Comparator  countries + Pakistan 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
" "  
1970 1985 2000 
+Comparator countries +Pakistan 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
The link between increased funding and better education or health indicators i s  equally weak. The 
Social Act ion Program has to date been the Government o f  Palustan's most concerted effort at 
improving i t s  pro-poor social expenditures. During the two phases o f  the program ( S A P  Project 1, 
1993/94-96/97, and S A P  Project 2 1997/98-99/00), a total o f  approximately $9 b i l l ion was spent, 
with 80 percent being contributed by the government. The program aimed at increasing the 
physical availability and improving the quality and efficiency o f  services, especially for the poor 
and for women, in elementary education, basic health care, fami ly planning and rural  water 
supply and sanitation. Outcomes were disappointing, particularly in education, which received 
roughly two-thirds o f  this allocation (Table 9) (Easterly: 2003; Operations Evaluation 
Department: 2002). Overall net enrollment rates declined f rom 46 percent in 1991/92 to 42 
percent by 2001/02, while net enrollments in rural  areas-a S A P  focus-fell f rom 41  percent in 
1991-92 to 38 percent in 2001/02 (PIHS data). There was however, some provincial variation 
around this declining national trend-the situation in Sindh, and especially Balochistan, was 
particularly disturbing, while NWFP showed some moderate progress. 
There was similarly l i tt le progress in rural water supply and sanitation. The percentage o f  
households with access to indoor piped drinlung water, in fact, declined slightly f rom 25 percent 
in 1995/96 to 22 percent in 2001/02. There were however, some positive achievements in health 
as indicated by a significant decline in the infant mortality rate (mortality rate among infants 
under age 1) and incidence o f  diarrhea (a significant cause o f  infant death) and modest 
improvement in prenatal care as measured by the immunization rate o f  children f rom 12 to 23 
months o f  age. 
20 
The roots o f  S A P ’ S  failure are o f  
course complex and have been 
wel l  explored.* On the one hand, 
i t may be that S A P  was 
overwhelmed by the deteriorating 
macroeconomic position that 
squeezed public expenditures in 
the social sectors-for example, 
public expenditures in education 
declined from 2.1 percent o f  GDP 
in 199 1/92 to 1.7 percent by 
1998/99 (World Bank: 2003a). 
On the other hand, however, the 
program failed to improve the 
composition o f  public 
expenditures, and non-salary 
inputs failed to keep pace with 
development expenditures, 
resulting in poor maintenance o f  
new infrastructure. Most  
failed to  adequately prioritize institutional reform and did not tackle the thorny issues related to 
the incentives for staff to improve outcomes either at the policymalung level or at the service- 
provider level.’ 
Table 9: Key Indicators in SAP Focus Areas 
a. Based on record and recall. 
b. Percentage o f  households wi th access to  indoor piped drinking water. 
importantly though, the Source: PIHS, various years. 
How CAN DEVOLUTION ASSIST IN SERVICE-DELIVERY IMPROVEMENTS? 
A Framework 
As noted, the existing institutional arrangements for social sector service delivery in Palustan 
deliver ineffective services and neither growth nor  additional investment expenditures offer a 
ready cure. Devolution offers a new set o f  institutional arrangements that, arguably, can produce 
effective solutions. I t  i s  important however, to emphasize that government po l icy  statements did 
not  regard service delivery and responsiveness as ends in themselves. In some respects, in fact, 
the architects o f  pol icy saw the pitfalls o f  measuring the success or failure o f  devolution by a 
narrow emphasis on efficient service delivery. Pakistan’s devolution initiative has been designed 
with three broad and inter-related objectives in mind: 
0 
0 
T o  inject new blood into a polit ical system considered to  be the domain o f  historically 
entrenched interests; 
T o  provide positive measures enabling marginalized citizens-women, workers, 
peasants-to access formal politics; and 
(World Bank: 2002a) notes that one largely ignored achievement o f  the SAP was that i t  placed social development 
center stage among both govemment and citizens. Thus it undoubtedly contributed to the polit ical prioritization o f  
poverty reduction approaches and undoubtedly contributed to the view among senior polit ical leaders that i t  i s  far 
more efficient in the short te rm to allocate the new fiscal space to debt retirement than increasing social service 
spending. 
The magnitude o f  this problem o f  unresponsive staff can be gauged by the fact that the number o f  complaints filed 
against key govemment departments more than tripled between 1985 and 1998 and that the proportion o f  
complaints that concern arbitrary decisions has r isen very significantly (Asian Development Bank: 1999). 
Complaints are categorized as delay, inattention, neglect, arbitrary decisions and corruption. 
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0 T o  introduce a measure o f  stability into a turbulent polit ical scene by creating a stronger 
l ine o f  accountability between new politicians and local electorates. 
Improvements in service delivery were one o f  several technical objectives, but as the overarching 
aims o f  devolution were political, it can not be said to stand or fa l l  on the basis o f  i t s  impact on 
service delivery. 
The changes introduced by devolution were summarized in Table 2 above. Full details are 
provided in the second volume (Annex I-Recent History). Given the multitude o f  political, 
administrative, and fiscal changes, it i s  important to try to put into perspective what these might 
imply for service delivery. 
Devolution changes the accountability relationships and the relative importance o f  various 
actors-most notably politicians and policymakers-associated with service delivery, as cast by 
the 2004 Wor ld  Development Report (World Bank: 2 0 0 3 ~ ) . ’ ~  The study focuses on the capacity 
and incentives faced by nazimeen for making services work at the district and TMA level. 
Whether the incentives really will in turn lead to better services in health, education, 
infrastructure, and access to  justice across local governments remains an empirical question. 
Cross-national studies find n o  clear evidence that decentralization has l ed  to better governance 
and improved service delivery (Azfar: 2002; Blair: 2000; Smoke: 2001).” 
Figure 1 summarized these assumptions in a simplified framework for  thinking about the prospect 
for  making services work under Pahstan’s devolution, centered o n  the nazimeen and their senior 
staff. 
The incentives and capacity to make services work under devolution can be grouped under two 
broad headings. 
First, there i s  the set o f  incentives that might make nazimeen want to see service delivery 
improvements for citizens at reasonable cost. As will be seen, in a context o f  indirect elections for 
nazimeen and complex intergovemmental relationships and polit ical career paths, i t i s  far f rom 
self-evident that service delivery improvements for  the poor will be a pr ior i ty for them. Nuzimeen 
must be influenced by citizen power, in the form of “voice, ”” so that they have an incentive to 
direct those providers to achieve service delivery improvements (although as Figure 1 illustrates, 
this assumes that they are in a position to direct the behavior o f  the staff that provide the 
services-motivated nazimeen with n o  abil ity to direct their front l ine staff will not  be able to  
improve services.). Voice must be accompanied by provincial efficiency incentives, so that 
service-delivery improvements are not  simply obtained through increased spending. 
lo The 2004 World Development Report (World Bank: 2003c) presents an accountability framework focused on 
service delivery. At its simplest, the WDR sets out an “accountability triangle,” where the nodes represent actors 
(citizens, politicians-policymakers, and service providers4epartments) and the sides represent accountability 
relationships (voice, compact-management, client-power). T h e  approach in this paper takes these principal-agent 
relationships as given, and does not seek to re-run the arguments that are we l l  set out in the World Development 
Report. The  approach here essentially converts these relationships into qualitative checklists or sets of incentives. 
Some studies are more sanguine about the impact o f  local govemments. For  example, in Bol iv ia i t  appears that 
devolution has resulted in changes in investment patterns in the country, putting a greater focus on education and 
water and sanitation, as wel l  as to a more geographically equitable distribution o f  public expenditure (Faguet: 
2001). 
“Voice i s  the relationship o f  accountability between citizens and politicians, the range o f  measures through which 
citizens express their preferences and influence politicians” (World Bank 2003). 
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Second, there are the incentives on those who provide the services-for example, the staff o f  
schools and clinics-so that they also want to  see improvements. This motivation can be provided 
through managerial power, ensuring that the nazimeen and senior staff have authority over the 
front l ine workers or, again, through citizen power (this time in the form o f  “clientpower”) 
providing potential service recipients with some direct means to have an impact o n  the conduct o f  
service providers. 
Unpacking the Incentives 
Examining the incentives that devolution might provide for nazimeen and senior staff, then the 
provincial efficiency incentives derive f i o m  the structure o f  the revenue base, including transfers 
and own source revenues available to meet the new local expenditure responsibilities. If well 
structured, these fiscal arrangements promote the efficient use o f  resources in meeting local 
preferences. Since nazimeen will typically face expenditure demands that exceed available 
resources, budgetary certainty in the form o f  predictable resource flows and a hard budget 
constraint, coupled with adequate autonomy in resource allocation, will encourage them to use 
public resources responsibly and efficiently. With these arrangements in place, nazimeen will 
more l ike ly  attempt to make the best trade-offs, for  example, in allocations between sectors, 
between recurrent wage and development expenditures, and attaining value for money (for 
example, through effective procurement arrangements). As i s  explored in more detail in the 
second volume (Annex I-Recent Histoly), some argue that own source revenues automatically 
contain more incentives for efficient use than transfers, as local taxpayers are more l ikely to 
demand results. 
Citizens would be able to make their demands for better services heard through the voice 
channel, the most obvious form o f  which i s  elections. However, voting may be based o n  other 
criteria than service delivery, as owing to years o f  bitter experience voters may not  see 
commitments o n  the part o f  politicians to provide broad-based public goods over time as credible. 
Hence, voters and politicians may emphasize directly visible and narrowly targeted projects such 
as school infrastructure. These schools may not  be staffed or maintained, but voters have come to  
k n o w  that they cannot ho ld politicians to their promises beyond the short term. 
Voice i s  l ike ly  to  be stronger, with councilors motivated to listen to  citizens, if there i s  public 
assignment o f  credit or blame and i f there are obstacles to councilors providing private goods 
targeted at a few influentials rather than public ones which benefit many. As an influence o n  
councilors, voice must compete with the incentives that the provinces can provide for nazimeen to 
serve their polit ical interests. That “pull” f i o m  the provinces i s  l ike ly  lessened when the 
councilors have independent polit ical legitimacy and when provinces themselves have fewer 
incentives to intervene at district level. 
The local governments, as represented by the nazimeen, in turn engage with service delivery 
providers at the local level (for example, schools and contractors) through managerial power, 
their abil ity to require service providers to adhere to particular standards o f  behavior and service. 
Again, as i s  explored in more detail in the second volume (Annex I-Recent Histoly), managerial 
power i s  strengthened if the staff that work  in the district are employed by the district-with hire 
and fire authority available to local managers, subject to suitable safeguards. Recognizing that 
this i s  unlikely to be the case for senior staff, nazimeen need distinctive authority over their 
behavior including input into their performance evaluations, and a credible threat to transfer them 
if the relationship i s  not  productive. Managerial power i s  strengthened by the extemal oversight 
provided by bodies such as Accounts Committees, Monitor ing Committees and District Public 
Safety Commissions. It also assumes that staff with appropriate sk i l ls  are available in sufficient 
numbers and that those staff have sufficient technical sanction powers to undertake their tasks. 
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A more direct route o f  accountability, client power, directly connects citizens with service 
provides, such as schools. Client power includes more formal mechanisms as functioning 
agencies that assist in dispute resolution concerning service delivery (Departmental Grievances 
Redressal and Complaint Cells and Citizen Police Liaison Committees) and bodies which provide 
direct citizen inputs into the management o f  facilities (Citizen Community Boards and School 
Management Committees). 
Adequate deployment o f  staff 
Citizen dispute resolution 
Community management o f  
facilities 
Although this i s  seemingly a more direct route o f  accountability, as the Wor ld  Development 
Report underscores, there may be a variety o f  reasons why client power might be insufficient by 
itself. Citizens may find particular services hard to monitor. What constitutes good health care 
may be diff icult to assess, and require other forms o f  accountability relationships (for example, 
oversight f rom health authorities or professional associations). 
Insaaf committees 
Adequate numbers and ski l ls 
Adequate technical sanction powers 
Departmental Grievances Redressal and Complaint 
Cells 
Citizen Police Liaison Committees 
Citizen Community Boards 
School Management Committees 
Table 10 summarizes the variables that are fundamental to these incentives being put in place. 
Table 10: Key Incentives in the Devolved Structures 
citizens 
Staff working in the district are 
employed by  the district 
Nazimeen authority 
staff 
over senior 
Extemal oversight 
DCO 
Credible threat to transfer the DCO 
Nazim ’s input into the performance evaluation for the 
DPO 
District policing plans approved by  the DPSC 
Accounts Committees 
Monitoring Committees 
District Public Safety Commissions 
Village and Neighborhood Councils 
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As will be seen, a number o f  crosscutting devolution changes have transformed these various 
incentives that are l ikely to affect service delivery. However, the study findings suggest that while 
many o f  the elements for better decentralized service delivery are in place, significant challenges 
for reform remains. Local  governments have been provided with additional resources under the 
PFC awards and their own revenue bases. These resource flows are proving relatively predictable, 
but allocations across local governments may be insufficient and inadequately distributed across 
local governments given new expenditure assignments, and in many cases setting poor incentives 
for  own source revenue mobilizations. 
Some o f  the biggest challenges remain in the area o f  administrative decentralization. The 
relationships between nazimeen and core senior staff (for example, DCOs) remain complicated, 
as these staff are s t i l l  largely beholden to the province. 
Various reforms to enhance citizen power have yet to prove themselves. Citizens were able to 
exert voice through the election o f  their UC representatives, but nazimeen at the district and TMA 
level remain indirectly accountable through the system o f  local councils. The Citizen Community 
Boards have the potential o f  enhancing voice through direct involvement in the planning and 
implementation o f  development funds, but are confronting many teething problems. Reforms in 
school management committees have the potential to enhance client power. 
In the justicial sector, a number o f  changes in accountability relationships appear to be both 
strengthening and weakening the prospects o f  service delivery in terms o f  security and access to 
justice, merit ing special treatment. 
Assessing the Impact  o f  Devolution on Service Delivery 
If, o n  balance, these changing incentives are in fact having some impact o n  service delivery, then, 
in principle, improvements could be measured directly. However, there are two  difficulties. First, 
devolution i s  recent and i t  would be premature to attribute any change in social-sector outcomes 
to new arrangements o n  service delivery. Second, in Pakistan there i s  n o  consensus on which data 
sources to use to  measure intermediate and outcome indicators, and it would be dangerous to 
judge the utility o f  devolution on the basis o f  any apparent trends in these indicators. 
Furthermore, there i s  n o  obvious relationship in the data between intermediate indicators that can 
be impacted by policies-such as percentages o f  schools with facilities l ike toilets and 
electricity-and outcomes. 
25 
Figure 4: Interpreting Education Data 
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This problem o f  data can be seen in 
the discrepancies in education-and- 
health intermediate and outcome 
indicators. In education, the two  
major sources for data are the 
Palustan Integrated Household 
Survey (PIHS) and the Ministry o f  
Education (MoE). Whi le  the P M S  i s  
a household survey, the Ministry o f  
Education constructs enrollment 
numbers f rom (a) the Educational 
Management Information System 
(EMIS), which gives data only o n  
enrollment in government 
educational institutions and (b) 
estimates o f  private enrollment, 
based o n  a census o f  private schools 
conducted by the Federal Bureau o f  
Statistics (FBS) in 1999-2000 and 
estimates o f  enrollment in 
madrassahs. 
Given these different modes o f  
collection, it i s  not  surprising that 
the two sources produce very 
different results. Overall, the PIHS 
data o n  enrollments are considerably 
below that o f  the Ministry o f  
Education-the PIHS shows net 
primary enrollment to be 42 percent 
as compared to 66 percent for the 
M o E  (Figure 4). These 
discrepancies have created such 
controversy that the government has 
called into question the methodology used in the PIHS.’3 
In health, at the national level, the EPI M I S  (management information system) and the PIHS, the 
two  main sources for the state o f  immunization coverage, both show a recent improvement, but 
starting f rom very different bases (Figure 5). Data f rom the EPI M I S  shows that immunization 
coverage in children for a number o f  diseases was declining until very recently Fo r  example, DPT 
3 immunization declined from 74 percent nationally in 2000 to 69 percent in 2002, before 
returning to 74 percent by September o f  2003. PIHS data on the other hand, shows a much lower 
percentage o f  children immunized but also suggests a rising trend between the last two sample 
years. 
l3 As a result o f  these controversies, the release o f  the 2001-02 report was delayed, and when i t  was released it 
included an “Explanatory Note” warning the reader that specific sections o f  the report were wrong, thus calling 
into question the accuracy of the entire report as wel l  as the previous PIHS rounds. While non-sampling errors are 
a problem in the PIHS, the M o E  data are generally believed to be more problematic as the mode o f  collection o f  
the M I S  creates many sources for errors, and the estimates o f  enrollment in private schools and madrassahs are 
problematic. In general, EMIS i s  best suited for collecting important administrative information l ike salaries, 
transfers and retention o f  teachers, for example, and not for tracking outcomes and performance indicators. 
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2. Assessment 
KEY FIND~NGS 
This study proceeds from a basic understanding that two preconditions produce improvements in 
service delivery. First i s  the requirement that the incentives motivating nazimeen make them want 
to see such improvements and, as a corollary, that they want to see these achieved-at least in 
part-by the more efficient use o f  existing resources. The second precondition i s  that those who 
provide the services- for example, the staff o f  schools and clinics-must also want to see 
improvements. Their motivation i s  a response to managerial power-ensur ing that the nazimeen 
and senior staff have authority over the front l ine workers+r, again, to citizen power that gives 
potential service recipients some direct means to guide the conduct o f  service providers. Figure 1 
earlier set out the assumed chain o f  connections between the new incentives and the l ikelihood o f  
improved services. This section synthesizes the discussion o f  these changed incentives set out in 
detail in the second volume o f  this report (Annex 2-Recent Histoly). 
New Incentives for Nazimeen and Senior Staff 
Provincial efficiency incentives 
The study assumes that devolution would be providing District and Tehsil Nazimeen with greater 
incentives for efficiency in fiscal management i f  it achieved positive movement in three key  
categories: 
0 Budgetary certainty-the degree to which they must l ive within hard constraints and the 
predictability o f  the budgetary transfers that they depend on; 
0 Autonomy in preparing the budget-specifically the development, the non-salary recurrent 
and the salary budgets; 
0 Incentives for local revenue-raising-the buoyancy and potency o f  taxes assigned, the clarity 
o f  revenue assignments and other incentives for  revenue raising. 
On budgetary certainty, as Table 11 shows, most funding for local government i s  in effect 
negotiated rather than formula-based. All negotiated revenues provide opportunities for 
gamesmanship, basing current pol icy decisions o n  their l ikely impact o n  future resource transfers, 
rather than on their merits. The proportions o f  the Provincial Consolidated Fund that ultimately 
are transferred on formula basis are trivial (less than 8 percent in al l  provinces). However, the 
more significant measure i s  the proportion o f  transfers that are, or should be, transferred to local 
government that are transferred o n  a formula basis. I t  i s  important t o  note that transfer has a 
precise meaning and refers to funds that are non-lapsing and within the re-appropriation authority 
o f  the district or TMA. On this basis, the formula-based proportion o f  de facto transfers (transfers 
made in practice) ranges from 71 percent (NWFP) to  17 percent Punjab. However, again this i s  a 
somewhat misleading figure, as NWFP and Sindh do not, formally, transfer funds for salaries as 
these remain in Account 1. If the proportion i s  taken from de jure transfers-the transfers 
mandated by the LGOs-then a l l  provinces come in at less than 25 percent. 
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Table 11: Proport ions of Total Funding Transferred to Loca l  Governments on  a Formula Basis 
(Rs. million) 
es (excluding own Formula based transfers 
Note Formula-based transfers are shaded. 
a. For Sindh and NWFP, GST was paid out to districts, TMAs and UAs first to meet baseline shares and then additional 
funds were distributed to new units. Punjab paid GST to TMAs and UAs alone, first to meet baseline shares and then 
on population basis to new units. In Balochistan GST was distributed on formula basis and was used for financing local 
development as well. No transfers for capital budget were made otherwise. 
b. De facto transfers are defined as payments from provinces to local government that are made to the account o f  the 
district or the TMA-that is, they are genuine transfers as they are non-lapsing and within the re-appropriation 
authonty o f  the district or TMA. In case of Sindh the de facto transfers include development funds, although they were 
made available through Account I, because budgetary autonomy was given to LGs. 
c. De jure transfers are those that are mandated by the LGO. For NWFP and Sindh, de jure transfers are considerably 
larger than de facto as salaries should be transferred via Account I V  as specified in the LGO, but in reality are not 
d Punjab transferred Rs. 50,859 in revenues to distncts as lump sums without specifying salary, non-salary and 
development allocations. Non-salary and development allocations were formula-based district shares while the salary 
transfers were in accordance with histoncal baseline, although in some cases negotiated increases were given. 
e No disaggregation i s  possible from the budget data, however, the DSD2 shows that Rs. 42,600 were booked as salary 
and non-salary expenditure in FY 2003 in the 34 districts and hence the development expenditures can be calculated. 
Source DSD2, based on 2002103 revised budget estimates. 
W h i l e  these transfers are negotiated, the data also reveals that there i s  considerable predictability 
in the transfers at the district level, with in most cases districts receiving only slightly less than 
what was budgeted. 
The district studies also revealed that local governments have l imi ted autonomy in preparing their 
budgets. Vertical programs are the main constraint o n  district and TMA autonomy in preparing 
the development budget, with often the volume o f  funds channeled through vertical programs 
dwarfing the district's own ADP for particular sectors.14 In the study districts, more than ha l f  o f  
the ADP i s  under the effective control o f  the federal and provincial agencies controlling the 
vertical programs (Table 12). This practice undermines the sovereignty o f  local governments in 
planning the development o f  their districts according to  their own priorities. 
l4 See Table 19 below for a summary o f  the institutional impact of vertical programs. 
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Table 12: Vertical Programs as a Percentage o f  the District ADP 
District 
Ki l l a  Saifullah 
Karachi 
Bannu 
Bahawalpur 
Faisalabad 
Khairpur 
2001-02 2002-03 
Total  VP Recurrent District Total  VP 
Recurrent District Outlay VP as YO Budget ADP Outlay VP as YO 
Budget (Rs.) ADP (Rs.) (Rs.) of  ADP (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) o f A D P  
- - 167.86 71.79 23.42 32.60 202.42 - 
7275.90 - - - - - 11631.19 - 
520.30 131.90 51.12 38.80 586.94 189.73 - - 
1368.92 239.01 177.78 74.40 1486.22 462.89 281.67 60.90 
1637.95 293.52 145.86 49.70 1637.95 192.00 - - 
2630.75 164.93 150.00 90.90 2630.75 710.00 358.70 50.50 
Local  governments also have l imi ted freedom in preparing the salary budget. Neither local nor 
provincial governments are, in practice, able to determine pay scales, which are set at the federal 
level. In addition, in Sindh and NWFP, salaries are transferred through provincial Account I 
rather than the district-controlled Account IV. The districts must seek approval f rom the province 
for the release o f  the funds from Account I for their salary payments. Thus, the salaries 
effectively are s t i l l  paid f rom the provincial budget. 
Local  governments are hugely dependent o n  intergovernmental fiscal transfers as taxes assigned 
to local governments lack sufficient revenue potential. This degree o f  vertical imbalance can lead 
to inefficiencies in both the levels and quality o f  public expenditure-specifically, i t  creates 
incentives for local governments to  overspend as well as reduces the incentives to spend these 
resources efficiently. T h e  logic in both cases i s  that intergovernmental transfers lower the costs to 
local residents o f  getting services. Arguably, the disconnect between expenditure and taxation 
encourages “free-riding,” as wel l  as reducing the incentives to monitor public expenditures, as 
resources are collected from distant taxpayers not  likely to  be using the services produced by the 
local government. 
Thus it i s  at least arguable that local revenues contain intrinsic incentives for efficiency, as local 
taxpayers might be more vigilant than distant ones and so efforts to improve own source revenues 
can imply incentives for efficiency. Incentives for  local revenue effort are l inked to  the buoyancy 
and potency o f  taxes assigned to local government, and the clarity o f  such assignments. Ef fort  
will be deterred if there i s  n o  credible connection to l ikely revenue results and if it i s  not  evident 
which level o f  government i s  to benefit f r om which tax. Whi le  districts have been given rights to 
raise additional revenues, their tax base i s  weak, and some district taxes and user charges are very 
diff icult to impose in practice. In the six study districts, for  example, for 2003/04 own source tax 
revenues ranged from 0 percent t o  8 percent o f  total revenues. Therefore, a large tax effort brings 
only modest results in total revenue. 
In addition, although the district and TMA taxes are clearly assigned in theory, administrative 
confusions in the collection arrangements blur the assignments in practice, further reducing 
incentives to increase collections. Administrative complexity i s  most clearly evident in the case o f  
property tax (UIPT). In Sindh, for example, where the province has control over various aspects 
o f  tax policy, collection i s  meant to  be the responsibility o f  the district, whi le TMAs determine 
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rating areas. This sharing o f  responsibility i s  l ikely to reduce the potential for a revenue source 
that could make up a significant proportion o f  the fiscal gap in the TMA budgets. 
Citizen Power (Voice) 
This study argues that there are two necessary conditions for the local polit ical leadership to have 
incentives for service delivery improvements. First, local councilors themselves must have an 
interest in serving the needs o f  their constituents and in particular the poor. Second, since the 
relationship between nuzimeen and councilors i s  a critical intermediate step in the linkage to 
citizens, nuzimeen must find the pull f rom the councilors more demanding than the pull f rom 
other polit ical powerbrokers, particularly the provincial governments. 
On the f i rs t  point, the study notes that while it i s  probably true that citizens value education and 
health services, i t  i s  also l ikely that voters believe politicians’ claims to deliver patronage and 
infi-astructure schemes are more credible than promises to improve health and education. In the 
context o f  devolution, jurisdictional overlap makes it particularly diff icult for  politicians to seek 
credit for improved services. When multiple levels o f  government are involved in delivering the 
same services, the public i s  unable to assign credit or blame effectively for that particular service 
to a particular politician. The overlap thus weakens incentives to perform we l l  o n  service delivery 
and encourages politicians to target services to their core supporters. Jurisdictional overlap i s  
particularly an issue in the education and health sectors, as federal and provincial vertical 
programs remain principal tools in promoting national pol icy priorities and represent a significant 
proportion o f  local-government expenditures o n  service delivery. 
The anecdotal evidence from the study districts also suggests the strong incentives working on 
councilors to focus on private goods. In a l l  the districts visited, The District and Tehsil Councils 
had reserved significant portions o f  their development budgets to be distributed equally among 
their respective councilors. The councilors in turn have used these allocations mostly for  
neighborhood-specific schemes, such as water and sewerage network extensions. l5 This focus on 
union-specific development has meant that union nuzimeen are not paying adequate attention to 
their other important role as district council members. The important council budget sessions 
were largely perfunctory, with budgets being passed in a matter o f  minutes, suggesting that 
district-wide issues had not  received the attention that they deserve. Monitor ing Committees, 
whi le formed, are generally not  functional, in part because councilors lack capacity and generally 
deal with a hs t ra t i ng l y  non-responsive bureaucracy, but also because councilors’ priorities l ie  
elsewhere, and their attention i s  focused o n  their particular constituency. 
I 
While these incentives to focus on private goods are strong, the study did not  find that devolution 
had exacerbated this problem. For  example, the evidence in Figure 6 shows n o  obvious reduction 
in operations and maintenance expenditures between the allocations in 2003/04, the f i rs t  year 
local governments prepared their own budgets, and that o f  earlier years. The argument in favor o f  
continued earmarlung-that non-salary budgets will be raided to finance new, greenfield 
projects-therefore does not appear justified. Similarly, the data suggests that there has not been a 
significant shift f rom large to small development schemes, or that councilors are abandoning 
existing schemes to gain polit ical glory by starting new ones. 
l5 As was noted earlier, this paper refers to private goods to include both pure private goods (that is, individual- 
specific) as well as narrow public goods (for example, locality-specific projects). Local infrastructure projects 
often encompass both- that is, only the local community benefits, and the contractors for the projects reap the 
private rewards. 
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Figure 6: Non-salary as a Percentage of  Total Expenditure (districts) 
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Source: ADB/DfID/WB D S D  Dataset 2-fiom 2001/02,2002/03 revised estimates and 2003104 budget estimates. 
On the second point, the study found that although elected by them, nazimeen have few 
incentives to take notice o f  the district or TMA councilors. They feel some need to maintain their 
support, as indicated by the equal allocation o f  development funds to each councilor. However, i t 
i s  striking that n o  district nazim faced effective opposition in any o f  the districts visited, in large 
part because the electoral college i s  often more dependent o n  the nazimeen than vice versa. 
On the other hand, a clear connection that emerges f rom the district visi ts i s  the importance o f  the 
polit ical relationship between the nazim and the ruling provincial polit ical coalition. Effectively, 
this relationship determines the extent o f  polit ical control that the District Nazim can exercise 
within local government as wel l  as the freedom local policymakers have to  act to meet their 
constituents’ demands. In two o f  the six districts visited-Bahawalpur and Faisalabad-the 
district nazim i s  allied to the Chief  Minister and the ruling provincial polit ical coalition, while in 
the other four the district nazim i s  in opposition. This relationship has a significant impact o n  the 
f l ow  o f  funds between the province and local governments, o n  the implementation o f  local 
development schemes and on the manipulation o f  appointments and transfers o f  personnel. 
New Incentives for the Service Providers 
For service delivery to improve, the service providers-and not  just their elected superiors-must 
want to see improvements. This motivation i s  provided either by ensuring that the service 
providers have an incentive to listen to the policymakers-managerial p o w e r - o r  by providing 
potential service recipients with some direct means to have an impact on the conduct o f  service 
providers-cl ient  power in the terminology o f  the W o r l d  Development Report (World Bank: 
2003~) .  
Managerial power over service providers 
In reviewing the changed incentives for front l ine staff and other service providers to “listen to  
nazimeen,” the study examines three key dimensions: 
0 
0 
0 
The extent to which staff working in the district are employed by the district 
Adequacy o f  the nazim’s authority over senior staff, including inputs into the 
performance evaluations for senior staff and abil ity to require their transfer. 
Extent o f  external oversight, including a review o f  the effectiveness o f  bodies, such as 
Accounts Committees, Monitor ing Committees, and District Public Safety Commissions, 
which are mechanisms for the monitoring o f  front l ine staff. 
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The overall conclusion from the district studies i s  that administrative devolution has been partial 
and, as yet, given district staff few reasons to respond to the authority o f  the nazimeen. The 
transfer o f  functions and the physical relocation o f  staff have not been fully matched by the 
transfer o f  the employer role. Local governments have l imi ted ability t o  create fiscal space by 
dismissing surplus staff, and in two o f  the four provinces (Sindh and NWFP), salaries continue to 
be paid f rom Account 1. In other cases, while the formal authority rests with the local 
govemment, the province continues to  exercise informal control. Whi le the LGO provides for a 
sophisticated sharing o f  control over posting o f  c iv i l  servants based o n  norms which clearly 
delineate responsibilities, informal provincial controls are clearly evident in the area o f  
Appointment, Promotion and Transfer (APT) authorities. In many cases, provinces have reduced 
the control o f  local political executives over their c iv i l  service through unilateral orders o f  
postings. 
The result i s  that although physically located in the districts, most senior district staff do not 
consider themselves as district employees and therefore are l ikely to accommodate provincial 
pressures to  transfer subordinate staff. This attitude has considerably weakened the accountability 
o f  senior staff to local elected representatives. In fact, polit ically motivated inter- and intra- 
district staff transfers are a main area o f  confl ict between provincial and local governments and 
are most severe in districts that are not polit ically aligned with the province, such as Bannu, 
Khairpur, and Karachi. Since TMA staff largely belong to  local govemment cadres or  are the 
council’s own employees, the problem o f  l o w  institutional allegiance and weak accountability i s  
less acute. 
These problems o f  accountability were clearly evident in the relationship between the district 
nazim and the senior staff in the district, particularly the DCO and the DPO. I t  was generally 
observed that the authority o f  the nuzim to write the ACRs o f  DCOs was an insufficient 
mechanism for enforcing accountability since it was an ineffective tool for  measuring the 
performance o f  an officer and tended to be viewed as a routine matter t o  be placed on an officer’s 
f i le at the time o f  promotion in fulfilling a legal or  administrative requirement. Officers tended to 
be given postings regardless o f  their performance in previous tenures. Nuzimeen also have very 
l itt le authority over the DPO. Formally, only in Punjab has the District Nuzim been given the 
init iating authority for  the ACR o f  the DPO, although it has been reported that this authority wil l 
be extended to  the nuzim in a l l  provinces. However, in practice in none o f  the districts studied 
were these performance evaluation reports completed in this manner. Some nuzimeen, in fact, 
considered?hat removing the authority o f  the former Distr ict  Magistrate in completing the ACR 
o f  a former district Superintendent o f  Police has contributed to deterioration in law  and order in 
general. l6 
The LGO provides for a number o f  institutional arrangements-such as Monitor ing Committees, 
and District Public Safety Commissions-for the legislative oversight o f  service providers. 
However, i t was generally observed that these mechanisms have either no t  been established, or 
have been introduced to only a l imi ted degree. For  example, the field visits revealed that, with 
some notable exceptions and for several reasons, Monitor ing Committees were not performing as 
the regulations envisioned. Similarly, Public Safety Commissions where formed, were generally 
unable to elicit compliance from the police in i t s  investigations. 
Press reports o f  a high level meeting held on 14 April 2004 involving the Prime Minister, Provincial Chief 
Ministers, the NRB and other federal and province officials indicate that significant changes will be introduced to 
the Police Order 2002 and that a new target date o f  December 2004 has been set for complete implementation of 
these new arrangements. Until these are officially confirmed and clarified, this report will make only passing 
reference to what has been reported, but will not speculate on their likely impact. 
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Citizen power (client power) 
As the WDR argues, service delivery can also be improved by improving client power, that is, 
strengthening the direct linkage between citizens and service providers. In principle, such an 
approach can b e  more effective than focusing on efforts to make service providers more 
accountable to  policymakers and then making policymakers, in turn, more accountable to 
citizens. The LGO and Police Order call for the creation o f  various bodies, such as Citizen 
Community Boards and Citizen Police Liaison Committees, which can serve to improve this 
client power. 
The overall conclusion from the f ie ld visi ts i s  that i t i s  too early to tell whether or not devolution 
has had any impact o n  client power for the better or the worse. W h i l e  in general participatory 
mechanisms, such as Citizen Community Boards and School Management Committees (a pre- 
devolution initiative) have yet to achieve their full potential, there are numerous examples that 
suggest that innovative local leadership has had a positive impact on community mobilization and 
in turn on service delivery. 
THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGED INCENTIVES ON SERVICE DELIVERY: A PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT 
As discussed above, i t i s  too early to determine the effect o f  devolution o n  service delivery 
outcomes. This section therefore focuses o n  the effect o f  the changed incentives for nazimeen and 
service providers o n  the four key sectors impacted by devolution-health, education, water and 
sanitation, and access to justice. 
Health 
The structural changes 
The overall picture for the health sector under devolution i s  encouraging. The transition was 
relatively smooth and the transfer o f  staff and facilities was accomplished without major 
disruption to services. Some districts took advantage o f  the changes to  restructure more 
comprehensively, and devolved procurement seems to  be workmg well. 
The post o f  executive District Officer Health (EDO-H) has been created and i s  f i l led in al l  
districts. All the health facilities, including district headquarters hospitals but not tertiary 
(teaching) hospitals, have been placed under this office. Training and staff development 
institutions that were earlier under the divisional headquarters are n o w  largely under the EDO- 
H.” However, only in Punjab are training institutions fully devolved (except medical colleges 
which remain with the provincial government). In some provinces, l ike NWFP and Punjab, this 
transfer provided an opportunity to carry out an extensive rationalization o f  the health facilities 
and to obtain data o n  utilization, citizen access and missing staff. 
Different provincial requirements have produced a number o f  structural models for health district 
departments. Some predate devolution and were part o f  the previous district decentralization plan. 
In NWFP, for example, there are three district types identified o n  the basis o f  size, and structures 
are tailored to these different types. Thus the number o f  posts and the specialties within a district 
depend o n  the type o f  district. Type A, Peshawar, i s  the largest district with a wide range o f  posts, 
departments and specialties. In Type B, medium-size districts, the number o f  specialties and 
l7 There are exceptions, for example, in K i l l a  Saifullah and Bannu, where in the earlier district there were no such 
institutions and the district health development center and nursing schools remain under the direct control o f  the 
provincial health services academy. 
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departments decline, and smaller Type C districts that do not  cover the full range o f  health care 
rely more o n  provincial expertise. 
The procurement o f  medicines and purchase o f  biomedical equipment have been devolved to  the 
districts, and purchase committees headed by the District Coordination Officer (DCO) have been 
constituted. The committees are responsible for technical scrutiny, standardization and purchase 
o f  medicines, capital goods and medical equipment. For  Balochistan, NWFP and Punjab, a 
provincial committee performs prequalification, and a system o f  rate contract eliminates the role 
o f  intermediaries. In Sindh, the absence o f  a system for rate contract or prequalification by the 
provincial government has led to complaints relating to  the purchase o f  medicines. Additionally, 
in Karachi Tehsil responsibility for health has been relinquished to the c i ty district, and different 
purchase procedures are in effect for health facilities that had been municipal rather than 
provincial units. Some o f  the outstanding issues in harmonizing procurement practices and rules 
are s t i l l  not  resolved as the Rules o f  Business are not yet in place. 
As argued earlier, while the anecdotal evidence suggests that there are strong incentives o n  local 
politicians to  focus on private goods, the study did not  find that devolution had exacerbated the 
problem, as evidenced by the protection o f  operations and maintenance allocations in the district 
budgets. Specifically in the health sector, the picture that i s  emerging suggests that the new 
powers to  procure are being used well, and citizens are increasingly finding that health facilities 
have medicines available for them. N o t  only i s  the supply picture undoubtedly improved, but i t  i s  
also noteworthy that the press has publicized few reports o f  corruption in contracting for  
medicines. 
Citizen power (voice) 
W h i l e  in general Monitoring Committees have failed to achieve their potential, in some districts, 
notably Karachi, Monitoring Committees were functional, in large part due to the more polit ically 
aware and educated body o f  councilors. Reports o f  these committees were submitted regularly, 
and the health committee claimed to have increased the attendance o f  staff by 20 percent, 
improved the quality o f  maintenance, and repair, a c la im that was generally supported by NGOs 
and journalists. Similarly, the c i ty health committee stated that i t had visited 25 hospitals in the 
last year to  ensure quality o f  service and reduce absenteeism. The committee members believe 
that this improvement has been achieved because o f  their consistent monitoring and not  because 
o f  the respective EDO’s interest in the improvement o f  services. Even here though, there i s  
considerable frustration with the bureaucracy, as exemplified by the fact that the District Council 
has passed over 300 resolutions, many o f  them call ing for  disciplinary actions against particular 
staff, but without much result. 
Provincial efficiency incentives 
Devolution has not yet produced district ownership and the consequential district oversight over 
vertical programs (Box 2). As outlined in more detail in the second volume (Annex I-Recent 
Histoly), vertical programs are in general problematic because they limit local government’s 
autonomy in preparing the budget, and limit public assignment o f  credit and blame, thus 
distorting relations between local service providers and councilors by reinforcing vertical 
relations with higher governments. T h i s  lack o f  local ownership i s  most marked in relation to the 
Lady Health Workers, but similar problems o f  delays in the release o f  funds from the province 
and weak supervision and monitoring by the districts beset the EPI, MCP, and TB DOTS 
programs. Whi le lack o f  capacity and training are clearly important factors, lack o f  full district 
ownership i s  a binding constraint. Districts do not allocate funds or other resources for 
monitoring and supervision, and without this involvement program targets are unlikely to be met. 
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Box 2: Ver t i ca l  Programs-Health 
The National Program for Family Planning and Primary Health Care, better known as the Lady  Health 
Worker (LHW) program i s  the ma in  federal program, w h l e  others, such as the Extended Program for 
Immunization (EPI), the Malaria Control Program, and TB DOTS, are primarily provincial programs with 
varying degrees o f  district involvement. 
The LHW program i s  the government’s flagship health program as wel l  as a major focus o f  donor 
interventions, primarily because i t  has developed a reputation for overall effectiveness. The program i s  
h igh ly  vertical, in the sense that the most important po l icy  decisions, such as the number o f  LHWs to  be 
employed, as w e l l  as financing, rest with the federal government. On the other hand, key  operational 
responsibilities, such as decisions o n  the allocation o f  LHWs within a district, as w e l l  as overall recruitment 
and supervision o f  the LHWs, are district functions. Currently, the program employs 70,000 LHWs, with 
an I-PRSP target o f  100,000 by 2004105. 
A Df lD- funded evaluation is one o f  the few data sources available on  the program (Oxford Pol icy  
Management: 2002) although this was undertaken pr ior  t o  devolution. The results o f  the study are mixed. 
In terms o f  outcomes, the study reveals that use o f  prenatal care and delivery services, use o f  
contraceptives, immunization coverage and prevention and treatment o f  common illnesses in children under 
f ive are a l l  better in LHW areas than in control groups. Fo r  example, it found 56 percent full immunization 
coverage in LHW areas as compared to  38 percent in control areas, and 20 percent modem CPR in LHW 
areas vs. 14 percent in control areas. Fo r  the most part, t h i s  difference i s  due to  the fact that LHWs tend to  
serve more economically developed areas.’ Once socioeconomic variables are statistically controlled for, 
L H W s  impact i s  positive but much  more moderate.2 
In terms o f  processes, the study finds that in general LHWs are recruited according to the criteria 
established by the federal government and are also adequately trained. However, there were major 
problems with the t imely payment o f  LHW salaries and serious undersupplies o f  medicines and 
contraceptives. For  example, only a third o f  the LHWs surveyed had been pa id  in the month preceding the 
survey; a t h d  had not  been pa id  for four months or more; and more than 2 0  percent o f  L H W s  had  run out 
o f  essential medical supplies in the last three months. Despite their extensive training, the knowledge o f  the 
L H W s  was limited, especially in curative care. Fewer than 25 percent knew the correct dose o f  antibiotic 
needed to  treat pneumonia. Supervision was weak, primarily because supervisors lacked adequate access to  
vehicles, but t h i s  weak supervision had more to  do with quali ty than frequency, as 70 percent o f  the LHWs 
had been supervised in the last month, and 82 percent in the last two months. 
Some o f  the main problems with the program-delayed release o f  salaries, poor  supervision-have 
primarily to  do with i t s  vertical nature. Release procedures f r o m  the federal level t o  the L H W s  in the case 
o f  salaries and to the districts in the case o f  non-salary inputs are cumbersome and need streamlining. As 
the study revealed, LHW performance i s  closely l inked t o  the quality o f  supervision, wh ich  in turn implies 
that the role o f  district governments i s  v i ta l ly  important. However, since pol i t ical leadership in the districts 
is largely unaware o f  the program, a crucial incentive for  improv ing the quali ty o f  supervision i s  lackmg. 
1. This i s  in part due to the federally-determined LHW selection criteria a) stipulating that L H W s  be 
relatively educated women and b) requiring a hnc t ion ing  health facil i ty in the area f r o m  wh ich  the L H W s  
are to  be recruited. 
2. Specifically, the presence o f  L H W s  increases the probabil i ty o f  a child’s being vaccinated and o f  the use 
o f  prenatal care during pregnancy. However, LHWs appear to  have no  impact o n  contraceptive use once 
socioeconomic factors are controlled for. 
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Managerial power 
Local  ownership o f  the reforms remains very limited. Table 13 documents the absence o f  
organizational structure and some key j o b  descriptions for district health offices in four o f  the six 
study districts. Implementation plans, though, were available in four o f  the districts. 
Table 13: Ownership of the Structural Reforms 
Source; ADBIDflDIWB DSD Dataset 1. 
In addition, personnel anomalies have developed in the process o f  allocating staff to the new 
district structures. In particular, former hierarchical relationships have become distorted. For 
example, the doctor in charge o f  the district headquarters hospital has been placed under the 
supervision o f  the ED0 (H), whereas previously the District Health Officer and the DHQ doctors 
would a l l  report to the Divisional Director Health Services. Also, the Medical  Superintendent o f  
the hospital, a grade 18 employee, supervises doctors in grades 19 and 20. 
Box 3: Citizens Using Private Medical Care 
Ki l la  Saifullah 29 percent 
Karachi 75 percent 
Khairpur 81 percent 
Bahawalpur 55 percent 
Faisalabad 37 percent 
Bannu 21 percent 
Source: (CIET: 2003). 
An emerging picture in the 6 districts, one borne 
out by the CIET social audit reports, shows more 
and more citizens migrating f rom the public to the 
private sector for  health care (Box 3). Predating 
devolution, this movement demonstrates 
dissatisfaction with existing public sector health 
provision at the local level and presents a 
challenge for district health departments. As the 
private provision o f  health grows, district health 
departments must provide not only government 
services but oversight and regulation o f  the private sector as well. Currently, most such 
departments maintain n o  record o f  private sector services, and n o  legal registration requirements 
exist except in one district.** Providing regulatory oversight-a key  future task for  district health 
departments-will require new legal frameworks and effective monitoring by trained district 
health teams. T h e  issue, however, does not yet seem to be on district planning agendas. 
I n  sum 
The key impacts o f  the changed incentives in the health sector are as follows: 
Citizen power (voice) 
o Whi le  in general Monitor ing Committees have failed to achieve their potential, 
there are isolated examples o f  these committees reducing staff absenteeism and 
improving operations and maintenance 
Provincial efficiency incentives 
Bannu was the only district where all clinics and hospitals were registered and paid fees that, while collected by 
the district, were submitted to the provincial govemment. 
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o There i s  complete lack o f  district ownership and corresponding lack o f  disttlct 
oversight over vertical programs. 
Local  staff ownership o f  the reforms is, as yet, very l imited 
Reporting lines and managerial relationships are not quite finalized 
Districts are unprepared for regulation o f  the growing private sector 
0 Managerial power 
o 
o 
o 
Education 
The structural changes 
In education, the new district structures have evolved h r the r  and are more settled than in the 
health sector. T h i s  i s  probably because, pr ior  to devolution, provincial education departments 
were already a long way down the road o f  decentralization and appropriate management 
structures had been established at the sub-provincial level. The sector has seen considerable 
experimentation at the district level-thus, although in al l  districts the basic structure o f  the 
District Education Office i s  in place, below that level a variety o f  education department structures 
are emerging to meet district-specific circumstances (see Table 14). 
Important variations among provinces and districts characterize the devolution o f  education 
management. The structure of the Departments o f  Education in the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP 
include three directorates-Primary, Secondary and High-while Balochistan init ially merged 
them into one but subsequently created a separate directorate for colleges. At the district level, 
Punjab has created separate departments for education and literacy, whi le the other provinces 
have opted for single departments for both sectors. In Karachi, the district govemment has not yet 
achieved uniformity in managing i t s  o w n  schools and those that were formerly under the tehsils. 
Procedures for tehsil schools-such as procurement rules-are s t i l l  in place and so although 
schools are al l  n o w  nominally under the Karachi Education Department, different rules and 
procedures allow former tehsil schools latitude denied to  district schools. These parallel service 
delivery arrangements have resulted in jurisdictional conflicts and overlapping and confusion 
among the concerned stakeholders in local govemment. 
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Table 14: Management Structure after Devolution 
Sindh 
Provincial 
level 
Education 
and Literacy 
Departments 
Provincial 
level 
Directorates 
District 
Education 
and Literacy 
Departments 
District 
Education 
0 f fi  c e r s- 
DE0 
NWFP Punjab 
Deputy 
District 
Education 
0 f fi c e r s- 
DDEO 
Assistant 
District 
Office- 
AEO/ADO 
Source: ADBiC 
Balochistan 
Department for 
Education and a 
Directorate for 
Literary and 
Non-formal 
Education 
1 .Primary 
Killa Saifullah- 
joint department 
DEO-Primar y 
DEO-Sec. 
DE0 Admin. 
1 .Primary 
2.Secondary 
3.High 
Karachi- 
separate 
departments 
DEO-EE (M) 
DEO-EE (F) 
DEO-Sec. 
DEO-Acad. 
DEO-Tech. 
DEO-Special 
Education 
DO-SEMIS and 
Planning 
DDO 
DEO-HS 
DEO-Sports 
ADO 
D i m  DSD Dataset 1. 
1 .Primary 
2.Secondarv 
3.High 
Bannu-joint 
department 
DO-EE (M) 
DO-EE (F) 
DO-Sec. 
DEO-College 
DO-Special 
Education 
DO-Sports 
DDO (M) 
DDO (F) 
ADDO-E 
ADDO-S 
1 .Primary 
~~econdary  
3.High 
Faisalabad- 
separate 
iepartments 
DEO-EE (M) 
DEO-EE (F) 
DEO-Sec.(M) 
DEO-Sec.(F) 
DEO-College 
DEO-Special 
Education 
DEO-Sports 
DDEOs at 
tehsil level 
AEOs at 
markaz level 
Bahawalpur- 
separate 
departments 
DEO-EE (M) 
DEO-EE (F) 
DEO-Sec. 
DEO-College 
DEO-Special 
Education 
DEO-Sports 
DDEOs attehsil 
level 
AEOs at markaz 
level 
In staffing the new structures, Punjab and NWFP districts are typical in that District Education 
Officers have been appointed for Secondary Education, Male Elementary Education, Female 
Elementary Education, Colleges, Special Education and Sports under the ED0 (Education). A 
gender consequence o f  devolution, most clearly observable in NWFP, i s  that the district structure 
reduced the management posts available for  women education officers. Prior t o  devolution, there 
were both women and men district education officers. Fol lowing devolution this post has been 
merged and, in the majority o f  cases, f i l led by men. 
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St ruc tu ra l  
features 
Membership 
Chairperson 
Poli t ical 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
11 14: parents to be 8: parents to  be 7 
Head teacher Head teacher and Parent Head teacher 
N o  Yes: un ion Yes: un ion N o  
elected elected 
parent 
representation 
Authority t o  hire I No  I Yes I N o  I N o  
representation 
and fire teachers I 
Authority for I No  1 Yes I N o  I N o  
I councilor 1 councilor 
school 
construction 
F Y 0 4  budgetary 
allocation 
Provinces also differ in their arrangements for school-based management (Table 15). School 
Management Committees predate devolution but have come to be associated with it, and in recent 
years have been revived, largely because o f  donor engagement at the provincial level (Box 4).” 
Sindh has gone the furthest, with SMCs being given powers, in addition to those for maintenance 
and repair and procurement o f  school materials, to recruit primary teachers o n  contract and to 
undertake construction o f  shelterless schools.’’ Sindh i s  also the only province that has formally 
incorporated the local polit ical leadership within SMCs and therefore given councilors a direct 
stake in the affairs o f  the local schools. 
Rs. 450 m i l l i on  Rs. 247 m i l l i on  None  
I B o x  4: School-Based Management  I 
School-based management was a key  feature o f  the Social Ac t i on  Program, and School Management 
Committees and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) were established in 1994 in a l l  provinces as part o f  
th is  project. These committees were to  per form certain school-based functions, such as procurement o f  
teaching materials, repair and maintenance o f  the school facility, increasing enrollment, reducing teacher 
absenteeism and raising funds o r  generating other resources for school improvement. Overall, studies 
reveal that these committees failed to meet these objectives.’ 
O f  the many reasons for  t h i s  failure, the most important was a general lack o f  understanding about the 
complexity o f  achieving true community-based management in rural societies marked by considerable 
socioeconomic inequality. Mos t  PTAs were formed by a process o f  selection rather than election, with the 
head teacher determining membershlp and controll ing the bodies. Parents in general lacked interest or were 
unaware o f  their roles and responsibilities. Even  motivated ones had n o  formal mechanism for disciplining 
teachers, and were l imi ted to  sending complaints to  line-department officials who  in turn had  l i t t le 
incentive to act o n  these complaints. 
The PTAs also lacked adequate funding. One survey revealed that in one district about a quarter o f  SMCs 
had received funds since their formation, while in the other district none had  received any money since they 
Names vary with the provinces-SMCs in Sindh, School Councils in Punjab, Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) 
in NWFP, Parent Teacher School Management Committees (PTSMCs) in Balochistan. 
Sindh Department o f  Education, notification no. PAIASIMISC-III2002, dated October 13,2002. T h i s  notification 
states that only female teachers wi l l  be appointed to primary schools and that teachers’ salaries wi l l  be fixed at a 
rate o f  Rs. 40 per month per student, but may not exceed Rs. 2,000 per month. 
2o 
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were formed (Department o f  Education and Mul t i -Donor  Support Unit: 1998). Moreover, the funds were 
delayed, pr imar i ly  due to  complicated release procedures that released funds f i rs t  into the P L A s  o f  the then 
Deputy Commissioners and then onward to  the S M C  accounts. The survey also found that in a number o f  
cases committee members, particularly co-signatories (who were to be nonteaching members o f  the SMCs) 
o n  S M C  accounts, were relatives o f  the school teachers o r  head teacher, ties which raised questions about 
corruption and greatly reduced the SMC’s abil ity t o  monitor school staff. As a result o f  these problems, the 
SMCs/PTAs became defunct. In 1999 al l  government funding was halted. 
1. For  example, according to  one survey o f  SMCs in two  districts o f  Punjab, in many cases these 
committees existed only in name, with roughly two-thirds holding either no  meeting o r  fewer than 5 
meetings in the past year (Department o f  Education and Mul t i -Donor  Support Unit: 1998). Other surveys 
reveal similar results. Fo r  example, the Pakistan Rural Household Survey, 2001 (conducted by the W o r l d  
Bank) showed that while 52 percent o f  the sampled schools possessed a P T N S M C ,  only  68 percent o f  
these had received government funds, and a quarter had not  met with the head teacher in the past month. 
Citizen power (client power) 
SMCs operate with varying degrees o f  effectiveness. In most cases, head teachers s t i l l  largely 
control SMCs, continue to select members, and school management remains de facto with the 
staff. Mos t  S M C  members, moreover, know l i t t le i f  anything about their roles and 
responsibilities. For  example, a majority o f  SMC members in Sindh had never received the 
notifications delineating their powers, and in Punjab it was observed that School Council 
members had never seen the proceedings register designed for supervision and management by 
the members (Indus Resource Center: 2003; Wor ld  Bank: 2002b). In cases in Punjab where 
teachers were not from the same village, there was litt le interaction between them and the 
committee members, a fact that i s  not  surprising since SMCs are not  involved in hiring and firing 
(World Bank: 2002b). Fear o f  audit objections i s  also resulting in S M C  funds being underspent. 
This i s  primarily because school managers have not been issued written instructions and rules o f  
business in relation to the use o f  funds. In Balochistan, for example, over 1,000 audit objections 
are currently pending against school heads. 
It i s  too early to say whether devolution has had any impact one way or the other o n  SMCs. On 
the one hand, there are many anecdotal reports o f  SMCs being subjected to harmful  interference 
by district governments in general, and union nazimeen in particular, particularly with regards to  
the use o f  SMC funds (Indus Resource Center: 2003; Wor ld  Bank: 2002b). I t  appears that in 
many districts o f  Sindh, locally elected officials were pushing for union nazimeen to be 
chairpersons o f  SMCs, or were pressuring school headmasters to  make purchases f rom certain 
dealers.21 
In other cases, active encouragement o f  SMCs by district and union nazimeen has resulted in 
significant improvements in school quality. The example o f  the Khairpur Shelterless school i s  a 
case in point: innovative district and union leadership has resulted in the construction o f  cheaper 
and higher quality schools. Similarly, in district Rahim Yar Khan, the National Rural  Support 
Program, in collaboration with the district government, has attempted to revitalize SMCs in one 
particular union council, and preliminary results show a positive impact on enrollments. The 
district government has ensured that where this experiment i s  talung place, the teachers posted in 
the relevant areas are al l  f rom the same village, an expedient that increases the communities’ 
abil ity to discipline nonperforming staff. In large part, the district government has been able to 
achieve this reallocation o f  the teaching staff because o f  i t s  close alliance with the provincial 
government. 
21  The notification clearly specifies that chairpersons have to be members o f  the community. Union councilors are to 
be members o f  the SMC. 
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Provincial efficiency incentives 
Vertical programs in education also pose a challenge for district education planning (Box 5). 
Districts have n o  freedom or flexibil i ty to use these resources according to their own priorities, 
and n o  additional funding to support the recurrent cost implications o f  vertical programs i s  
available. The literacy department in Karachi, for instance, receives i t s  funding through a pipeline 
directly f rom the provincial government. T h i s  support, however, effectively frees the literacy 
department f rom the control o f  the district government under which it i s  meant to  work and puts i t  
under provincial control. The ED0 Literacy establishes schools, which are often run by NGOs. 
The education and literacy departments do not work together with the result that schools are 
opened by one agency without taking account o f  what the other i s  doing. Some areas have 5 or 6 
schools within a small radius, while other areas have none. 
Box 5: Vertical Programs in Education 
The Education Sector Reform program (ESR) (2001-2005) i s  the lynchpin o f  the federal government’s 
re form strategy in education. I t  carries a projected cost o f  Rs. 100 b i l l i on  over and above current annual 
national expenditures o n  education. I t s  largest component aims at rehabilitation o f  primary schools; other 
priorit ies include technical education, higher education, literacy, quality assurance, promoting public- 
private partnerships and mainstreaming madrassahs. The federal government determines no t  only the size 
o f  the program, but also the specific allocation to be made for each area o f  emphasis. Funds go to the 
provinces as development grants and then onwards to district Account IV. In the past, in an  apparent 
attempt to  prevent re-appropriation, these funds were then immediately shified f r o m  Account IV in to the 
P L A s  o f  DCOs. 
The largest component o f  ESR i s  the rehabil itation o f  facilities in existing primary schools. Whi le  districts 
are to  identify the beneficiaries, it i s  possible that pol i t ical pressure wil l cause M P A s  t o  b e  involved as 
well. Since the operational and maintenance responsibilities for these schemes rest with the districts, if the 
districts do not  fully o w n  the projects, it i s  not  clear that they will accord the operations a high priority. 
These problems o f  district ownership worsen when some ESR programs bypass the districts altogether. 
Fo r  example, the literacy stream and the early childhood education program are being managed at the 
district level by the ED0 Literacy through post-devolution, separate Literacy Departments rather than, as 
before, within the Education Department. Fo r  these programs, Federal funds go to the provincial 
government, which channels them onward-without any involvement o f  the district government-to the 
ED0 Literacy, an office supposedly subordinate to  district officials. 
Managerial power 
A key challenge for the districts i s  to put in place adequate monitoring and oversight mechanisms 
in respect o f  the private sector, whilst at the same time not discouraging the growth o f  this 
increasingly important prof i t  and nonprofit sector. The private sector i s  o f  increasing importance 
in the urban areas o f  Pakistan, but i s  insignificant in rural  Sindh and Balochistan where private 
schools account for  only 3 percent and 1 percent o f  overall enrollment, respectively. In Punjab 
and NWFP the private sector accounts for  42 percent and 59 percent, respectively, o f  schools in 
rural areas (Federal Bureau o f  Statistics: 2000). The growth o f  religious schools i s  particularly 
pronounced in Balochistan and NWFP. In a l l  provinces, in lower-income groups enrollment in 
NGO schools has increased-between 1991 and 1995-96, enrollment in private schools increased 
by 70 percent as opposed to 4 percent in public schools.** 
22 PIHS Round I and Round 11. 
41 
I n  sum 
The key impacts o f  the changed incentives in the education sector are as follows: 
0 Citizen power (client power) 
o Whi le  it i s  too early to tell whether devolution has had any impact one way or the 
other on SMCs, there are cases o f  innovative leadership resulting in significant 
improvements in school quality 
Vertical programs are creating problems in district education planning 
Effective regulation o f  the increasing numbers o f  private schools and madrassahs 
remains a challenge 
0 Provincial efficiency incentives 
0 Managerial power 
o 
o 
Water and Sanitation 
The structural changes 
Before devolution, the provincial Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) had the main 
responsibility for the development and maintenance o f  water and sanitation services, particularly 
for large-scale projects and particularly in rural areas. In addition, Development Authorities 
(DAs) and Water and Sanitation Authorities (WASAs) were providing similar services in large, 
urban centers. Although in legislative terms water and sanitation are n o w  clearly assigned to 
tehsils or towns (except in the case o f  city districts, where they are district responsibilities), the 
emerging implementation arrangements tell a messy story o f  uneven retention o f  provincial 
control. Each province has devolved PHED in a different way, even though the pre-devolution 
structure o f  the department was the same in al l  four provinces and the same clause o f  the LGO 
governed devolution in al l  provinces. 
In Balochistan, the PHED department remains at the provincial level, with the Secretary and 
Chief  Engineer operating f rom Quetta. The office o f  Superintending Engineers (SE), located 
before devolution at the divisional level, has been replaced by that o f  the Executive Engineer 
(XEN). N o t  district offices in any formal sense, they are instead deconcentrated arms o f  the 
provincial department. As a result, TMAs are only providing solid waste management, street 
lighting and street soling projects. 23 Water supply development, operations and maintenance 
(only in urban areas) remain with the district PHED offices. 
Sindh oversaw the most faithful interpretation o f  the LGO. The province PHED office was 
abolished and merged into the Local  Government and Rural  Development Department 
(LG&RDD), and the staff was devolved at the TMA level. However, in Karachi, the K W S B  has 
continued as an autonomous body leaving l itt le responsibility for  water and sewerage with the 18 
towns. XENs work with the TMA sta f f  but report to the K W S B  management and are not 
accountable to the TMA. T h i s  lack o f  devolution o f  the K W S B  i s  a highly polit ical issue given 
the demands from the population. As a result o f  nonperformance, TMAs and Unions are investing 
in distribution networks and other small-scale projects in a piecemeal style. 
Punjab has also devolved PHED to  the TMAs but has preserved the PHED structure with SE 
circles being maintained in four areas o f  the province. Additionally, DAs and WASAs  in large 
cities, such as Faisalabad, have been devolved to one tehsil, without appropriate reorganization. 
Therefore, while the WASAs’  service network spreads in neighboring TMAs as well, those 
TMAs are denied a role in decisions o n  the quality or coverage o f  service provision. 
23 Soling refers to the paving of streets and open drains with bricks. 
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Finally, N W F P  provides an example o f  the recentralization o f  the PHED. Initially, PHED had 
been devolved to  the district, not TMA, level. However, in M a y  2003, the provincial government 
divided the province into six circles, each headed by a Superintending Engineer (SE) o f  W&S 
department, a newly established post with jurisdiction over 4-5 districts.24 These divisions, or 
circles, n o w  have responsibility for water and sanitation services. 
Administratively, TMAs have acquired a much-strengthened structure under devolution. There 
are separate posts for Planning, Infrastructure and Services, Finance and Regulation, in addition 
to a Chief  Officer, who i s  a remnant o f  the former Municipal  Committee. However, the failure to  
complete the devolution o f  PHED has deprived tehsils o f  the quantity and quality o f  technical 
expertise they need. The burden on TMAs has been increased with more UCs added to the 
jurisdiction o f  each TMA. The Municipal  Committees (MCs) in districts and tehsils that used to  
provide municipal services to the urban populations are n o w  required, with litt le increase in 
staffing or resources, to deliver these services to  a much wider jurisdiction, includes sizable rural  
areas not previously part o f  their mandate. 
Provincial efficiency incentives 
Former municipal authorities have continued as before in their delivery o f  municipal services and, 
in some post-devolution cases, have been innovative in their approaches. The new, primarily 
rural, tehsils, however, lacking an existing resource base f rom which to operate services or make 
new investments to expand coverage, have faced major problems. Furthermore, the independent 
and freestanding nature o f  each tehsil does not  al low any equalization across the tehsils o f  any 
one district. There are n o  mechanisms for priorit izing resources within a district t o  ensure that the 
relatively deprived rural  areas begin to build services equal to those o f  the former municipalities. 
Apart f rom Karachi, which as a c i ty district i s  able to plan for i t s  whole area, other districts have 
n o  legal mechanism under the legislation for undertakmg cross-TMA water and sanitation 
schemes. Without that option, they have diff iculty planning urban infrastructure. 
The continuation o f  vertical programs in water and sanitation in al l  districts, funded either by the 
federal or provincial government and often supported by donor agencies, represents a challenge to 
district ownership (Box 6). NWFP presents an extreme example o f  the distortions these programs 
can cause, as the move to established SE circle offices was made at the behest o f  MPAs and some 
senior W&S department officials in order to  win control o f  the DERA and DIMRC programs that 
are funded by the Wor ld  Bank and ADB, respectively. In Bannu district, these programs were 
considered by the district government to be redundant or polit ically motivated, and indicative o f  
the provincial govemment’s interference in district matters, as project sites are identified by 
M P A s  or MNAs but not  by local councilors and there i s  n o  local input in determining the 
programs’ priorities. 
Box 6: Vertical Programs in Water and Sanitation 
The Khushal Pakistan Program (KPP) and the Provincial Tameer Programs are two o f  the main vertical 
programs in the Water and Sanitation sector. While neither specific to this sector and are broadly aimed at 
generating employment through public works, such as construction o f  roads, electricity and schools and 
basic health units, water, sewerage and sanitation schemes form a significant proportion o f  these programs. 
The two programs are, however, quite different in the degree o f  district control over planning and 
24 A Circle i s  an administrative division (for technical departments such as PHED) that clusters several districts 
together. As an example, SE Bannu has jurisdict ion (scheme identification and Technical Sanction power) over 
four districts: Bannu, Lakk i  Marwat, D I Khan, and Tank. 
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implementation. In KPP, the federal government provides the broad criteria, while local governments, in 
particular un ion councils, identify the specific schemes that are then approved by the DDC. By contrast, the 
Tameer Programs in the four provinces are highly vertical; districts have very l i t t le say in planning, 
budgeting, or expenditure control. In these programs, members o f  the provincial assemblies (MPAs) can 
each identi fy development schemes o f  up to Rs. 10 m i l l i on  for any sector in the provincial domain. In 
Punjab, the Distr ict Development Committee has to  give the technical sanction to these schemes, thereby 
providing district governments with a modicum o f  influence. In Sindh, the M P A s  have the choice o f  
seeking technical approval f r o m  the district o r  provincial P&D departments. 
The pronounced pol i t ical visibility o f  water and sanitation schemes has made them a serious cause o f  
confl ict between provincial and local governments. With regards to  the Tameer programs, findings f r o m  
the district visit suggest that districts were opposed to  many o f  these schemes, an attitude that calls into 
question their long-term sustainability. In some cases even the KPP projects have become a too l  in conflicts 
between provincial and local governments, with informal provincial controls over the DCO and EDOs 
being used to approve schemes over the objections o f  the district pol i t ical leaders. 
Managerial power 
Overall, the survival o f  PHED and related structures in al l  provinces hampers the delivery o f  
services by TMAs by restricting the resources and personnel available to them to plan and 
execute large schemes. In Bannu, for example, the acting ED0 has a technical sanction limit o f  
Rs. 2 million, whereas the superintending engineer-still within a provincial c i r c l e - c a n  sanction 
schemes o f  up to Rs. 10 mill ion. It i s  feared that TMAs may become graveyards o f  small, 
nonfunctional infi-astructure projects instead o f  being able to address health and hygiene issues in 
water projects, or drainage in soling projects-work for which integration i s  essential. 
Some o f  the teething problems could be alleviated if the provincial governments disseminated the 
Rules o f  Business (ROBS) more actively. Their delays, however, appear to  have prompted local 
bodies to evolve their own division o f  responsibilities and their own processes and procedures. Of  
greater concern, provincial departments have been able, in effect, t o  re-appropriate the 
responsibilities o f  local governments, as observed in the case o f  rural  water and sanitation 
Citizen power (client power) 
Whi le  in general CCBs have yet t o  become fully functional, as explained in detail in the second 
volume (Annex I-Recent History), there are some success stories where active involvement o f  
councilors and community organizations has had a positive impact o n  service delivery. In 
Bahawalpur, for example, the work  o f  an active CCB greatly improved the sewerage system o f  a 
neighborhood-a new sewerage l ine was built by the members, which was o f  a higher quality and 
built at a lower cost than as compared to those constructed by the Works and Services 
department. The key ingredients o f  this success story were support f rom the union government, as 
exemplified by the regular release o f  funds, and an educated and proactive membership. Another 
success story comes form district Jhelum in Punjab, where the district government, in partnership 
with a union government and the National Rural  Support Program (NRSP), has launched a p i lo t  
project under which CCBs have been created and are being provided on-the-job training through 
the implementation o f  physical infrastructure schemes, including sewer-drain and reservoir 
construction. 
I n  sum 
The key impacts o f  the changed incentives in the water and sanitation sector are as follows: 
0 Provincial efficiency incentives 
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o 
o 
o 
Limi ted resource bases are posing financial constraints on the new, primarily 
rural tehsils 
The independent and freestanding nature o f  each tehsil i s  constraining common 
planning or equalization across the tehsils 
Vertical programs are contributing to the pressure f rom the provinces to 
undermine devolution. 
The continuation o f  the provincial PHED and related structures i s  restricting the 
resources and personnel available to  the TMAs 
The Rules o f  Business have not  been disseminated, and provincial departments 
have been able to effectively re-appropriate the responsibilities o f  local 
governments. 
Whi le in general Citizen Community Boards have failed to meet their potential, 
there are some examples o f  community management resulting in improved 
service delivery 
Managerial power 
o 
o 
0 Citizen power (client power) 
o 
Access to Justicez5 
The structural changes 
The key reforms in access to justice are the abolition o f  the executive magistracy and the changes 
introduced in the Police Order 2002 aimed at establishing an institutional framework that 
replaced extra-departmental checks (the district magistrate) with arrangements to  make police 
answerable to citizens and the r u l e  o f  law, and increasing the efficiency and competence o f  the 
police. Devolution in the justice sector rests on complete separation o f  the judiciary f rom the 
executive and began in 1996 following a Supreme Court judgment. This entailed reassigning 
criminal trials under major criminal statutes to judic ia l  magistrates. The executive magistrates 
were, however, s t i l l  lef t  with some judicial functions under the Police Ac t  1861, Police Rules, and 
local and special laws. In some cases the Executive Magistrates could s t i l l  pass sentences o f  up to  
three years imprisonment. With the abolition o f  the office o f  the District Commissioner, who was 
also the District Magistrate, a l l  judic ia l  powers o f  the executive magistracy are n o w  vested in the 
judiciary. In addition, the executive functions relating to l a w  and order and local regulation have 
been either transferred to the police, or the judiciary, or have not  been reassigned. Each Civil 
Judge n o w  acts also as a Judicial Magistrate, whi le the District and Session Judge exercises the 
judicial powers o f  the erstwhile District Magistrate. The centerpiece o f  the police reforms i s  the 
creation o f  District Public Safety Commissions (DPSC) to  institutionalize community monitoring 
o f  the police. Together with the judiciary, DPSCs are the bodies to prevent and punish police 
excesses and ensure that the police function in accordance with law. 
Managerial power: nazimeen authority over police 
Executive officers in al l  the districts associate the end o f  the executive magistracy with weak 
implementation, regretting that they must n o w  prosecute and prove every alleged violation before 
an independent judicial magistrate. More  profoundly, the vesting o f  the former District 
Magistrate’s powers in the district and session judge has fundamentally changed the relationship 
between the district executive and the police. Whi le  overall responsibility for  l a w  and order i s  
given to the District Nazim, nazimeen generally do not  feel that the l a w  adequately defines their 
relationship with the district or c i ty police officer, nor do they have access to  the legal and 
regulatory knowledge within their executives, such as was characteristic o f  the executive 
25 Details o f  the police and judicial reforms are provided in the third volume (Annex 2-Technical Considerations). 
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magistrates. Where there i s  functional and constructive relationship between the police and 
nazim, i t  i s  generally because o f  a personal relationship rather than defined institutional roles and 
responsibilities. The immediate impact o f  friction between the two has been a decline in the rate 
o f  prosecutions under local laws. There are four major reasons for this decline. 
First, the judiciary, which i s  now required to enforce municipal regulations that executive 
magistrates previously oversaw, has not  been oriented in i t s  new jurisdiction under the local laws, 
and Judicial Magistrates do not effectively use the summary procedure available to them under 
the law. The increase in the number o f  cases handled by the courts has further exacerbated delays. 
Second, the executive generally lacks the capacity and awareness to enforce local laws before 
independent courts. Improvements in disposal o f  cases can arise f rom more specialization within 
the judiciary by creating separate c iv i l  and criminal courts. All four high courts have agreed in 
principle to  put such arrangements in place, but the pace o f  implementation i s  not  uniform. Weak 
enforcement by the executive i s  also tied to o ld  patterns o f  patronage that are particularly 
endemic where violation o f  local laws can bring substantial economic benefits, as in 
encroachments o n  local government property. 
Third, n o  municipal authority can n o w  direct police to take action and enforce local laws at the 
district level. Formerly the police were obliged to obey the summons o f  the executive magistrate 
who usually accompanied the district officers to  enforce local and special laws which tended, 
typically, t o  be ‘politically diff icult’ t o  implement. The executive magistracy was seen by the 
executive as being responsible for  implementation o f  these laws in a way that allowed politicians 
to  remain away fkom the fkay. Abol i t ion o f  the executive magistrate i s  now perceived to have lef t  
the various departments, concerned with breeches in these laws, in disarray.. N o w  i t  i s  the police 
who decide when to come and in what strength. When assistance was provided promptly i t was 
usually o n  request o f  the districts’ nazimeen. More  often, assistance was provided with 
considerable delay. District staff also explained that the police did not provide adequate security, 
and-without executive magistrates as buffers-they had to face threats o f  violence that reduced 
their zeal for enforcement. 
Fourth, and most wonyingly, i t  seems that polit ical interference contributes to weak enforcement 
o f  local laws. Several DCOs for instance, noted that direct interference by the nazimeen or simply 
lack o f  interest by them in enforcement o f  local laws impeded enforcement. Yet  where nazimeen 
took an interest in enforcement, as in the case o f  price control laws in Bahawalpur, enforcement 
rose above pre-devolution levels. 
In principle a l l  four provinces have ordered the separation o f  investigation fkom the watch-and- 
ward function. However, the situation in the six districts was far f rom uniform. Investigative 
activity had not  been separated at a l l  in K i l l a  Saifullah, whi le such separation held only at the 
thana level in Bahawalpur and had been implemented in only ha l f  o f  Faisalabad. In most districts 
the investigating officers reported to the Station House Officer (SHO) who heads the police 
station and i s  in charge o f  i t s  watch-and-ward policing. This dual responsibility has blurred the 
distinction between the two ostensibly separate police functions. Furthermore, the police station 
watch-and-ward staff was s t i l l  investigating local and special laws.26 
Where it has occurred, the separation has not  had any demonstrable, positive effect such as an 
increase in conviction rates nor led to improved citizen perceptions o f  police performance. 
26 T h e  Police Order (Article 18(4)) allows such investigations by police station staff where the punishment for an 
offence does not exceed three years imprisonment. 
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Instead the general belief i s  that since citizens now have to  pay bribes to two  police forces and 
that corruption has increased. Any efficiency resulting f rom this internal reorganization i s  
unlikely until an independent prosecution service i s  established. 
I t  i s  also generally perceived that the judiciary has been unable to effectively control police 
excesses. Even before the abolition o f  the district commissioner/magistrate and the executive 
magistracy, there was growing disquiet about the ability o f  the executive and the courts to control 
the police. However, before devolution, citizens could approach the executive magistrate to 
redress gnevances against the police. Now, the process i s  more complicated. The citizen must 
either approach the DPSC, which i s  not  presently regarded as a viable option, or seek judicial 
intercession, which i s  a lengthy and expensive process. The separation presents an opportunity for 
a more independent judiciary to put a stop to unlawful police behavior. However, judicial 
magistrates do not appear to be sufficiently conversant with the relevant provisions o f  the 
Criminal Procedure Code under which they can hold the police accountable. Moreover, the lower 
judiciary lacks protection against reprisals by police or other officials whose conduct i s  penalized 
and many feel they are insufficiently supported by the high courts when this occurs. M a n y  judges 
reported a worrying correlation between criminal acts against them and disciplining o f  unlawful  
police behavior. 
Traditionally, i l legal detentions by the police have been a major cause for citizen complaints 
against the police. The Police Order seeks to curb this abuse by empowering the nazim to inspect 
police stations and by criminalizing the failure to  produce arrested persons before magistrates as 
required by the Criminal Procedure Code. However, supervision o f  the police through regular 
inspections o f  police stations was almost nonexistent. Under the previous system, the District 
Magistrate was empowered to  visit police stations under the Police Rules issued under the n o w  
defunct Police Act. Although by law, the District and Session Judge i s  empowered to inspect 
police diaries and to order the release o f  persons illegally detained, such officials were not 
prepared to inspect police stations for this purpose. There i s  clearly a need for better inspection by 
a third party independent o f  the police. DPSCs could play this role but, as discussed above, are 
not fully functional. 
Managerial power: external oversight 
As outlined in detail in the second volume (Annex I-Recent Histoly), in general institutional 
mechanisms for external oversight o f  service providers have either not  been established, or have 
been introduced to only a l imi ted degree. This problem i s  especially evident in the case o f  
DPSCs. Effective DPSCs that enjoy public confidence do not  exist in any o f  the six districts 
studied. Only in the two districts o f  Punjab and Khairpur in Sindh have DPSCs been not i f ied and 
some preliminary meetings held. In n o  district has the DPSC approved a police plan as required 
by law.*’ The DPSC in Khairpur had n o  budget, while those in Bahawalpur and Faisalabad did. In 
a l l  districts there i s  a widespread perception that DPSCs will be ineffective in controlling the 
police. 
A success o f  the new system i s  the establishment and functioning o f  the District Cr iminal  Justice 
Coordination Committees (DCJCC) designed to  enhance interaction among various agencies o f  
the district criminal justice system. These committees, made up o f  representatives o f  the prisons, 
judiciary and police services, are supposed to deal with the irritants in the working o f  that system. 
Despite i t s  role in enforcing municipal offenses, the committee surprisingly lacks a representative 
27 More recently, policing plans have been completed and approved by DSPCs in many districts o f  Balochistan. 
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o f  the district 
institutions involved. 
DCJCC also acts as a horizontal accountability mechanism for the 
The DCJCC has been established in Khairpur, Bahawalpur, Faisalabad and Bannu, but not in 
K i l l a  Saifullah because the officers who are supposed to be i t s  members are not  posted in the 
area. Similarly in Karachi i t  was not clear who would sit  o n  the committee, as Karachi i s  s t i l l  
divided into f ive Judicial Districts. In the districts where the committee had been established, i t 
was reported that communication and coordination among the various actors in the criminal 
justice system had improved. 
I n  sum 
The key impacts o f  the changed incentives in the access to  justice sector are as follows: 
0 Managerial power: nazimeen authority over police 
o The end o f  the executive magistracy, and the lack o f  nazimeen authority over 
police, has resulted in the decline in rate o f  prosecutions under local and special 
laws 
The nazimeen and the judiciary are unable to check police abuses 
DPSCs have in general failed to  carry out their mission, and there i s  growing 
public perception that the police are out o f  control. The lack o f  improvement in 
the public perception o f  police i s  exacerbated by the continuation o f  police 
abuses such as non-registration o f  First Information Reports (FIRS) and il legal 
detentions. 
No arrangement exists to replace the Executive Magistrate in each police station 
jurisdiction. The power to inspect places o f  pretrial detention has been assigned 
to the n ~ z i m . ~ ~  
o District Criminal Justice Coordination Committees (DCJCC) have succeeded in 
enhancing the interaction among various agencies o f  the district criminal justice 
system. 
o 
o 
0 Managerial power: external oversight 
o 
VISIBLE WINS WHEN POLITICS ALLOW 
Judgments about the success or failure o f  devolution do no t  depend solely o n  i t s  impact o n  
service delivery, but anecdotal evidence suggests some progress. Reports are common, for  
instance, that doctors are more often present in health facilities and teachers in schools than was 
the case before devolution. This increasing availability o f  staff may also be related to the 
increasing l ikelihood that local facilities, particularly for  health, will actually have medicines 
available for  treating patients. Where procurement i s  fully devolved, as in Punjab, evidence 
suggests that public medical facilities are n o w  well-stocked and therefore more used. Some 
provinces and districts have rationalized facilities. Punjab rationalized Basic Health Units, many 
o f  which did not meet local needs. Other achievements that might be attributable at least in part to 
devolution include community participation fostering reduction in school-building costs and some 
increases in enrollment and retention. Significantly, at the union level, there i s  considerable 
evidence o f  councilor involvement in local dispute resolution and redressal o f  gnevances against 
service providers. 
28 
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In some districts (for example, Sargodha and Attock) representatives o f  the district government, in both cases 
EDOs for law, have been invited to attend. 
The executive magistrate’s jurisdiction was coterminous w i th  the territorial jurisdiction o f  the police, under Cr.PC 
Section 1641364. The nazim’s weak control over the DPO, and his lack o f  support by an executive body 
acquainted with the law, has diluted the pre-trial activities o f  the police. 
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The study found particular areas o f  promising progress: 
Khairpur district: Khairpur i s  among the most innovative districts in terms o f  community 
involvement in service delivery. School Management Committees, with the help o f  union 
councils, have been given the responsibility to construct shelterless schools o f  which 35 have 
been completed. With community monitoring, their construction costs have come down 
considerably without compromising quality. These schools have been constructed at around Rs. 
200,000-250,000, while similar ones built by the Education department in the past cost 
approximately Rs. 780,000. This initiative i s  a good example o f  developing partnerships with 
local communities and fostering community ownership o f  local schools. I t  should be widely 
disseminated to other districts for replication. The Khairpur pi lot  confirms international findings 
o f  similar programs that: the schools are wel l  constructed; costs are remarkably lower; and 
completion time i s  much shorter. 
Bahawalpur District: Ahmadpur East hospital has a capacity o f  60 indoor beds with two air- 
conditioned wards. The district has collaborated with the hospital to achieve significant 
improvements. The operating theater i s  fully equipped, and a qualified surgeon conducts major 
and minor operations. The Medical Superintendent o f  the hospital i s  an anesthesiologist. An 
orthopedic surgeon working in the post o f  medical officer looks after trauma and bone diseases. A 
chi ld specialist and obstetrician are also posted there. Medicines are in good supply, and three 
casualty medical officers provide emergency treatment free o f  cost. In addition to procuring the 
new equipment, the district government has also managed to clear Rs. 2.6 mi l l ion o f  previous 
liabilities for  building construction. 
District Criminal Justice Coordination Committees have been established and meet regularly in 
al l  6 districts except Karachi and K i l l a  Saifullah to carry out investigations, raise issues o f  
juvenile justice, insist on timely challans (indictments), and on the production o f  witnesses in 
accordance with the law. The delegation to the Sessions Court o f  the power to  issue w r i t s  o f  
habeas corpus has been greeted positively as providing a relatively inexpensive remedy against 
the continuing practice o f  i l legal detentions by the police and-in some areas-by powerful  
elites. 
Gulshan-e-Iqbal town, Karachi: In collaboration with Transparency International, the town  
administration has established a Customer Service Center to register citizen complaints. An 
elaborate procedure has been developed to  track the action taken o n  these complaints and to 
gauge the level of customer satisfaction. The town government i s  also developing an interactive 
and informative web site while in the process o f  electronically connecting a l l  13 union councils 
with the town administration, as wel l  as providing the union and town offices with computers 
through which citizens can register their complaints on-line. The town administration i s  also 
consolidating a variety o f  existing data o n  the municipal infrastructure, and linlung i t  to  a GIS 
system, and has launched a property survey in order to increase property tax collections. 
Tehsil Jaranwalla, Faisalabad: The town administration has taken a number o f  innovative steps 
to  improve service delivery. With private sector and NGO involvement, the tehsil i s  constructing 
a comprehensive database o f  the existing infrastructure, including, for  example, the number o f  
water outlets, pipes, drains, connections, joints and other details o f  sewerage, gas and telephone 
connections. This database wil l then be integrated into a GIS system and used to prepare a master 
plan o f  the town. With baclung from the Tehsil Nazim and based on their o w n  consultations, the 
19 women councilors in the Tehsil Council have pooled their individual allocations for 
development schemes to develop a Women’s Resource Center. This center will have a shelter for 
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abused women and embroidery, computer and other industrial training facilities. Even more 
encouragingly, the woman MPA from the tehsil has contributed her individual development 
allocation to the construction o f  this scheme. 
The same nazim, responding to citizen complaints, has undertaken activities that do not come 
under his direct jurisdiction. When Palustan Railways did not respond to  requests to improve the 
road at two o f  the city’s main railway crossings, he  ordered his staff t o  use their own resources to 
improve it. Similarly, as a measure to support the local traffic police, h i s  TMA has hired eight 
people f rom a private security agency to help manage traffic and lessen the impact o f  traffic jams. 
Union councils, Karachi: Councilors are demonstrating innovation in response to increased 
contact with citizens. One union council has purchased manhole covers and street lights from i t s  
own funds even though such maintenance falls outside their purview. The naib nazim claimed 
that the public does not have the patience to wait while the KWSB takes months to  respond to 
requests to supply manhole covers.The union has also hired sanitation workers (kundimen) o n  
contract, despite the objections o f  the provincial auditor that such an initiative goes beyond their 
scope o f  responsibility. Another union council has mobil ized the local community to restore a 
local park. Neighboring union councils are also cooperating to improve service delivery. For  
example, one council that did not have adequate resources to purchase a tractor and a trolley 
(sanitation vehicles) has developed an arrangement with i t s  neighboring union council whereby 
one has purchased the tractor and the other has purchased the trolley, and the vehicles are shared 
between the two. 
Nuzimeen and Senior Staff C a n  M a k e  a Difference 
The new incentives have seemingly allowed determined and dynamic nazimeen to achieve 
significant results. 
The key variable i s  the strength o f  the provincial incentives to intervene in the districts. The 
province has few incentives to intervene when: 
The Chief  Minister and/or the main provincial coalition and the District Nazim are from 
the same polit ical alliance 
The Provincial Assembly constituencies within the district are f i l led with politicians f rom 
the same polit ical alliance 
The nazim has sufficient independent polit ical standing to resist provincial interventions. 
When the province has few incentives to intervene, the nazim gains a fa i r ly  free hand to  direct 
district staff and, despite the inevitable resource constraints, can achieve results. However, when 
the provincial incentives for intervention are high, nazimeen often finds their hands tied (Box 7). 
Box 7: Provincial Interventions at the District Level  
I n  Khairpur district, the nazim i s  a social activist tumed pol i t ical leader. She brings to  her posit ion a vast 
experience in investigative journalism, activism in women’s rights, environmental conservation and social 
uplift. The daughter o f  former Chief  Minister and PPP stalwart Qaim Ali Shah, she has effectively used her 
pol i t ical background despite i t s  having also been a major impediment, since her father’s opponents-chief 
among them the powerful Pir o f  Pagar+have become her opponents as well .  
As one o f  two female nazimeen in the country, she has some significant achievements to  her credit. She has 
encouraged the formation o f  over 100 CCBs in the district, with the assistance o f  UC nazimeen and the 
ED0 Community Development. Hers i s  one o f  the few districts that has been active in this sector. A jo in t  
committee o f  the treasury and opposition members o f  the district council has approved a total o f  98 
schemes, while the DDWC under the DCO’s chair has approved 59 schemes. Forty CCBs have deposited 
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their contributions to  these schemes. Unfortunately these CCBs have become hostage to  the pol i t ical 
polarization that typifies the administration o f  this district and have no t  yet received funding themselves. 
The successful init iative to  fund the construction o f  shelterless schools, using district funds and the 
contributions o f  beneficiary communities managed with the assistance o f  U n i o n  Councils, has also stalled 
due to  confl ict with the province. Apparently o n  instruction f r o m  the province, the DCO did not  approve 
the new structures and have not  been regularized by the Education Department for the same reasons. 
I n  District Bannu, the provincial government mounts a great deal o f  interference in the affairs o f  the district 
govemment. The provincial government often overrides the role o f  the district government, even, in some 
instances, sending instructions directly to the ED0 (Education) instead o f  fol lowing the proper procedure. 
In  southern districts of NWFP, provincial and federal polit ics revolve around the development o f  water 
schemes. Because many o f  the schemes-mostly donor funded-are provincial schemes, nazimeen were 
given no  say in the development decision-making process. The nazimeen therefore prevented their Works 
and Services EDOs f r o m  attending meetings in Peshawar o n  these vertical programs. The response o f  the 
province has been to  establish new provincial posts at the circle level (group o f  districts) to enable the 
province to go forward with provincially approved projects without involving local governments- 
effectively cutt ing them out o f  major water and sanitation decision-making and ensuring that MPAs 
influence these decisions. Fo r  example, in Bannu the DERA schemes for 2003-04 were finalized by the 
MNA and M P A s  f r o m  the district in a meeting with the provincial Works and Services Department. 
A Decisive B r e a k  f r o m  the Past 
Devolution has brought a decisive break with the past in two important respects. First, local 
government n o w  has unambiguous constitutional protection. The agreed changes to the 
constitution were enacted on 30 December 2003, fo l lowing a vote in the Senate, and National 
Assembly (29 December). The local government system, as prescribed by the Provincial Local  
Government Ordinances, i s  now included in the sixth schedule o f  the 1973 Constitution. Under 
Article 268 (2) o f  the Constitution, laws specified in the sixth schedule cannot be altered, 
repealed or amended without the previous sanction o f  the President. Further, i t i s  evident that 
there i s  growing support for  devolution across a l l  polit ical parties. 
Second, as a result o f  the LGO provisions, the reservation o f  33 percent o f  local council seats for 
women in a l l  three levels o f  local government has proven the most strategic step ever undertaken 
by government toward women’s polit ical empowerment. Mos t  directly, despite the significant 
number o f  vacant seats, i t has enabled over 30,000 women to  enter into formal politics at the local 
government level. The consequences have already been felt in province and federal politics-not 
just in terms o f  increased women’s representation, but also in the fiscal and administrative 
domains as well. T h e  Federal cabinet and the cabinets o f  Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan l ook  set 
to approve multiyear Gender Reform Act ion Plans which will commit them to  wide-ranging 
reforms consistent with devolution in electoral procedures, women’s representation in the c i v i l  
service and in terms o f  introducing new measures in statistics, budget and expenditure 
management to track the impact o f  resource allocation decisions on women. 
Thus, devolution marks a decisive break with the previous arrangements-arrangements that, as 
the earlier discussion highlights, were associated unambiguously with the persistent failures in 
service delivery. 
VISIBLE LOSSES 
As with any dramatic pol icy change, there are costs as w e l l  as gains. Two concerns emerged 
prominently during the course o f  this study: c i v i l  servant morale and l a w  and order and public 
safety. 
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Civil Servant Morale 
Discussions with senior staff in all districts emphasized that career paths for the provincial and 
federal staff posted in the provinces following devolution, causing a serious loss in morale. There 
are two ways o f  looking at this contention. These senior staff saw devolution as, at best, a 
confusing and demanding institutional change and, at worst, as a sudden and unfair b low  to their 
career prospects. Others regarded the move as a long overdue restraint on privileged groups who 
had protected their fast-track career options for too long and dismissed the protests as the 
complaints o f  those who feared losing rents f rom district postings that were often thought to be 
particularly l ~c ra t i ve .~ '  Figure 7 shows the profi le o f  the DMG group. 
Figure 7: DMG Staff by Grade 
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Source: Federal Govemment Civil Service Census, 2000. 
Although few in number, District Management Group staff (DMG) and the Provincial Civil 
Service (Executive) were the most affected and the most vocal about their concerns. The DMG 
group felt the loss o f  their career prospects most acutely. This occupational group had, 
historically, been posted to the districts and divisions, at the level o f  Commissioner, Deputy 
Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner. Also, as one o f  
three groups in the All Palustan Uni f ied Grades (MUG), statistically they had a better than 
average chance o f  promotion to senior grades. At the highest level o f  the c i v i l  service, o f  the total 
o f  47 BS-22 officers, 29 belong to the MUG, more than 60 percent o f  the total (Figure 8). 
30 For the reasons why cadre interests are particularly deeply entrenched in Pakistan, see (Kennedy: 1987). 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Positions by Grade for FUG and APUG Staff 
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Other provincial occupational groups also felt that devolution had diminished their career 
prospects and their status. Provincial Public Health Engineering staff in particular regarded their 
proposed transfer to the tehsils as particularly demeaning. This concern lies behind much o f  the 
determined resistance to  the transfers, opposition so effective that, in the main, water and 
sanitation continues to operate as a provincial function with technical and administrative sanction 
powers continuing to l i e  in the province. 
In considering morale, the operational question i s  not  whether the loss o f  career prospects and 
privileges was justified. The question i s  how to re-establish a sense o f  purpose and enthusiasm in 
those who must provide the administrative lead for the new local governments. 
Law and Order 
The reforms dealing with access to justice were undoubtedly among the most complex, ambitious 
and controversial elements o f  devolution. They entailed three major legal and institutional 
changes: 
0 Although devolution i s  often seen as predicated o n  the 1973 Constitutional principle o f  
the separation o f  powers, it i s  more accurately understood in terms o f  Article 37(i) o f  the 
C ~ n s t i t u t i o n , ~ ~  which refers to subsidiarity. Nonetheless, devolution did result in further 
separation o f  the executive f rom the judiciary by abolishing the post o f  deputy 
commissioner and dividing the power o f  that office among the District and Sessions 
Judge, district nazim, the DCO, and DPO. This change also entailed scrapping the office 
o f  district magstrate, one o f  many hats o f  the Deputy Commissioner, and the cadre o f  
Executive  magistrate^.^^ 
With the abolition o f  the deputy commissioner, the Police Order 2002 was originally 
crafted to insulate police f rom polit ical interference and provide a “unity o f  command” 
by m a h n g  the district police officers (DPOs) responsible for a l l  police professional 
0 
3’ 
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“The state shall decentralize govemment administration so as to facilitate expeditious disposal of i ts  business to 
meet the convenience and requirements of the public.” 
I t  should be noted that the ED0 Revenue remains with trial jurisdiction in cases relating to land records and land 
revenue, continuing an age-old tradition extending from the office of the ziladar, to collector, to the deputy 
commissioner. 
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matters including postings and transfers o f  0f f ice1-s.~~ Unl ike the previous police head o f  a 
district, the D P O  i s  no longer supervised by or accountable to  any part o f  the local c iv i l  
service, but accountable to new structures-District Public Safety Commissions and 
Police Complaints A~ tho r i t i es~~-and  to the judiciary that has now assumed al l  o f  the 
judic ia l  and quasi-judicial powers formerly held by district commissioners. 
Police reforms also include creating a separate independent prosecution service. The 
federal government has proposed a model l aw  to set up independent prosecution 
agencies, and this draft i s  under active consideration by provincial governments. Apart 
f rom Balochistan, however, promulgation o f  the new laws has been mired in turf disputes 
between the province departments o f  l aw  and home. 
As noted earlier, the key concerns are: the power o f  the District Executive to  enforce regulations 
has been weakened; nazimeen have litt le control over the police; there has been some decline in 
prosecutions; and there i s  a widespread perception that corruption has risen. Of  most concern, it 
seems that weaknesses in external oversight o f  the police have made the police less governable. 
The consequence i s  that, in popular perception, the incidence o f  police excess and torture during 
pretrial detention has increased markedly, along with a perception that police are unresponsive to 
increasing (or better reported) violence against women (Human Rights Commission o f  Pakistan: 
2004). As a result police reforms are in serious danger o f  being perceived as a one-way street on 
which the police has simply secured more resources whi le becoming less accountable. 
Rising corruption in the police service exacerbates corruption in other public offices, motivated 
by the sense that corruption and unresponsiveness can occur with impunity. The failure o f  the 
police to provide basic public safety i s  undoubtedly associated in the public perception with a 
decline in accountability in other service areas (for example, revenue and tax, land, irrigation) 
which impact o n  the poor. 
A CHALLENGING TIME FOR DEVOLUTION 
As noted earlier, devolution had both broad governance objectives and some narrower technical 
goals. Although this study i s  modestly optimistic about the future o f  devolved governance in 
Palustan, in the near term, devolution wil l achieve few i f any o f  these objectives. I t  i s  certainly 
unrealistic to anticipate that substantial improvements in service delivery could be detected after 
such a short period. Thus while the evidence does not  al low the proponents o f  devolution to point 
to many specific improvements, as systems bed down, detractors might be able to point to some 
areas in which devolution has seemingly made matters worse without compensating systemic 
improvements. Even the gains have been less substantial for the districts than for the TMAs, as 
the pervasive and often undermining intrusion o f  the province into district affairs i s  a particular 
problem. 
In reality, devolution i s  undoubtedly a fact o f  l i fe. I t  i s  not  plausible to expect any substantial 
return to a discredited set o f  institutional arrangements with a proven track record o f  failure. 
However, undoubtedly opposition to i t (from the senior bureaucracy and f rom provincial 
politicians in particular) s t i l l  remains. There i s  n o  certainty that, in the face o f  this opposition, 
devolution will now be developed and entrenched to maximize the returns that i t  might offer. The 
33 I t  i s  reported that powers of postings and transfers o f  DPOs have been vested in the provincial Chief Minister who 
will appoint on the basis o f  a list prepared by the Province Police Officer. Further, Members o f  Provincial 
Assemblies in the district jurisdiction will become members of the DPSCs. See footnote 16. 
I t  i s  reported that the 14 April 2004 decision has merged the functions o f  the Police Complaints Authority with the 
Province Public Safety Commission. See footnote 16. 
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risk i s  that in fail ing to deliver visible service delivery improvements in the short term, the 
process will freeze in place and the present hybrid arrangements will be accepted as permanent. 
There are other potential challenges for devolution on the horizon: 
Managing inequity between and within provinces 0 
0 Reemergence o f  private-goods strategies. 
Managing Inequity Between and Within Provinces 
The l ikely significant increase in the fiscal transfers to the provinces under the 7’ NFC Award 
herald a major advance in devolution. However, as shown below, given that the current award i s  
generally fiscally equalizing, the l ike ly  accompanying shift away f rom a population-based 
formula underpinning the divisible pool  presents some potential risk o f  increased fiscal inequity if 
these transfers are designed inappropriately. 
Any evaluation o f  fiscal equalization in Palustan requires some judgment about the provinces’ 
current o w n  fiscal capacity,35 expenditure needs, and the fiscal gap between the 
T o  put current federal-provincial fiscal equalization in perspective, Table 16 sets out different 
revenue categories, expressed on a per capita basis-with those most associated with local tax 
effort or local tax base on the lef t  and those best thought o f  as equalization transfers arranged o n  
the right hand side.37 Whi le the Own Source Revenues (OSR), Straight Transfers, and OZT 
replacement grants (which together can be broadly categorized as provincial “own” revenues) 
vary significantly across provinces, the divisible pool  allocations are by design the same across 
a l l  provinces. 
Table 16: Per Capita Resource Flows (FY 2003/04) 
Source: Federal  and p rov inc ia l  budget estimates, and  W o r l d  B a n k  s ta f f  calculations. 
Fiscal capacity o f  a sub-national government equals the revenues that could be raised by that government if it 
applied national average tax effort to al l  i ts tax bases. 
Two major caveats are in order on the expenditure needs side. First, there is typically at best a l imited 
correspondence between fiscal resources, spending, and public sector outcomes. Efficient use o f  resources rather 
than absolute levels often matter more for ultimate performance. Secondly, the expenditure levels o f  the “richest” 
province may not necessarily be what i s  realistic or desired for all other localities. 
The four comuonents o f  the mainstream federal-wovincial transfers are as follows: 
The  divisible pool provides revenue sharing; 
Straight transfers represent the return o f  resource royalties, charges and excises after deducting a federal 
collection fee to the province o f  origin; 
Special lump sum transfers are provided to NWFP and Balochistan provinces for backwardness; and 
In 1999, a fourth component was effectively added to the Award, the “Octroi and Zilu Replacement 
Grant,” although in practice the transfers o f  the 2.5 percent GST began only from fiscal 2002-03. 
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T o  gauge the current equalization impact o f  the transfers, Table 17 presents the cumulative per 
capita revenues as a percentage o f  the national average, moving f rom lef t  to right. 
Table 17: Cumulative Provincial Revenues (Normalized) 
Source: Federal and provincial budget estimates, and World Bank staff calculations. 
Overall, comparing column 3 (own source revenues + straight transfers + OZT replacement) to 
column 5, i t  can be seen that per capita revenues do converge with, by design, the divisible pool  
making the greatest contribution toward this c~nvergence.~’  Sindh and Balochistan have the 
highest levels o f  locally derived revenues (due primarily to royalties o n  natural gas and oil), 
which appear to reflect the higher fiscal capacity given the assigned tax basis. Their per capita 
“own” revenues are more than one and a ha l f  times the national per capita average. The 
subsequent transfers reduce these per capita disparities somewhat. 
These figures suggest that the current system o f  divisible pool  and other grants provides some 
degree o f  fiscal equalization, although to be sure i t  would be necessary to  assess whether the 
remaining variance reflects differences in expenditure needs, and these data are not available. The 
results are intuit ively reasonable, however, if expenditure needs in Balochistan are driven by the 
provinces size and remoteness. I t  should however, be noted that whi le o n  per capita terms the 
current NFC formula does result in some fiscal equalization, population i s  only one factor 
determining fiscal needs, and other factors l ike poverty and backwardness are equally important. 
Thus the current divisible pool  arrangements, when coupled with the subvention grants, might be 
providing a reasonable degree o f  fiscal equalization whi le being based o n  population measures 
which offer both transparency and simplicity (Shah: 1994). The proposals currently under 
discussion to include backwardness, tax effort and other indicators in the NFC formula, i f  
designed poorly, could make the system complex without achieving fiscal equalization. 
The sensitivity o f  NFC awards to any move away f rom population as the overarching criterion in 
the divisible pool  allocations-whether toward area, poverty, or the Human Development Index 
(HD1)-suggests the need for creative solutions grounded in technical 
38 I t  i s  frequently observed that the vertical fiscal imbalances coupled with the correspondingly high levels o f  
transfers may be setting disincentives for the provinces to raise their own revenues. Historical evidence, for 
example, suggests that the provinces might be under performing on OSR, something which i s  aggravated by the 
transfers (Ahmad and Wasti: 2003). 
The choice o f  fiscal-capacity and expenditure-needs indicator proxies used intemationally varies significantly 
(Ma: 1997; Shah: 1994). Especially on the expenditure-needs side, simpler indicators are typically preferred, as 
comprehensive and reliable sub-national data are typically in short supply. Population i s  typically the default 
expenditure needs. Indonesia recently introduced the use of area, regional price levels and poverty in addition to 
population as measures o f  expenditure needs (Hofman, Kadjadmiko and Ka i  Kaiser: 2002). 
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Devolution certainly need not exacerbate problems o f  inequity (Smoke and Schroeder: 2003). 
The few cross-national, empirical analyses conducted o f  this proposition reveal n o  clear-cut 
pattern. For  example, one study o f  regional inequality in both developed and developing countries 
(Shanka and Shah: 2003) found that unitary countries were on average more regionally unequal 
than federal countries. The study hypothesized that this negative relationship between 
decentralization and inequality results f rom the greater polit ical r isks these disparities pose for 
federal states and therefore the greater incentive to restrain these inequalities. Most  transition 
economies have equalization components in their grant programs to sub-national  government^.^' 
Even without changes in the NFC formula, there are r isks in the present federal-provincial 
arrangements. Although in principle, the formula-based distribution o f  the divisible pool  
combined with the grants has potential for  fiscal equalization, since the former relies on revenue- 
sharing, any changes in the overall tax situation can result in unforeseen consequences for 
equalization (Shah: 2002). 
The PFC awards offer a further r i sk  o f  increased fiscal inequity. In principle, the present 
generation o f  PFC Awards i s  l ikely to be fiscally equalizing to some degree, o n  the simplistic but 
not  unreasonable assumption that formula-based allocations to  districts are more l ike ly  to  be 
equalizing than discretionary allocations based on polit ical clout. In addition, the formulae have, 
to varying degrees, factored underdevelopment as an indicator o f  fiscal need. However, current 
data do not al low any determination o f  the changes introduced by the f i rst  round o f  PFC awards, 
and it i s  clear that the new, primarily rural, tehsils with n o  existing resource base f rom which to 
operate services have faced major problems. It i s  evident that the delivery o f  municipal services 
in densely populated urban and peri-urban areas presents a different type o f  challenge than their 
delivery in the often dispersed, poor, rural areas. Developing rural  water and sanitation requires 
significant investment. At the same time, rural tehsils are poor, and their scattered populations 
increase the cost o f  service provision. The independent and freestanding nature o f  each tehsil 
does not al low any equalization among tehsils o f  any one district. N o  mechanism for priorit izing 
resources within a district ensures that the relatively deprived rural areas begin to build services 
equal to those o f  the former municipalities. 
Re-emergence o f  private goods strategies 
The pull o n  councilors to provide private rather than public goods wil l remain very real for 
reasons o f  history, patronage and polit ical visibility. The oversight mechanisms are we l l  designed 
but s t i l l  in transition. As yet, District Councils and their Monitor ing Committees are not  
providing any strategic check o n  these tendencies. CCBs have yet t o  take o f f  t o  any significant 
degree. In many districts the Mushawarat Committees, designated as the main institutional 
vehicles for district-wide planning, are not  functioning properly pr imari ly because o f  polit ical 
tensions between the district and tehsil nazimeen. Whi le  checks and balances are introduced and 
institutionalized, the well-trodden path o f  patronage-based hiring and distribution o f  small 
schemes undoubtedly beckons local councilors. 
The second volume (Annex I-Recent History) sets out the l imi ted evidence available so far. 
Reassuringly there i s  l i tt le s i g n  that expenditures are being moved f rom operations and 
40 Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine have adopted transfer formulae that explicitly incorporate 
either fiscal capacity and/or expenditure need equalization concems. In developing countries, programs using an 
explicit standard o f  equalization are untried, although equalization objectives are implicit ly attempted in the 
general revenue-sharing mechanisms used in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan and 
South Africa. These mechanisms typically combine diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula and 
fall significantly short on individual objectives. Because the formulae lack explicit equalization standards, they fail 
to address regional equity concems satisfactorily. 
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maintenance expenditures toward new investments, f rom large to small schemes, or f rom 
completing ongoing schemes toward more new schemes. However, the fiscal evidence i s  limited 
and nuanced. T h e  well-established pattem might come to dominate again in time. 
THE KEY CHALLENGES FACING DEVOLUTION 
In sum, the key challenges facing devolution can be summarized as follows: 
e Completing devolution is not seen to be inevitable. Although the abandonment o f  the 
reforms i s  unlikely, especially n o w  that local governments are protected under the Sixth 
Schedule o f  the Constitution, there i s  some hope, in some quarters, that it might be frozen 
at i t s  current stage and there i s  a widely held view that i t s  completion i s  tied to the 
sustainability o f  the Musharraf government. 
Vertical programs undermine planning and budgeting in local government and reduce 
the commitment of senior s ta8 Vertical programs have largely but not entirely outlived 
their usefulness. Given pressure to improve service delivery and the perception that 
central control i s  required to overcome local governance problems, federal governments 
and donors alike have favored vertical programs. That approach, however, represents an 
outdated mindset that held central control to be feasible, a v iew refuted by very strong 
evidence that such top-down management causes as many problems as it solves. 
Senior stafl andpoliticians from the provincial governments feel devalued. Devolution 
was seen as a zero-sum game in which any gains for local government were inevitably 
losses for the provinces. This problem i s  clearly evident in the jurisdictional conflicts 
outlined in detail in the second volume (Annex 1-Recent History), particularly the 
problem o f  politicians in higher levels o f  government claiming credit for the efforts o f  
local governments (Box 12, Annex 1-Recent History). This verdict will not  change 
without some credible signals being sent about the future role o f  the provinces and, very 
particularly, without the transfer o f  functions f rom federal t o  provincial governments 
along with at least the medium term prospect o f  reducing the chronic vertical fiscal 
imbalances. 
Senior staflandpoliticians from the local governments consider themselves to be under 
threat from theprovinces. M a n y  feel that the provincial governments wil l seek ways to 
undermine their performance however determined their efforts. T h i s  feeling i s  certainly 
justif ied in districts that are polit ically opposed to the province (for example, K i l l a  
Saifullah and Khairpur), where the province can use i ts  administrative control over senior 
district staff, such as the DCO, to  influence the f l ow  o f  funds and the implementation o f  
local development schemes. Mir ror ing the federal-provincial relationships, some credible 
signals o f  future intentions are necessary; they need to include further transfer o f  some 
functions such as PHED to  local authorities and the prospect o f  some tax reassignments 
and debt-for-performance swaps. Certain weaknesses that have emerged in the 
implementation o f  the LGO concerning sanctioning powers in local government, the 
monitoring committee and the weak oversight offered by the Local  Govemment 
Commission also need to be addressed. 
Senior staff andpoliticians from local governments have not yet realized the degree to 
which they are in charge of their own affairs. For example, as discussed in the second 
volume (Annex 1-Recent History), local governments remain heavily reliant o n  
provincial revenue transfers and, whi le not ing that the taxes assigned to  them lack 
buoyancy and potency, they have not fully uti l ized user charges as potential sources o f  
own source revenue increases. The past has, o f  course, shaped the present, and despite the 
large numbers o f  new councilors, a legacy o f  dependency and o f  waiting for  instruction 
hangs on. Local governments are n o w  in a position to reduce the development throw- 
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forward, to increase the coverage o f  user charges and to improve inter-jurisdiction 
planning and coordination 
Federal and provincial governments do not perceive many alternatives to vertical 
programs. The debate has been cast in terms o f  either seeking, ineffectively, to over- 
determine the behavior o f  sub-national governments through vertical programs, or 
abandoning both the programs and any prospects for communicating the PRSP goals 
f rom the federal to the provincial and then to the local level. The potential use o f  
conditional grants as an interim measure to achieve service-delivery and poverty- 
reduction goals has not yet won the full accord o f  federal and provincial governments. 
The range o f  such grants available to federal and provincial governments can be 
increased through negotiations with the donors and by improving the range and quality o f  
social-indicator data available. 
District governments do not employ their own s tas  As noted earlier, and elaborated in 
the second volume (Annex I-Recent Histoly), local governments have litt le de facto 
control over the APT authorities o f  local staff, and especially l i tt le control over the DCO 
and DPO. The ambiguities in the present arrangements and the reality that, for  many 
district staff, there i s  n o  pressing reason to fo l low the instructions or the pol icy direction 
set by the nazim or the council will only be overcome through the creation o f  a distinct, 
local-government, career service. Accountability also requires the provincialization o f  
accounts as a f i rs t  step toward complete preparation by districts and the maintenance o f  
their own accounts. 
The separation ofjudicial and executive powers is incomplete. The reporting 
arrangements between the District Police Officer and the nazim are uncertain and the 
transfer o f  a l l  non-adjudicatory powers to the courts have combined to lower confidence 
in the police and judiciary even further. Nazimeen have l i t t le control over the police and 
as a result the enforcement o f  regulations has suffered, there has been some decline in 
prosecutions, and there i s  a widespread perception that corruption has risen. 
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3. Recommendations 
A STRATEGY FROM HERE 
T o  bolster devolution as a process and, in particular, i t s  impact o n  service delivery, i t s  architects 
and supporters need to take a strategic view o f  the challenges they face and the responses within 
their grasp. This chapter offers a range o f  practical actions that can be taken immediately to add 
momentum to  the transfer o f  authority, resources and responsibilities. I t  opens, though, by 
examining three key considerations shaping an overall strategy that would 
1) Raise awareness o f  devolution’s gains and potential, 
2) Incorporate flexibil i ty within the framework o f  basic principles and 
3) Make  local governments allies in pursuing national priorities. 
Seize the Opportunity Presented by the NFC Award 
Note the successes 
The successes o f  devolution are not  widely known. Three are clear. 
First, it has changed the incentives for nazimeen, senior staff and service providers within districts 
and TMAs: 
Provincial efficiency incentives. 
o Budgets are predictable 
o 
o 
Significant autonomy has been achieved in preparing the non-salary recurrent 
budget 
Despite problems with the tax bases and administrative collection arrangements, 
clear revenue assignments have been provided along with some incentives for  
local revenue-raising. 
Incentives have been created for nazimeen to respond more directly t o  the 
concerns o f  citizens without resorting to  the time-honored approach o f  providing 
patronage jobs and small schemes. 
Councilors have become public figures, earning significant polit ical legitimacy 
fol lowing good voter turnout and pol i t ical  contestation and evidence o f  increased 
contact between citizens and policymakers. 
There are some sporadic but encouraging signs in relation to the Citizen 
Community Boards and the School Management Committees. 
Citizen power over nazimeen. 
o 
o 
Citizen power over service providers. 
o 
Second, i t has already led to some visible service-delivery and fiscal gains: 
Anecdotal reports find doctors more often present in health facilities and teachers in 
schools than was the case before devolution. Reportedly the l ikelihood has increased that 
local facilities, particularly in health, will actually have o n  hand medicines available for  
treating patients. 
Determined and dynamic nazimeen can already achieve significant results as long as they 
have a free hand and n o  undue interference f rom the provinces. 
Contract-based employment i s  being used to  prevent permanent liabilities arising. 
Finally, i t  has marked a decisive break f rom the past: 
The 1973 Constitutional provision regarding the separation o f  powers has finally been 
achieved in local governance. 
Local  government n o w  has unambiguous constitutional protection. 
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0 33 percent o f  local council seats are reserved for women in al l  three levels o f  local 
government. 
200,000 - 
180,000 - 
160,000 - 
140,000 - 
120,000 - 
100,000 - 
80,000 - 
60,000 - 
40,000 - 
A public information campaign setting out both progress and problems would assist in 
entrenching devolution and in spurring a more open debate about the options f rom here. N o w  i s  
the time for such a campaign. The NFC decision i s  l ikely to be announced soon and offers a 
significant opportunity to kick-start this debate. 
The SigniJicance of the likely NFC Award 
Figure 9 depicts the increase in provincial consolidated funds that might emerge as a result o f  the 
new N F C  award. 
Figure 9: Provincial Consolidated Funds under New and Old NFC Scenarios 
Current transfers 
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Assumptions: 
Note; These assumptions model the transfers as st i l l  including the existing grants-despite the probability that these would be 
incorporated in the p o o l L o n  the basis that if they are in fact incorporated into the pool  then a formula w i l l  be sought that 
roughly replicates the current pattern, and so the effect would be the same. 
Source: ADB/DfID/WB D S D  Dataset 2-and staff calculations from the f low o f  funds model. 
I 
The projections w i th  increasing provincial shares have been simulated on the total revenue collected in FY 2003. 
The  inter-provincial sharing formula remains the same (population based and the population proportions o f  1998 census 
are used). 
There i s  no change in the amount o f  straight transfers, special transfers or provincial OSR. 
In turn, the federal government appears to be advocating the abolition o f  the OZT offset and 
special grants, as wel l  as a revision o f  the Div is ib le Pool  allocation formula. The current 
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allocation formula might be extended beyond population to include area or the Human 
Development Index. Mov ing  to a full formula-based allocation f rom the Divisible Pool  carries 
significant polit ical challenges. Political reality may require that relative changes in overall 
provincial allocation amounts not differ significantly between provinces. In that case, the 
provinces would be l ike ly  to receive on the order o f  10 percent more federal transfers each, a not 
insignificant windfall. In tum, Sindh may argue for additional revenue sharing (for example, o f  
customs revenues), as formula-driven transfers tend to work against it. 
The provincial-local implications o f  a revised N F C  are unclear. N o t  only i s  there much 
uncertainty about what the changes in transfers to the provinces will be, individual provinces’ 
decisions on h o w  to pass these resources o n  to their local governments may be even more 
uncertain. Any simulation o f  the impact o f  a revised NFC award o n  local governments i s  
therefore highly speculative. However, higher federal divisible pool  transfers to  the provinces 
enhance the significance o f  the provincial finance commissions (PFCs). Overall increases in 
provincial-local transfers will l ikely exceed current allocations o n  existing recurrent expenditures 
(mainly district wages). These additional resources will therefore l ike ly  be distributed in accord 
with the evolving PFC formulas. The abolition o f  the OZT offset, impl ic i t  in the full merging o f  
the additional GST revenues in the Provincial Allocable, will also end the impl ic i t  earmarlung o f  
these resources to TMAs based o n  their historical levels o f  collection. 
Assuming that the resultant increases in provincial resources are made available to  local 
govemments under the same sharing arrangements, including the application o f  the current 
Provincial Retained and Allocable ratios as wel l  as maintaining salary and development 
proportions, then a 50 percent NFC award would impact o n  DSD District spending as shown in 
Table 18. I t  may, however, be argued that the Provincial Allocable should enjoy a proportionately 
greater share o f  the increase, given the PRSP spending priorities. 
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Table 18: Potential Increase in District Budgets with N e w  NFC A w a r d  
I Baseline NFC at 37.5 percent NFC at 50 percent allocation 
(Rs. million) 
District Development Salary ment Salary previous budget 
Develop- Percent of 
Source: ADB/DfID/WB D S D  Dataset 2-and staff calculations f rom the flow o f  funds model. 
Assumptions: 
The simulation compares the projections w i th  the baseline revised budget estimates o f  FY 
2003. 
T h e  inter-provincial sharing formula remains the same (population-based, using the 
population proportions o f  the 1998 census). 
There i s  no  change in the amount o f  straight transfers, special transfers or provincial OSR. 
Provincial Allocable i s  calculated using the current ratio but applied to the entire 
Provincial Consolidated Fund. 
T h e  share o f  the district is calculated using the formula for sharing development funds 
prescribed by PFC in that province. 
T h e  additional revenues are divided among development and salary allocations in 
accordance with their FY 2003 proportions. 
Assuming, not  unrealistically, that the major share o f  additional resources i s  in fact available for 
development spending, the impact in the six districts studied would o f  course be even more 
dramatic, ranging in the study sample districts f rom 270 percent for  K i l l a  Saifullah to 7,400 
percent for  Faisalabad (see the third volume, Annex 2-Technical Considerations, for  details). 
The magnitude o f  increase i s  so significant as to warrant a rapid consideration by PFCs o f  the 
lunds o f  grant systems to be used to transfer these resources in ways that also pursue PRSP 
priorities. 
A public-information campaign launched in tandem with the announcement o f  the NFC Award 
might set out the l imited evidence o n  devolution’s successes and challenges-but more 
importantly, i t could highlight the goals that devolution i s  seeking to reach and invite debate o n  
the best ways to achieve them. 
Enforce the Core Principles-and Accommodate Local  Differences 
The implementation challenges have evolved in two ways. First, the message of  devolution has 
gone f rom the broad and visionary to the narrow and technical. The March  2000 announcement o f  
the devolution plan and the subsequent August 2000 Local  Govemment Plan presented a broad 
strategic vision (National Reconstruction Bureau: 2000). Subsequent debate has focused o n  the 
technical issues o f  implementation-with a strong focus on the technical fiscal and administrative 
aspects and an underlying concem about the degree o f  compliance with the Local  Govemment 
Ordinances. 
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Box 8: Celebrate Modest Diversity 
The ED0 Education in Rawalpindi announced that he will decentralize his powers to  enable teachers to 
seek resolution o f  human-resource management issues at the tehsil level. The ED0 said, “It was 
physically impossible for me to  handle a l l  issues. The district education department has to  handle 22,000 
personnel. H o w  is i t  possible for a single person to  deal with such a large number o f  people, especially 
when there are heaps o f  problems?” The DDO, the DEOs, and the DDEOs have been empowered to  deal 
with a l l  cases o f  teachers in the i r  respective areas. Off ice bearers o f  Ittehad-e-Assataza Pakistan expressed 
their great appreciation o f  the EDO’s step, which they said, had solved the long-pending problems o f  the 
teachmg community. 
Source: Dawn, January 19,2004. 
Second, the range o f  actors has grown exponentially. Whi le the NRB alone supervised the pre- 
October 2002 phase o f  devolution-defining policy, assigning new functions, powers and 
responsibilities to existing and newly created organizations and enacting laws and regulations to 
make these arrangements durable, in the present phase this i s  neither possible nor desirable. 
Unl ike the first stage o f  devolution, the process o f  adapting the new institutional arrangements to 
local circumstances will now depend on the sustained efforts o f  elected and administrative 
officials at federal, province and local levels, not  least by devising ways to productively engage 
private sector and c iv i l  society in this process. 
The increasing complexity o f  the actors that must implement the next stages o f  devolution argues 
for some relaxation o f  the one-size-fits-all approach, with some recognition that provinces are 
l ike ly  to fo l low slightly divergent paths. Since local governments across the country face very 
diverse situations (Qadir: 2003), some variance in implementation i s  not  only inevitable but also 
welcome (Box 8). Turning a constructive blind eye to some o f  the more marginal differences has 
prevented needless federal-provincial conflict, and has started devolution along a path that wil l be 
o f  strategic value in the future-where basic principles are recognized and enforced, but where, in 
the detail, local institutions are tailored to local circumstances. 
N o w  that the basics are in place, the message f rom the federal government might perhaps return 
to  the level o f  broader principles rather than detailed implementation  instruction^.^^ T o  achieve 
this, in a context o f  many veto-players, strong leadership f rom the Prime Minister’s Office will be 
crucial. 
Transmit National Policv Priorities More  Effectivelv 
Move from an over-reliance on vertical programs 
At the federal level, specific purpose or conditional grants in the context o f  Pakistan’s 
intergovernmental fiscal system remain small compared to other types o f  transfers, although a 
variety o f  programs have existed in the past (Ahmad and Wasti: 2003).42 Provincial governments 
re ly  largely on block transfers f rom the divisible pool  (revenue sharing), “straight transfers,” and 
“special lump sum transfers” for  backwardness. “Other transfers and development grants,” 
similar t o  conditional or special purpose grants, total 2.3 percent and 3 percent o f  federal 
recurrent transfers in FY 2002/03 and 2003/04. However, these figures do not  include on-lent 
donor projects, which continue to  p lay a significant role in provincial finances. These are 
4’ 
42 
Tight-loose tactics, that is, holding fast to core principles, while allowing diversity in implementation, are well 
known. See particularly (Bellamy and Taylor: 1998; Peters and Waterman: 1982; Witkin and Berry: 1975). 
International experience with conditional grants varies significantly, although they appear to find some role 
alongside unconditional revenue sharing via block grants in most federations (Shah: 1994, Annex F). The  third 
volume (Annex 2-Technical Considerations) presents the evidence conceming their usage. 
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undoubtedly significant; the federal and provincial governments continue to operate a wide range 
o f  vertical programs, many o f  them effectively earmarked, conditional grants (see the third 
volume, Annex 2-Technical Considerations). 
Provincial governments use earmarlung to a very large degree. F rom the perspective o f  the 
districts, between 30 percent and 60 percent o f  the total resource flows for development projects 
within their geographical boundaries are earmarked. In the study TMAs, between 19 percent and 
59 percent o f  the transfers are within the appropriation authority o f  the TMAs. 
In sum, Pakistan uses conditional grants to a very l imited degree-but when it does, it tends to 
favor earmarking through vertical programs. The result i s  that a large share o f  financing for 
health, education, water supply and sanitation i s  delivered in ways that systematically undermine 
local government accountability. 
Vertical programs represent attempts by higher tiers o f  government to influence the policy and 
behavior o f  lower-level governments by direct intervention. Retaining some influence over sub- 
national pol icy i s  sensible. Federal and provincial governments need some levers to  influence 
local priorities in order to  achieve national objectives such as minimum standards in education 
and health, to foster internal economic union and to meet spillover effects (see Shah: 1994). In 
practice, though, vertical programs have a poor track record, and they are n o w  damaging the 
nascent accountability, credibility and authority o f  local governments. 
Pragmatism not purity 
Table 19 shows the relationship o f  vertical programs to other forms o f  conditional grants and to 
unconditional b lock grants. One goal i s  to seek movements, where possible f rom lef t  to right in 
order to reduce the damage that the transfers cause to sub-national accountability. This entails 
replacing vertical programs in the medium term as the primary instruments for  expressing federal 
and province government policies and, in particular, PRSP service delivery commitments. 
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Table 19: Characteristics and Impact of  Vertical Programs and Conditional Grants 
Shown in the 
budget of: 
Conditioned 
on: 
Expenditure 
control and 
accountability 
arrangements: 
Awarded 
through: 
Degree that 
systems are 
made part o f  
normal 
functioning of 
sub-national 
governments: 
Transaction 
costs: 
Likely 
damage to 
sub-national 
accountability 
I 
Vertical programs 
Most -Least I Conditional grants Unconditional block grants 
vertical 
Higher level 
government 
Not  conditional- 
based on project 
agreement 
Parallel project 
facility managed 
b y  higher level 
government 
Individual mnistries or departments 
vertical 
Sub-national 
govemment 
(but might 
require pre- 
authorization 
by higher level 
Inputs 
(earmarking), 
0' PE9ceSs.!3 ............ 
Sub-national 
govemment- 
but w i th  
special 
arrangements 
(local imprest 
w i th  either ex 
ante or ex post 
gove-Fmen!).. ........ 
.C!?!??O!S) ....................... 
Sub-national government 
............................................................................... ............... 
Processes, i No t  conditional 
outputs or 
Rely on existing provincial or local govemment 
accounts control 
outc!?.Ees ................................ i .......................................... .................. ......... 
......................................................................................................................................................................... 
: NFCPFC 
Parallel systems Parallel systems plus quasi legal Integrated w i th  statutory 
compacts arrangements b y  design 
................................................. .......................... ................................................................................................................................ ~ ................................................................................................................. 
Veryhigh- ~ I Moderate-proliferation o f  grants j Low-few, strategic 
special purpose I creates demands on local i conditional grants. 
units and ' administration 
establishments . 
High 4 Low 
The approach to  that goal, however, needs to be realistic. A simplistic conversion o f  a l l  transfers 
into formula-based b lock grants might present some risks. In particular, although i t  i s  changing 
rapidly under the new devolved arrangements, the polit ical economy s t i l l  prevalent at provincial 
and local-government levels might provide incentives for provincial and local governments to  use 
additional decentralized resources for other purposes than meeting PRSP goals.43 Thus where the 
challenge i s  to provide incentives to meet higher-level standards or otherwise to  influence local 
priorities, then grants conditioned o n  outputs, outcomes or processes can be tools o f  a reasonable 
43 This risk has also been noted in other settings. See (Andrews and Schroeder: 2003). 
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strategy. Grants should not be conditioned on inputs (that is,  not  earmarked o n  inputs) see Table 
20, and should not attempt to  cover multiple objectives within the same grant. 
Table 20: Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design 
Grant Objective 
To bridge fiscal gap 
To reduce regional 
fiscal disparities 
To compensate for 
benefit spillovers 
Setting national 
minimum standards 
Influencing local 
priorities in areas o f  
high national but low 
local priority 
Stabilization 
Grant Design 
Reassign responsibilities 
Tax abatement 
Tax base sharing 
General Non-matching Fiscal 
capacity equalization transfers 
Open-ended matching transfers 
with matching rate consistent 
with spill-out o f  benefits 
Conditional non-matching 
block transfers with conditions 
on standards o f  service and 
access 
Open-ended matching transfers 
(with preferably matching rate 
to vary inversely with fiscal 
cauacitv) 
Capital grants provided 
maintenance possible 
Source; (Shah: 1994, 1998). Also in (World Bank: 1997). 
Better Practices 
Tax abatement and tax base 
sharing in Canada 
Fiscal equalization programs o f  
Australia, Canada and Germany 
Republic o f  South Africa grant 
for teaching hospitals 
Indonesia pre-2000 roads and 
primary education grants 
Colombia and Chile education 
transfers 
Matching transfers for social 
assistance as in Canada 
Limit use o f  capital grants and 
encourage private sector 
participation by providing 
political and policy risk 
guarantee 
Practices to avoid 
Deficit grants 
Tax by tax shanng 
General revenue 
sharing with multiple 
factors 
Conditional transfers 
with conditions on 
spending alone 
Ad hoc grants 
Ad hoc grants 
Stabilization grants 
with no future 
upkeep requirements 
Whi le inferior as a means o f  transferring full accountability to sub-national governments, 
conditional grants represent a pragmatic approach one which recognizes that the federal 
government maintains a legitimate interest in provincial, district and local institutional reforms 
and service delivery arrangements. 
Table 21: Benchmarks in Moving from Vertical Investment Programs to Conditional Grants 
To the extent that they are necessary, conditional grants should a im  to incorporate the features 
listed in the right-hand column o f  Table 21. However, in the first instance, data problems might 
require that these conditional grants take the form o f  the transitional mechanisms also set out in 
Table 21, to be replaced as quickly as data systems improve by conditional grants coordinated 
through the mechanism o f  the NFC and PFC. Box 9 provides some illustrations. 
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T a b l e  19 had h i g h l i g h t e d  the signif icance o f  coord inat ing such  grants through t h e  mechanisms o f  
the  NFC and PFCs, but also notes that real ist ical ly, th is  i s  not attainable in the shor t  term.  
Box 9: Incentives for Restructuring in Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation and 
Uganda 
Incentives for restructuring in the Russian Federation 
A federal Regional Fiscal Reform Fund (RFRF) has been established with W o r l d  Bank assistance. 
Disbursements f r o m  the fund are made to  regions that have chosen to enter a competition-conditional o n  
their success in implementing two-phase reforms o f  public finance. Disbursement o f  the f i rs t  phase i s  
conditional o n  (inter alia): 
Comprehensive budgets 
Reduction in wage arrears 
Reductions in non-monetary receipts 
Disbursement o f  the second installment i s  conditional on: 
Reductions in off-budget resources. 
Introduction o f  3 year budget framework 
Publication in the mass media o f  budget, debt and procurement details. 
Compliance with minimum quality standards in budget management 
Establishment o f  single treasury account 
Conditional and Unconditional Transfers in Uganda 
The Local  Government Development Program (LGDP) has been p ivota l  in Uganda’s fiscal 
decentralization. Since the beginning o f  fiscal decentralization in FY 1994, Uganda faced a familiar 
quandary. H o w  could development resources be devolved to local governments to a l low elected leaders to  
p lan and allocate them according to  local preferences, w h l e  at the same t ime insuring the PRSP objectives 
for health, education, water, rural roads, and so forth would b e  priori t ized by local councils? By 1998 the 
need to address this question was becoming more acute: as a result o f  HIPC, budgets for health, education, 
water, roads and other PRSP priorit ies were increasing rapidly. Rather than address the question, donors 
and central government had  preferred to  create additional vertical programs and highly restrictive 
conditional grants. Evaluations o f  local government performance demonstrated that t h i s  was having adverse 
impacts o n  local government governance and undermining devolution. 
The L G D P  was created to provide a common set o f  standards for judging performance and at the same t ime 
to channel resources to  local governments in ways that allowed local councilors to decide h o w  they wou ld  
be allocated. 
All local governments have access to  a formula-based local government grant, however their access and 
level of hnding i s  dependent o n  the annual local-government assessment. 
Loca l  governments are assessed o n  their corporate performance, against minimum requirements and 
benchmarks related to  areas such as planning, budgeting, f inancial management, engineering 
capacity-all o f  w h c h  are derived f r o m  existing laws. 
Those local governments that do  not  meet minimum requirements get n o  local development grant. 
However they do  remain eligible for a capacity-building grant enabling them to  upgrade their 
performance. 
The hghest-scoring local governments in the assessment receive 10 percent greater allocations under 
the Local  Development Grant. 
The LGDP framework has provided a strong incentive for local governments to  upgrade their corporate 
performance. I t  shows that benchmarkmg can be carried out in a developing-country context o f  l imi ted 
administrative capacity. I t  also has become a common accountability p la t form for a range o f  donor- 
financed, sector-specific grant systems. 
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Risks of Overuse 
Over-reliance on conditional grants can prove detrimental to local government performance and 
accountability. Disaggregated data are very diff icult to obtain, but Table 22 suggests that 
typically, in federal jurisdictions, n o  more than 10 percent o f  federal-provincial transfers take this 
Federation 
Argentina 
B raz i l  
Mex ico  
Nigeria 
Russia 
South 
Afr ica 
Uni ted 
States 
Table 22: Conditional Grants in Major Federations 
Specific Purpose Grants 
Variety o f  special funds 
Health and education earmarking 
(FundeflSUS), and guidelines o n  
minimum expenditures in these 
sectors. 
Limited Discretionary Funding 
Aportaciones restricted (Webb and 
Gonzales: 2003) 
Education Tax Fund (ETF) (World 
Bank: 2001) 
By 1998, adopted pol icy  to  shift 
toward unconditional grant programs 
(“equitable share”), and freeze levels 
o f  existing discretionary grants 
(Bahl: 2001) 
Wide array o f  federal sectoral 
programs 
Approximate Share 
43 percent in 1997 (Haggard and Webb: 2001, table 
5) 
L e s s  than 10 percent as per 1988 Constitution 
(Haggard and Webb: 2001, table 5) 
Discretionary grants 2 percent o f  total state and 
municipal revenues in 1999 (Wor ld  Bank: 2002)’ 
Less than h a l f  in 1998, and declining (Haggard and 
Webb: 2001, table 5) 
In the late 199Os, various special o r  conditional 
grants accounted for over a third o f  transfers to  the 
regions (Martinez-Vazouez and Boex: 2001). 
Over 90 percent o f  U S  federal grants to  states and 
local governments in the 1990s were conditional o r  
categorical. However, sub-national governments 
were only  dependent o n  the federal government for 
about a fifth o f  their revenues (Ma: 1997). 
Consequently, the share o f  conditional grants in 
sub-national revenues totaled only  about 18 percent. 
Moreover the extent o f  deconcentrated vertical 
programs in quite l imited. 
In addition to  the general grant program, the federal government makes grants to  the states and 
municipalities (which have their own constitutional status) for  a variety o f  specific purposes, and states also 
conduct projects o n  behalf o f  the national government. Moreover, there has been a significant use o f  
“voluntary” o r  “negotiated” transfers, often for po l i t ica l  purposes. 
The Source of funding matters 
Over and above these design features, any federal-provincial conditional grants must, o f  course, 
be funded f rom the federally retained portion o f  the federal divisible pool. I t  will be diff icult t o  
argue for their funding from the provincial share o f  revenue sharing to which the provinces can 
argue they have a constitutional right. Province-local conditional grants are less constrained as 
local governments are legislative and not constitutional creations. 
44 See (Craig and Porter: 2003) for an account o f  the negative consequences o f  over-reliance on conditional grants in 
Uganda. 
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PRACTICAL ACTIONS TOWARD THE 7 GOALS 
The three-point strategy discussed above can provide a push to make devolution h l l y  operative. 
I t  supports the PRSP (Box 10) and serves to hurry history toward the fol lowing goals: 
Box 10: Fine-Tuning Devolution in the 
PRSP 
“Devolution i s  now a ground reality. The 
al l  its components and consolidation that 
include (a) some modifications such as the 
direct election o f  zila and tehsil nazimeen; 
(b) some additions such as federal to 
provincial devolution to strengthen 
provincial autonomy; and (c) federal and 
provincial restructuring.” 
Source: (Government of Palustan: 2003, p. 
591 
challenge now is the imp1ementation Of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Some steps can bring immediate relief. Others can 
prepare the ground for the medium term. Setting a 
series o f  clear goals i s  the foundation o f  a tight- 
loose strategy that maintains the core principles but 
date, i t i s  important to move forward in those areas 
that offer opportunities for visible wins, at the same 
time avoiding needless battles for  small gains. 
The actions proposed to meet these goals are not  
original but have been derived fi-om wide-ranging 
studies and consultations, supported by other recent 
reports (see Table 23). 
allows local diversity. To entrench the gains to 
Devolved governance accepted as irreversible; 
The federal government credibly committed to strengthen the future role o f  the provinces; 
The provincial governments credibly committed to strengthen the future role o f  local 
govemmen t ; 
Local  governments challenged to demonstrate that they merit confidence; 
A menu o f  conditional grants enabled; 
Local  governments held to account; and 
Full separation o f  executive and judicial powers. 
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Completing Devolution Accepted as Inevitable 
Box 11: Fostering Debate on Decentralization 
“Decentralization i s  a dynamic process. N o  country ever gets i t  right on its first try. Circumstances 
change, and the nature and design o f  intergovernmental fiscal relations should change also. An important 
aspect o f  establishing an adequate institutional framework for decentralization i s  thus to build in some 
‘error-correction’ mechanism, that is, to permit and encourage the adaptive development and evolution o f  
the system in response to changes in needs and capacities. 
“Much more informed and open discussion o f  these matters than now prevails in most countries i s  needed. 
Regular publication o f  relevant data would help, but one cannot rely solely on an interested party (the 
central government) to carry out, le t  alone publish, all the information needed for public discussion. In 
countries in which intergovernmental fiscal issues are important, consideration might therefore be given to 
establishing a small nongovernmental research institute focusing on local government problems.” 
Source: (Bird: 2001). 
The goal i s  t o  achieve a consensus among Palustan’s governments, citizens and donor partners 
that stable and significant assignment o f  taxing powers and functional responsibilities to elected 
sub-national governments i s  the only credible strategy for lasting improvements in service 
delivery and achievement o f  PRSP commitments. 
Achieving the goal requires engagement with a much broader range o f  stakeholders (Box 11). 
Palustan’s devolution was wel l  served by publication o f  the Local  Government Plan 2000. T h i s  
creative document set the agenda and established a common framework for  the host o f  parties to 
devolution. Since then, a slew o f  ordinances, amendments, codes, regulations and guidelines, not 
surprisingly, have f i l led in the space created by the Devolution Plan 2000. 
Other countries at comparable stages o f  devolution have found it vital to revisit the original 
statements, l ike that published by the NRl3 March  2000, and prepare a white paper to 
communicate clearly the nature o f  the steps government intends to take to  complete the 
devolution project. Such a strategic paper would revisit the original Devolution Plan, identify 
elements that may be reconsidered or configured differently (for example, the role o f  Public 
Safety Commissions at union, thana, and tehsil levels, or Vi l lage and Neighborhood councils), 
modified (for example, how to implement the LGO in the Cantonments or  Federally 
Administered Tribal Agencies), or newly introduced (for example, the proposed five-part 
independent service group). I t  would outline h o w  remaining steps are to  be introduced over time 
and present a renewed appeal t o  the polit ical parties and donors. Most  importantly, such a paper 
could assist in consolidating the currently broad citizen support for devolution (Pattan 
Development Organization: 2003). 
Although the main polit ical parties were in i t ia l ly  opposed to devolution, i t n o w  enjoys near 
bipartisan support. A white paper that sets out the potential benefits in terms o f  legitimacy and 
accountability that might be conferred by direct elections for district and tehsil leaders, as 
recently proposed by the government (Government o f  Pakistan: 2003, p. 54), might also provide 
an opportunity for Palustan’s polit ical parties to  make official, organizational commitments to 
devolution through their party manifestoes. Such a response becomes more l ike ly  if the pol icy 
statement explores possibilities for local governments to operate on an explicit ly party polit ical 
basis. This study has confirmed the key role that party affiliations continue to play in local 
government politics and the all-important relationship with province governments. 
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Box 12: Selling Decentral izat ion in Uganda  
Af ter  6 years o f  implementation, the Government o f  Uganda in 2001 designed and published a Fiscal 
Decentralization Strategy to streamline and communicate a process for moving the next stage o f  
decentralization forward in a way that enhanced local government budget autonomy, increased 
transparency-not just about fiscal transfers, but also important po l icy  decisions and performance-and 
ensured that strong linkages were created with the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy process. The 
Fiscal Decentralization Strategy, approved by Cabinet in 2002, has been pivotal in three important 
respects. First i t  has clearly delineated to sector ministries and local governments the way  forward o n  
completing fiscal decentralization. Second, it has challenged donors to  harmonize their procedures in a 
more devolution-friendly way. And third, the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy has helped gamer support 
for a broadly representative debate about the reforms involving c i v i l  society, parliamentarians, private 
sector and the c i v i l  service. 
Source: (Government o f  Uganda: 2003, p. 2). 
For  donors, the paper might reinforce the fact that for countries in the process o f  devolution and 
where a significant share o f  spending for social services i s  dependent on donor support, 
harmonizing donor procedures with devolution i s  critically important (Box 12) .45 Insuring that 
donors have sufficient, accurate, and timely information about progress and government 
intentions i s  one part o f  the equation. The other part i s  insuring that donors are reassured that the 
LGO, related ordinances and the hard-won budget, accounts and procurement codes form a 
common accountability framework for donor support. The goal: persuade donors that insisting o n  
vertical programs to protect special-purpose project delivery arrangements i s  less and less 
necessary. 
This study has documented many commendable efforts to perform wel l  in the face o f  the obvious 
constraints posed by a new and incompletely implemented Devolution Plan. But litt le i s  known o f  
these efforts. Devolved governance i s  seen as the only credible approach to a problem that has 
eluded Pakistan since Partition, namely to establish a set o f  institutional arrangements capable o f  
efficiently converting public resources into the delivery o f  services. Nevertheless, remarkably few 
o f  the many initiatives being taken by local governments receive the recognition they deserve. In 
country, the debate on devolution remains somewhat polarized and superficial. Internationally, 
the contrast could not be greater between the depth and intensity o f  academic and practitioner 
debate on the future o f  the big-bang devolution in Indonesia and the paucity o f  evaluation and 
critique o f  a reform in Palustan, which has, in many ways, been more fundamental. One possible 
mechanism for highlighting the progress that some determined nazimeen have made i s  a series o f  
federal and provincial award ceremonies, celebrating particular local successes. Other efforts 
should be made to increase the level o f  research and balanced media coverage o f  devolution. 
Act ion recommended: 
Issue a White Paper on strategic options for adjusting legal, administrative, polit ical and 
fiscal arrangements in support o f  devolution. 
45 (Annan: 1999; Brown, Foster, Norton and Naschold: 2001; Development Assistance Committee: 2003; Foster and 
Mackintosh-Walker: 2001 ; Teskey and Hooper: 1989) provide particular insights into the potential use o f  
conditional grants within SWAPS. 
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Demonstrable Federal Government Commitment to Strengthened Role of  the Provinces 
Timetable for the PRSP Commitment on Functional Devolution 
The PRSP makes the point that deconcentration o f  functions will not be complete until federal to 
provincial devolution takes place to strengthen provincial autonomy (Government o f  Palustan: 
2003). The government had previously announced i ts  intention at the Pakistan Development 
Forum in M a y  2003 to examine the roles o f  federal government in relation to  those o f  the 
Provinces and reallocate responsibilities more clearly to provinces on the basis o f  subsidiarity 
(assigning responsibilities to the level o f  government best placed to deal with the associated 
responsibilities, costs and benefits). Candidates for disengagement by the federal government 
include: population planning, agriculture, local govemment, tourism development, transport and 
communications, delivery o f  health, social welfare and women’s development and education 
services.46 This will entail the restructuring o f  the federal level to eliminate units that are 
unnecessarily duplicating provincial functions, such as education, health, and agnculture. It wil l 
also involve restructuring the provincial level to strengthen capacity for  pol icy formulation as 
well as winding down direct execution o f  functions being assumed by the local governments. 
The proportionate cuts in total employment would be small-around 3 percent o f  the existing 
workforce-representing some Rs. 27.1 b i l l ion in wage bill savings. The proportionate program 
savings would be more significant. However, the point i s  not  primarily fiscal although some fiscal 
sharing v ia  the NFC, to match new functional responsibilities, including through a special federal 
grant out o f  federal share of the divisible pool  may be necessary. The significance o f  the transfer 
o f  functions i s  that it demonstrates that the federal government recognizes that provinces are not 
just a problem to be bypassed in the march toward devolved governance. 
Some degree o f  hosti l i ty f rom provincial governments toward local governments and district 
governments, in particular, was noticeable throughout the study. Until relations between the 
federal and provincial governments are adjusted so as to complete devolution, such tensions can 
be expected. Provinces unambiguously considered that they had lost power and influence as a 
result o f  devolution. Devolution o f  these functions would ease provincial governments’ concern 
about becoming redundant in the wake o f  the major devolution to  the district governments, would 
lift the morale of the provincial c iv i l  service and enable the federal government to focus o n  i t s  
key strategic functions. 
Act ion recommended: 
0 Federal government to conf i rm i t s  planned timing for functional reassignment to provinces. 
Preparations in hand for the 7‘j NFC Award now 
The problems o f  inappropriate federal-provincial tax assignments and burdensome and expensive 
provincial debt are wel l  known and have been debated for  some time. 
46 Similar arguments are made in (Shah and others: 1996; World Bank: 2003a, p. 87). 
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Figure 10: The Spectrum of Autonomy in Tax 
Revenues 
Own 
Tax 
Revenue 
Tax 
Revenue 
Sharing 
Subnational govemment sets tax rate and 
Subnational govemment sets tax rate only 
Subnational government sets tax base 
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consent of Subnational government 
Revenue split fixed in Iegijlanon (ma! be 
changed unilaterallv by the central  . .  
govemment) 
Revenue split determined by the central 
govemment 
Central govemment sets rate and base o f  
Subnational govemment tax 
decentralized 
Il 
centralized 
Source: Developed from (Ebel and Yilmaz: 2002). 
Existing provincial taxes and user charges 
are inefficient and inequitable, and are 
incapable o f  generating sufficient 
revenues to meet a significant share o f  
provincial expenditure needs (Malik: 
2003; Shah and others: 1996; 
W o r l d  Bank: 2000). Admittedly, 
provincial tax effort has, in addition, been 
lackluster but in significant part this has 
been due to reliance o n  numerous, 
frequently changing, low-yield tax 
instruments, and poor tax records that 
have created strong incentives for  tax 
evasion. 
T w o  measures have been consistently recommended. First, whi le collection remained a federal 
responsibility, the provincial revenue base could be expanded by allowing sharing o f  selected 
federal tax bases (income tax and possibly GST) through provincial add-ons over and above the 
federal rates. Second, some taxes and charges can be devolved to provincial governments (for 
example, the specific-purpose excise duties such as those o n  tobacco products) (see Figure 10). 
The rationale for  these moves was most recently developed in (World Bank: 2000,2001) and 
emphasized in (Malik: 2003). 
A further and more complex question concerns an expansion in the base o f  the GST o n  services. 
This apparently attractive proposition i s  fraught with technical problems, as while this i s  (by 
default) a provincially assigned revenue, most o f  the services o n  which it should be charged are 
federal functions (telecoms, electricity transmission and distribution, gas distribution, a large 
proportion o f  transport, including air travel, railways, and sea travel). The provincial governments 
have an interest in expanding the GST base to these services, and a committee has been 
established to finalize recommendations o n  this matter. Mos t  o f  these services are taxed by 
imposing a federal excise duty or GST whi le treating the relevant outputs as goods rather than 
services. This i s  not  the only problem. At the moment, the revenue f rom the tax i s  distributed as 
per the NFC formula. As a result, the provinces disagree o n  which services to expand the GST to. 
For  example, since the bulk o f  financial services are located in Sindh and Punjab, NWFP and 
Balochistan would l ike the tax to be expanded on these services in order to  obtain more revenue 
without either significant impact o n  economic activity in the province or major polit ical fall-out. 
Despite these difficulties, on balance this i s  a sensible pol icy option. 
The challenges faced by the provinces as they labor under a high burden o f  expensive Cash 
Development Loans (CDLs) are also wel l  identified in recent studies (World Bank: 2000).47 In 
addition to explicit liabilities, the provinces have substantial contingent ones, mostly in the form 
o f  unfunded pension liabilities (pensions are pay-as-you-go) and debt guarantees and workers’ 
compensation obligations o f  provincial autonomous bodies (Table 24). Due  to  the rapid growth in 
provincial employment in the early 1970s, pension payments have increased sharply. 
47 CDLs constitute the overwhelming majority of all provincial debt. T h e  other debts are market loans, foreign 
exchange loans on-lent by the federal govemment and floating debt-the bulk o f  it acquired in the mid-1990s as a 
result o f  the 1997 NFC provision permitting provinces to borrow from the State Bank o f  Pakistan to meet short- 
term cash flow. That leeway inadvertently encouraged fiscal mismanagement in the provinces by allowing their 
governments to finance their revenue deficits through borrowing. 
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Urged by the federal g~vernment ,~ '  provinces 
structural adiustment and uublic-resource 
Tab1e 24: Outstanding Debt Against have used the opportunity presented by recent Provinces, July 2003 
Province Debt Interest (2003- 
Punj ab 82,983.28 12,237.44 
Sindh 40,121.60 5,936.27 
NWFP 35,427.3 1 4,298.16 
Balochistan 15,386.22 
(2003) 04) 
World Bank and ADB to seek federal government 
dispensation for early retirement o f  the CDLs. 
Their action has created a more sustained fiscal 
space at the provincial level, since the interest 
payments include a significant subsidy f rom the 
In preparing for the next NFC Award, the government might also wish to propose the size and 
scope o f  a standing secretariat with a significant technical capacity to evaluate options for future 
Commissions and prepare detailed pol icy alternatives. B o x  13 provides some comparisons. 
Box 13: Technical Capacity Available to Other Intergovernmental Finance Commissions 
The Finance and Fiscal Commission (FFC) in South Afr ica was established by Section 220 o f  the 
Constitution o f  the Republic o f  South Africa. The Financial and Fiscal Commission was instituted to  
provide advice with respect t o  the equitable sharing o f  revenue and other intergovernmental f iscal issues, 
and to  limit subjective pol i t ical decisions regarding the allocation o f  public resources in the spheres o f  
national, provincial and local government. 
The FFC i s  a permanent expert commission. Act ing as an advisory body, it i s  mandated to  make 
recommendations o n  financial and fiscal matters to  parliament, the provincial legislatures and any other 
institutions o f  government when necessary. The FFC i s  separate f r o m  government and therefore i s  able to  
perform impartial checks and balances between the three levels o f  government. I t  facilitates cooperation 
o n  intergovernmental fiscal matters. 
Excluding the outsourced legal advice and human resource functions, the FFC has 23 permanent 
professional staff, divided between a finance administration and operations department and a research 
program. Staff include a librarian, information specialists and specialist researchers. 
48 The Finance Minister urged provinces to develop provincial debt-repayment strategies so as to reduce their debt 
servicing costs when presiding over the first meeting o f  the reconstituted National Finance Commission (NFC) to 
discuss the 6th NFC Award on November 19,2003. 
The Federal Minister o f  Finance has announced the government's willingness to revise the rate o f  interest on loans 
extended to the provinces in next year's budget. (Dawn, February 22,2004). 
49 
78 
Act ion recommended: 
Establish High Level Expert Group o n  federal-provincial tax reassignment (including 
possible debt-for-performance swaps), to report within 2 years 
Ensure adequate technical capacity and resourcing for standing NFC secretariat 
Box 14: The PRSP Recognizes the Need to 
Resolve Jurisdictional Rivalries 
“At t h i s  point, there i s  some degree of overlap and 
mismatch between responsibilities for  design o f  
the program, implementation and delivery. Ths i s  
part ly due to the ongoing devolution process 
devolving f r o m  upper level t o  lower levels o f  
the next 2-3 years wil l need to better al ign 
accountabilities and expenditures, resources, and 
administrative and po l i cy  functions.” 
Source: (Govemment o f  Pakistan: 2003, p. 68). 
government, and thus, the government’s effort in 
Demonstrable Provincial Government Commitment to Strengthening Local Government 
Progress has been made in Punjab and Sindh. 
In NWFP and Balochistan completing the 
transfer o f  authoiity will require significant 
recurrent expenditure of R ~ .  3 0 ~ ~ 4  million in 
NWFP and Rs. 134.1 m i l l i on  in Balochistan. 
However, in addition to  transferring the staff 
with the large accrued debts o f  the TMAs. 
Otherwise, those obligations will prevent them 
f rom developing new schemes or maintaining 
large existing schemes and thus prevent the 
effective implementation o f  public-health 
fiscal transfers also, no t  least to cover salary 
to the TMA, Some effort must be made to deal 
Reassignment of province administered functions to local governments completed 
Mirror ing the need for federal-to-province transfers o f  functional responsibilities, functions 
mandated to  local government but currently retained by provinces must also be shifted to the next 
level. The evident mismatch between responsibility and accountability for  water and sanitation i s  
a clear example o f  incomplete devolution. The incomplete transfer o f  authority over service 
providers both in specialist agencies (for example, WASA, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, 
and the Sindh Katchi  Abadis Authority) and province departments (for example, PHED/LGRD) 
has resulted in the uneven retention o f  provincial control. T o  the extent that it i s  not  completely 
cynical about local government performance (CIET: 2003), the public wants to see action and i s  
unlikely to be impressed by nuanced points concerning the inabil ity o f  councilors to respond 
because they lack control over the administrative machinery. The current situation has led to 
some significant problems for the credibility o f  newly elected district and TMA leaders who are 
unable to deliver on improved water and sanitation services. 
In reducing the debt burden, however, it will be important not to signal any softening o f  the 
budget constraints for TMAs. Recurrent non-salary liabilities, which historically have been 
largely comprised of electricitjr charges, could be subsidized through cost sharing with the district 
and with n o  impl ied commitment for  future accumulation o f  liabilities. Alternatively, TMAs 
could be expected to bear the costs through the medium o f  their shares in buoyant, GST-based 
transfers. 
Provinces can, for instance, adjust TMA non-salary liabilities through a debt-for-performance 
swap (Box 15). The provinces can prescribe process and fiscal targets including cost recovery and 
link progress to drawing down a conditional grant. Major  amounts o f  the grant should go toward 
financing (or adjusting) liabilities with a significant amount lef t  for local, discretionary allocation. 
In addition, incentive grants should be provided to TMAs once they meet the targets and get 
write-off for local discretionary allocation. 
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Box 15: “Debt W r i t e - o f f  f o r  Performance” in P u n j a b  
Punjab’s 122 TMAs are burdened by unpaid debts, electricity bills and pension dues o f  the staff 
transferred to  loca l  governments. Recently, the Department o f  Finance, Government o f  Punjab, estimated 
these liabil i t ies at Rs. 3.7 billion-more than ten times Punjab’s total UIPT collection in FY 2003. And 
for the 15 TMAs in Punjab for which data was compiled under the DSD, l iabil i t ies amount to  292 percent 
o f  their own-source collection for FY 2003. 
The Punjab government announced a one-time waiver o f  these liabilities, but has decided to  provide this 
as a conditional grant to b e  sure that a hard budget constraint and incentives for  improved local tax 
collection as w e l l  as important non-tax revenues l ike water and sanitation charges are reinforced. The 
grant i s  conditioned o n  TMAs’ undertaking an analysis o f  collection inefficiencies and preparing and 
securing counci l  endorsement o f  a p lan for raising own-source revenues over 3 years. The Department o f  
Finance, with t e c h c a l  assistance f rom the Decentralization Support Program, wil l help TMAs to  meet 
their obligations and be eligible for the grant. I t  i s  possible that matching grants may  come f rom the 
Province under PFC to  helD offset the Polit ical costs o f  local action. 
TMAs have varying technical capacity. Groups o f  TMAs can meet the requirement by joint ly 
financing senior engineers, thus allowing them to  bring the technical and financial sanction 
powers within their administrative scope and ending their reliance o n  province offices. 
Act ion recommended: 
0 TMA debt-for-performance swaps. 
0 Transfer o f  PHED staff and budgets to the TMAs 
Incorporate the Lessons of Transition in Revisions to LGOs, Rules of Business and Delegation of 
Power. 
The transition to  devolved governance has highlighted three key areas o f  the LGOs and secondary 
legislation that have not resulted in effective local structures. Although this failure i s  due in part 
to weak implementation, the NRE3 and other key agencies have signaled the time has n o w  come 
to revisit the legislation rather than just reiterate what i t originally intended. 
The Delegation o f  Power instruments have meant that many district staff n o w  have less financial 
authority than before devolution. In many districts, EDOs are category I1 officers, whereas the 
equivalent position previously had category I financial powers. As the Principal Accounting 
Officer i s  a Category I officer and therefore has higher financial sanction and procurement 
powers, the budget preparation process and expenditure authorization within the districts i s  
unduly centralized. There i s  a similar need to  enhance the technical sanction powers o f  technical 
staff in TMAs. Among other problems, the l o w  level o f  sanctioning authority provides the pretext 
for the recentralization o f  Public Health Engineering to  the Province. 
Monitor ing Committees are no t  performing as envisioned. Among the reasons: improper 
constitution o f  the committees without a formal vote by the Council and denying the opposition 
any opportunity to participate; lack o f  training o f  the councilors; inadequate traveling allowances 
and transport facilities; and inabil ity to enforce decisions. 
The Local Government Commissions have n o  authority t o  impose a settlement and are seen, 
largely, to represent the interests o f  the province rather than as unbiased facilitators o f  the 
devolution process. 
Refinements to the LGO, the Delegation o f  Powers and the Rules o f  Business can resolve these 
problems. A review could provide the opportunity to use these instruments as further incentives 
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to local governments to perform. For example, the LGO could allow district governments, subject 
to a satisfactory business plan, to amend their structures and merge or bifurcate some 
departments-allowing for the possibility that large city districts do not  need the same structure 
as smaller rural  districts. 
Act ion recommended: 
0 Province-by-province review o f  the LGO, Rules o f  Business and the Delegation o f  
Powers in order to improve the functioning o f  the Local  Government Commission and 
the facilities and authorities provided to the local government Monitor ing Committees 
and to  recognize well-performing local governments by allowing them to  move to  more 
relaxed regulatory regimes. 
Major commitment to capacity development 
Capacity i s  primarily a function o f  institutions rather than the reverse-and so training and 
traditional capacity-building has l itt le lasting impact i f  the basic incentives are weak. However, 
whi le there are many shortcomings in implementation o f  the array o f  new local institutions 
introduced under the Police Order and Local  Government Ordinances, there i s  evidently great 
need for province by province capacity development: including basic orientation and training o f  
elected and administrative officials, and the provision o f  adequate facilities and equipment. 
Although the Devolution Transition Grants provided by federal government in the last two fiscal 
years addressed this need for many local governments, a large number s t i l l  require basic facilities. 
This i s  most marked in Balochistan where local governments, particularly at the tehsil levels, lack 
basic structures and equipment necessary for  maintenance o f  even the most basic records and files 
essential for  local government functioning. 
In the in i t ia l  stages o f  devolution, the NRB shouldered the responsibility for  capacity 
development, through their advocacy o f  the Devolution Transition Grant, support for  Devolution 
Transition Teams, public awareness and special purpose training activities-such as in respect o f  
Chapter XI1 and XIIA o f  the LGO-this i s  n o  longer feasible or appropriate. I t  i s  essential that 
provincial governments, together with local governments address this requirement directly since 
they have a particular interest and responsibility to see that this occurs in a way that i s  tailored to 
needs in both the administrative and legislative organs o f  government. 
Ongoing province-focused public sector reform programs5' are providing targeted support to 
departments responsible for finance and planning, only sporadic efforts are being made to  reorient 
the key l ine departments51 most affected by devolution. Staff o f  provincial departments are aware 
that devolution has substantially changed their ro le with respect to direct service delivery, but few 
in education, health, water and sanitation, or  in the productive sectors have begun to develop 
capacity for their new roles in sector po l icy  and standards or technical support and mentoring o f  
their corresponding local government departments. M o r e  concerted efforts are required in respect 
o f  new institutions. The Province Finance Commissions, through support f rom the 
Decentralization Support Program, are actively engaged in research, training and other 
preparations for the upcoming Awards to  local governments, but there i s  a glaring absence o f  
similar efforts with respect to the Local  Government Commissions. Similarly, the lengthy 
disputes regarding the police complaints authorities and Public Safety Commissions has been a 
convenient excuse for the lackluster support provided to  these institutions. N o w  that agreement 
Supported by the World Bank in Sindh and NWFP and the ADB in Punjab and Balochistan. 
Exceptions are the World Bank supported Education Sector Reform program in Punjab and the Sindh Devolved 
Social Services program supported by the ADB. 
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appears to  have been reached,s2 there i s  pressing need to prepare and not i fy  the Police Rules and 
embark o n  a major capacity development effort for these critically important bodies. Similarly, 
training and other support i s  also necessary for the members o f  provincial assemblies. Although 
UNDP and U S A I D  are providing some capacity-building support there remains a critical need to 
ensure province policymakers are oriented in how local government i s  intended to  work  and in 
the steps necessary to  activate critically important province bodies-such as the Accounts 
Committees and other assembly committees. 
At local government level, this report argues that the core principles o f  devolution should not 
only be reconfirmed, but that diversity should be encouraged in h o w  they are applied. This 
principle might apply not  just to how local government structures are created-bearing in mind 
the obvious differences in requirements f rom rural Balochistan to central Karachi-but also in 
approaches to  local capacity development. In rural Balochistan, for instance, NGOs have 
considerable experience with provision o f  water supply facilities, in Punjab, private sector 
agencies, including NGOs, play a large role in primary education. Responsive capacity 
development requires arrangements through which local governments can contract-in such 
services f rom a range o f  sources, including provincial agencies, NGOs and the private sector. 
This demand-led approach to capacity development in turn will require that local governments 
are also encouraged to  develop their capacity to  become ‘clients’ for  these soft sector services, 
and that NGOs and private sector firms-in planning, accounts, audit, procurement, evaluation 
and training-learn to respond to local governments as consultants in addition to their emerging 
role in the implementation o f  province programs. 
Several existing modalities could be uti l ized for capacity development. First, as noted, there i s  a 
plethora o f  vertical programs with a primary focus on delivery o f  services. Typically, these 
include efforts to build local capacities in program execution. As argued earlier in this section, a 
strategy i s  needed to convert these programs and transit toward greater use o f  formula based 
transfers. This presents an opportunity to similarly redefine the focus and purposes o f  support for  
capacity development under these programs so as the progressively integrate ‘executive’ 
functions-planning, budgeting, expenditure controls and accountabilities-within local  
government operations. Second, the multi-donor supported Devolution Trust for Community 
Empowerment i s  presently contracting NGOs to support CCB-local government relations. 
Additional support i s  required, to extend this effort and to ensure it i s  we l l  attuned to  local 
variations in needs. Third, to promote better matching o f  capacity development to  local needs, 
there i s  scope to expand arrangements being made under the Decentralization Support Program 
whereby local governments and provinces reach agreement o n  specific training and related needs 
through a participatory planning process, jo int ly appraise proposals and monitor the quality o f  
services provided by private contractors. DFID, U S A I D  and the ADB are considering providing 
local government capacity development grants l inked to development grants within the PFC 
system. Under this arrangement, local governments that perform well, that i s  effectively utilize 
capacity development grants and demonstrate performance against common eligibil i ty criteria, 
would qualify t o  access further budget support which may be uti l ized through their development 
plan and budget process. 
Act ion recommended: 
Training for provincial staff in education, health, water and sanitation departments 
concerning their new roles in sector pol icy and standards or technical support and 
mentoring o f  their corresponding local government departments. 
~ 
52 See footnote 16. 
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0 Targeted support for Local Government Commissions, Police Complaints .Authorities and 
Public Safety Commissions. 
Training for the members o f  provincial assemblies concerning how local government i s  
intended to work, and in the steps necessary to support the Accounts Committees and 
other assembly committees. 
Training for local government staff in managing the contracting-in o f  services f rom a 
range o f  sources, including provincial agencies, NGOs and the private sector. 
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PRSP (Box 16) and elsewhere 
(World Bank: 1999,2000,2001). 
For the districts, much ofthe debate 
revolves around the possible 
Tax to  the districts. Currently a 
Provincial tax in al l  four Provinces, 
AIT i s  a contentious issue in 
Palustan, in part because the 
Constitution i s  silent about this tax. 
H ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  since agriculture generates 
Of A~icultural Income 
Box 16: T h e  P R S P  Recognizes the Need for Fur ther  T a x  
Devolution 
“Presently the local governments depend primari ly upon fiscal 
transfers f r o m  province governments for meeting their 
expenditure requirements. Loca l  revenue mobil izat ion i s  an 
important activity for the sustainability o f  local govemments. 
Future strategy wil l l ook  a further devolution o f  taxes to the 
local levels, widening o f  tax base, rationalization o f  local 
taxes and improvement o f  collection and recovery 
mechanisms .” 
Source: (Government o f  Pakistan: 2003, p. 56). 
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Box 17: Potent ia l  Shor t  T e r m  Gains f r o m  AIT 
Devolut ion 
Assuming that a 20 percent increase in AIT collection 
were to  result f r o m  the decision to share AIT collection 
with provinces o n  a 50-50 basis, the added revenue would 
represent about 5 percent o f  Bahalwalpur’s development 
budget and 4 percent o f  Faisalabad’s. However, an added 
incentive could be created by the provinces’ agreeing to  
pass i t s  50 percent share back to districts as a matching 
grant (that is, collection at district level, h a l f  given o n  the 
basis o f  the point  o f  collection and the other h a l f  as a 
matching grant), with the province remaining responsible 
for setting rates and controll ing pol icy. On this basis, i t  i s  
reasonable to  assume a far greater increase in collection. 
A 50 percent increase in collection, along with the 
revenue from the matching grant, wou ld  amount to  12 
percent o f  Bahawalpur’s development budget and 10 
percent o f  Faisalabad’s in FY 2003. In Faisalabad’s case, 
t h i s  i s  equivalent to ha l f  the total spent o n  agriculture in 
FY 2003. For  Bahawalpur, the increase amounts to twice 
i ts outlays in FY 2003 o n  Social Welfare. 
Source: ADBIDfIDIWB DSD Dataset 2. 
Box 18: Potent ia l  Revenue Gains f o r  TMAs in Trans fe r r i ng  UIPT Col lect ion Responsibi l i ty t o  the 
Dis t r ic ts  
Devolution o f  AIT i s  technically 
complex. On the one hand, converting 
the tax into a land-based farm tax on 
small farms (with no exceptions) and 
transferring assessment and collection 
responsibilities to the d i s t r i c t s 4 r  just 
sharing the tax directly with the 
districts-ou1d create a and 
much-needed additional resource base 
for them. On the other, the tax itself i s  
anomalous as it differentiates between 
agricultural and other forms o f  
income+pening the door to  
manipulation and evasion. M ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  it 
i s  administratively problematic to 
devolve as land registries are held at the 
provincial level (World Bank: 1999, 
2ooo). 
For  the TMAs, the Urban Immovable 
Property Tax holds significant revenue 
potential, and there i s  scope both to  
I t  i s  dif f icult  to assess the potential revenue gains for the TMAs o f  transferring collection responsibil i ty t o  
districts. A 20 percent increase in UIPT collection wou ld  mean that Rs. 118.6 m i l l i o n  in additional 
resources would be available in Punjab for allocation. A 2 0  percent increase i s  no t  an  unreasonable 
expectation, indeed for many TMAs where collection i s  particularly low, t h s  rise wou ld  b e  within easy 
reach. As a percentage of existing development spending, the increase wou ld  b e  significant, even for 
predominantly rural TMAs. Although for TMA Jaranwalla the projected increase represents on ly  4.8 
percent o f  development spending, this TMA has a very high proportion o f  development spending in the 
total budget. For  other rural TMAs the gain would be considerable. Fo r  Yazman in Bahawalpur, the add- 
o n  represents a 48.8 percent increase in FY 2003 development spending. 
I Source; ADBiDfIDIWB DSD Dataset 2. 
I t  i s  often noted that collection could be rationalized by malung the districts responsible for  
collection in all circumstances, broadly maintaining the current revenue-sharing arrangements 
between them and the TMAs (Wor ld  Bank: 2000,2001). Given the lack o f  buoyancy in property 
tax in recent years, despite tremendous growth in residential and commercial properties, there i s  a 
strong case to argue that the transfer o f  collection duties would give local councils a much greater 
incentive to utilize this tax. In addition, other administrative constraints must be removed and a 
general survey wil l  be required to  update valuation tables and capture new properties. The 
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assessment formula will also need revision along with a review o f  the administrative structure and 
computerization o f  records (Malik: 2003).53 
Box 19: Local Innovation: Property Tax Enhancement through Self-Assessment in Hyderabad 
The Indian cities o f  Hyderabad and Bangalore have introduced self-assessment, property-tax systems to  
good effect. B o t h  municipal corporations decided to  place the responsibility for tax assessment o n  the 
individual ratepayer rather than municipal employees. The a i m  was to  increase revenue and reduce the 
scope for collusion, rent-seelung and corruption. When the process began, there had  been n o  revision o f  
assessments in Hyderabad for at least 20 years. T o  tackle the l ike ly  deadlock o f  blocks, appeals and 
l i t igation associated with tax revision the Corporation introduced self-assessment in 1999 based o n  
existing legal provisions to make a return true to  the best o f  “your knowledge.” Owners and occupiers 
submitted returns guided by residents’ welfare associations that had negotiated o n  plausible rate 
guidelines. Sample verif ication occurs to  track untruthful filing, which-where identified-results in 
higher assessment penalties or cr iminal charges with publicity. Revenues more than doubled in the f i rs t  
three years. 
Source: ADB staff files. 
Further devolution o f  collection to the districts has already occurred o n  a pi lot  basis. However, 
the situation in N W F P  highlights the complexity o f  the choices involved. NWFP has recently 
transferred collection o f  UIPT to local govemments in Nowshera and Swabi, while keeping the 
assessment at the provincial level. The result has been a drop in collection attributable, according 
to the provincial Department o f  Finance, to capacity problems at the district 
illustrates other innovations. 
B o x  19 
Again mirroring the situation in relation to the federal-provincial assignment o f  taxation, 
awareness o f  these issues has produced litt le consensus o n  remedies. As a result, the imminent 
PFC awards will not  reflect any proposals for significant changes in tax assignments. An 
opportunity has been missed. To avoid missing the next one in 3 years, provincial governments 
should establish formal reviews o f  options for reassigning these taxes, with a reporting date at 
least 1 year before the anticipated end o f  the forthcoming PFC Awards. 
There i s  however a significant difference between the provincial govemments’ preparing options 
ahead o f  the next round o f  PFC Awards and the federal govemment’s preparing options ahead o f  
the next N F C  Award. First, this advance move requires some acceptance o n  the part o f  the federal 
government that provinces can and should fo l low separate paths. There i s  n o  intrinsic reason why 
the devolution o f  AIT and UIPT should look the same in NWFP as in Punjab. Second, 
realistically, some provincial governments have less capacity than the federal government to  
undertake the long-term perspective analysis required and will need additional incentives to 
stimulate timely, effective action. 
In preparing for the next PFC Awards, the provincial governments might wish to propose the size 
and scope o f  a standing secretariat, with a significant technical capacity, which can evaluate 
options for future Commissions and prepare detailed pol icy alternatives. 
53 Other innovations are also possible. Suggestions are also advanced from time to time to give the property owner 
the option to assess the rental value o f  his or her house and pay the property tax accordingly. If, on revaluation by 
the ETD, if it i s  found less than the market value or rental value, the owner would be required either to offer the 
house at self-assessed value to the govemment or pay the differential wi th high penalty rate. 
The  point that there are no certainties in reforming land and property taxation is wel l  made in (Bird and Slack: 54 
2002). 
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Act ion recommended: 
Provinces to announce formal reviews o f  provincial-local tax reassignment, t o  report 
within 2 years. 
changed? Has council considered the long- 
term, recurrent-cost implications o f  new 
development spending? 
Improving the efficiency o f  resource 
allocation will entail three responses by 
local governments, as illustrated in B o x  20 
for NWFP. First, a clearer link i s  needed 
between investment decisions and a 
medium-term planning process. T h i s  
requires, at heart, that investments be better 
connected to reliable indicators and 
knowledge o f  local needs and o f  l ikely 
resource availability beyond the annual 
budget-planning process. I t  should be 
possible n o w  for districts and TMAs to work 
Box 20: Reducing the T h r o w - F o r w a r d  in NWFP 
The NWFP Government has been trying to  rationalize 
i t s  ADP to avoid the practice o f  allocating nominal 
amounts to  ongoing schemes and to  reduce throw- 
forward l iabil i t ies that had  accumulated to  such an 
extent that they equaled 3.24 years o f  the current 
ADP. Recently the province went through successive 
rounds o f  repriorit izing projects (breaking them into 4 
priori ty groups, o f  which they on ly  fimded the top 3) 
and consequently reduced the ADP throw-forward 8 
percent be low the level o f  FY 2003. As a result o f  the 
reprioritization, the number o f  new projects for FY 
2004 was reduced f r o m  980 t o  723, and the number o f  
completed projects i s  expected to  increase f r o m  the 
342 originally targeted to  4 13 for FY 2004. 
out l ikely revenue over a three-year period 
(the PFC award and OSR projections) and 
I Source: Govt. o f  NWFP calculations. 
indicate how income will be distributed across different sectoral priorities that may in turn shift 
over time according to council’s priorities. 
55 Throw forward can be defined as the claim on future development resources by the existing portfolio of 
development projects 
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Box 21: The  Scale of  the District Throw-Forward Problem 
F o r  four o f  the districts in the study (Karachi, Faisalabad, Bahawalpur and Khairpur) information was 
compiled concerning throw-forward o f  district ADPs o n  June 30, 2001-immediately before the elected 
local governments took charge. The results were contrasted with snapshot data concerning the throw- 
forward in 2003104 to assess the impact o f  the inherited throw-forward, its c la im o n  districts’ development 
resources and whether the district governments have been in a posit ion to  start new schemes. 
The ma in  conclusions are: 
The four district govenunents combined inherited a throw-forward o f  about Rs. 3 bil l ion, which 
wou ld  have taken district governments 2.6 years to  complete at the 2001102 level o f  allocation and if 
n o  new schemes were started in the interim. 
In comparison the throw-forward in 2003104 i s  28 percent lower, mainly because Karachi and 
Faisalabad cut their throw-forward significantly, whereas throw-forward o f  ongoing schemes 
increased more than threefold in Bahawalpur and 19 percent in Khairpur, indicating that the smaller 
districts init iated a large number o f  new projects in 2002103. 
The overall, inherited and self-generated throw-forward in 2003104 s t i l l  represents a significant 
constraint on the abi l i ty o f  district governments to start more new projects. 
See the third volume (Annex 2-Technical Considerations) for further details. 
Second, medium-term plans and annual budgets need to reflect a clear connection between 
development proposals and recurrent cost requirements. 
Third, and most immediately, local governments need to rationalize and reduce their development 
throw-forward. Mos t  have a large portfolio o f  incomplete projects that should be reviewed to cul l  
redundant or unviable obligations and to prioritize the revised l i s t  for completion in a phased 
manner. NWFP (Box 21) has recently achieved some progress at the province level; most district 
governments are capable o f  doing the same. 
Act ion recommended: 
Local  governments to rationalize and reduce their development throw-forward, cull ing 
redundant or unviable obligations priorit izing the revised l i s t  for  completion in a phased 
manner. 
Coverage of user charges increased 
In the six study districts, there are encouraging trends in own-source revenue collection. 
Appropriate levying o f  user charges is, again, frequently discussed and has been extensively 
reviewed (Malik: 2003; Wor ld  Bank: 2000).s6 However, user charges are polit ically difficult. 
Although districts might recognize significant potential for  increased user charges in the health 
sector (outpatient services, in particular) and in secondary education, they are l ikely to judge that 
the polit ical costs outweigh the l ike ly  fiscal gains. A further disincentive i s  that, in general, effort 
at the facility level i s  currently not rewarded. For  example, where modest user charges have been 
levied in education, they have been collected at the level o f  the school and then sent to the district 
for reallocation. In health, outpatient department fees are more often than not  deposited in the 
provincial account. 
Determination and imagination might realize some short-term progress. For  example, at the TMA 
level, Punjab has provided some incentives to TMA nazimeen for  cost recovery in water and 
56 The broader utility o f  user charges i s  well set out in (Bahl: 1999; World Bank: 2003c), and a useful assessment o f  
the challenges involved i s  provided in (Bird: 2003). 
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sanitation by waiving electricity arrears, loans liabilities and pension liabilities if cost recovery 
matches the TMA’s own expenditures on water-supply systems. There are early but impressive 
results (Box 15).57 
Selective application o f  user charges could establish a visible linkage between the paying public 
and the quality o f  services that they value and for which they are willing to pay. However, this 
move requires a careful political strategy; province politicians would, in many cases, be only too 
happy to portray districts as rapacious and unconcerned with the poor. Since their policies 
determine what services can and cannot be charged for, the provinces would have to feel some 
benefit f rom the change. 
Act ion recommended: 
Provinces to ensure that user charges are returned to local governments. 
Districts to identify opportunities for increasing user charges in health and secondary 
education, providing some incentives at the facility level for collection. 
Strong interjurisdiction planning and coordination 
Crafting workable arrangements for resolving disputes and making consistent plans and decisions 
i s  a challenge fo r  any multi-representative electoral system. Palustan i s  attempting an innovative 
approach to inter-local government coordination and integration. Called Mushawarat 
Committees, they a im to achieve through a nonhierarchical polit ical process o f  negotiation and 
compromise that which i s  frequently achieved elsewhere only through an administrative 
h i e r a r ~ h y . ~ ~  
The public credibility and fiscal efficiency o f  local governments depend o n  concerted efforts to 
clarify jurisdictional responsibilities and demonstrate that workable arrangements exist for  
coordinating planning and implementation o f  vertical programs both among tiers o f  local 
government and with province governments (Box 22). The Mushawarat Committees and DDCs 
provide highly visible platforms to nurture this capability. The former could provide a plat form 
for district-wide, medium-term planning as we l l  as resolve common disputes about jurisdictions 
and responsibilities. DDCs likewise present a forum for district, province and federal polit ical 
representatives to ensure resources are used more in wiser, more publicly credible ways. B o t h  
may be used to encourage civil-society engagement in debates about local service delivery policy, 
plans and budget processes. 
Although it i s  true that Mushawarat Committees might offer a rational basis for  the effective 
coordination o f  development programs at the district and TMA levels, it i s  not  in the individual 
interest o f  the district or  any single TMA to ensure their success. The polit ical incentives 
discussed earlier make councilors value schemes that publicize their individual contributions to 
their constituents more than they value coordination. T o  break the impasse and tilt the balance in 
favor o f  coordination, additional incentives might be needed f rom the province. 
57 
58 
See also (Sidat Hyder Morshed Associates (Pvt) Ltd.: 2003). 
Since October 2002, the challenge o f  institutionalizing this new approach has been increased b y  the resistance o f  
MNAs and MPAs who can see successful local government planning, investment and dispute resolution as 
undermining their position as coordinators. 
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Box 22: Multi-agency Planning in West Bengal and Kerala 
The Distr ict Development Plan (DDP) and the Metropolitan Development Plan (MDP) process has been 
established in West Bengal as a planning system to integrate the activities o f  local governments and other 
spending departments at district and metropolitan levels. Distr ict Planning Committees have been 
constituted in al l  districts in accordance with the Distr ict Planning Committee A c t  1994. The D D P  i s  
intended as b o t h  a comprehensive multi-sectoral p lan and as an instrument for optimizing and equalizing 
resources. An infrastructure p lan is an essential derivative o f  the comprehensive plan. At the same time 
G o W B  i s  the f irst State in India to have made provision for a Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC). 
One was established in Oct  2001 for the Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA) to  converge and guide the 
various local DDPs within a wider strategic framework o f  economic, social and environmental 
development. The M P C  has 60 members, 40  o f  whom are elected by and f r o m  the elected representatives 
o f  urban and rura l  local bodies in Kolkata Metropolitan Area. 
A similar system o f  integrated district planning has been established in Kerala where 40  percent o f  the 
outlay o f  the State F ive Year Plan has been allocated for decentralized planning and development 
mediated through local government. The first stage o f  local planning i s  based o n  a participatory planning 
process known as the Peoples Plan Campaign. Based o n  a strategic perspective in every gram panchayat, 
these strategies and needs assessments are then formulated into the Annual Plan by special panchayat and 
municipal task forces. The Annual Plans are then consolidated into b lock and district plans to  be spatially 
and functionally integrated in to a district Perspective Plan. 
Source: ADB staff f i les. 
Act ion recommended: 
Districts to empower the Mushawarat Committees to provide a plat form for district-wide, 
medium-term planning. 
Local governments regulate and engage with private sector service providers 
As the private provision o f  health and education grows, the role o f  the responsible district 
departments must become overseer and regulator o f  the private sector as we l l  as provider o f  
government services. Currently, most district health or education departments maintain n o  record 
of services provided by the private sector, and are poorly equipped to promote or regulate the 
sector. A first, near term step toward rectifying this weakness would be for provinces to  
promulgate local government public-private partnership rules (as under LGO Schedule 5, Part A). 
W h i l e  the role o f  local government i s  not  necessarily l imi ted in this way, these rules should, in 
the interim, focus o n  two types o f  relationship: 1) where the local government i s  outsourcing 
services, which potentially includes the entire local government mandate; and 2)  where local 
governments are regulating the market, for example, in rapidly expanding private-sector delivery 
o f  health and education services. 
Act ion recommended: 
0 Provincial governments to develop and promulgate local govemment public-private 
partnership rules (as under LGO Schedule 5, Part A). 
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Judicious Selection f r o m  a M e n u  o f  Conditional Grants 
Cautious use of conditional grants 
As noted earlier in the section on Transmit National Policy Priorities More Effectively, at the 
federal level, Pakistan uses few specific purpose or conditional grants compared to other types o f  
transfers-and when used, the form o f  conditionality preferred for provincial-local transfers i s  
earmarking. One goal o f  reform i s  to reduce the damage that such transfers cause to sub-national 
accountability. However, an overly rapid conversion o f  a l l  transfers into formula-based block 
grants i s  a hostage to fortune, as it would leave the federal and provincial governments without 
levers through which to communicate pol icy preferences that might be at odds with local 
polit ically determined concerns. 
Recognizing that to some degree they run counter to the logic o f  transferring full accountability to 
sub-national governments, conditional grants represent a pragmatic approach which recognizes 
that the federal and provincial governments, respectively, maintain a legitimate interest in 
provincial, district and local institutional reforms and service delivery arrangements. 
A s  set out above, these are nuanced instruments and there are three concerns to be borne in mind: 
0 
0 
0 
They can only be employed at the margins-ver-reliance o n  conditional grants i s  l ikely to 
be detrimental to local government performance and accountability. 
It i s  important to coordinate such grants through the mechanisms o f  the NFC and PFCs, 
although not ing that this i s  not  attainable in the short term. 
Any federal-provincial conditional grants must, o f  course, be funded f rom the federally 
retained portion o f  the federal divisible pool  as provinces can argue they have a constitutional 
right to the provincial proportions o f  the shared revenues. This constitutional constraint does 
not apply at the provincial level. 
With these constraints in mind, there are some l ikely candidates for conditional grants at both the 
federal and provincial level. 
At the federal level, in assisting provincial-local tax reassignments, the federal government could, 
in principle, propose special conditional grants to provincial governments, necessarily made 
outside o f  the NFC, conditioning access to the grant o n  the existence o f  a published plan for 
reviewing tax assignments and amounts payable that reflects the coverage and success o f  p i lot  
projects. 
Provincial governments could propose conditional grants to districts, in i t ia l ly  outside the PFC if it 
i s  too late for their inclusion in the imminent awards, which: 
0 
0 
0 
Provide incentives for  the reduction in development throw-forward 
Provide matching incentives for the increased application o f  user fees within a range 
acceptable to the province 
Provide incentives for  districts and the associated T M A s  to develop integrated district plans 
through empowered Mushawarat Committees and t o  fund schemes consistent with the plans. 
Bearing in mind the significance o f  using conditional grants sparingly, then the effect o f  such 
conditional grants could also be achieved by government requesting that such conditionalities are 
included in provincial budget support credits or loans provided by donors and the multilateral 
lending agencies. 
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A c t i o n  recommended:  
Federa l  and  p r o v i n c i a l  governments to consider u s i n g  cond i t i ona l  grants, select ively 
and if necessary outside o f  the  N F C P F C s  in i t ia l ly ,  to achieve ove ra rch ing  p o l i c y  
goals. 
Existing vertical programs reviewed and proposals redesigned 
V e r t i c a l  p r o g r a m s  r e m a i n  s ign i f icant  features o f  in tergovernmenta l  relat ionships. In addition to 
the  government- funded ve r t i ca l  programs, donors p r o v i d e  extensive suppor t  for federal and 
provincial ve r t i ca l  programs.  For l o c a l  governments, highly ve r t i ca l  p rog rams  not only underm ine  
accoun tab i l i t y  and operat ional  e f f ic iency.  Add i t i ona l l y ,  t h e y  create a n  env i ronmen t  in w h i c h  
fknding in the  k e y  sectors i s  l a rge l y  de te rm ined  elsewhere. T h e  resul t  i m p e l s  e v e n  w e l l -  
i n ten t i oned  local counci lors  either to sh i f t  f unds  about rapidly as they  try to cove r  the  priority 
sectors or to second-guess n e x t  year’s amount o f  ver t ica l -program al locations. In some cases, the 
p rog rams  c a n  create incentives for recentral izat ion. 
D o n o r s  h a v e  b e g u n  to recognize these p rob lems  and h a v e  started initiating f e w e r  ve r t i ca l  and 
m o r e  devo lu t i on - f r i end ly  projects. T h e  Wor ld -Bank -suppor ted  Punjab Educa t ion  Sector Reforms,  
the  p roposed  P u n j a b  M u n i c i p a l  Services I m p r o v e m e n t  P ro jec t  and the  A D B - s u p p o r t e d  Southern 
Punjab B a s i c  Urban Services P ro jec t  a n d  the  Sindh D e v o l v e d  Soc ia l  Services P r o g r a m  e x p l i c i t l y  
recogn ize  l o c a l  government  ownersh ip  (Box 23). These p rog rams  p r o v i d e  examples o f  how far, 
and how rapidly, donors are prepared to r e a l i g n  the i r  operations in accordance with t h e  changed 
r e a l i t y  presented by devolut ion.  
Box 23: Donor-Supported Transitional Vertical P r o g r a d G r a n t s  
The ADB-financed Southern Punjab Basic Urban Services Project, approved in late 2003, i s  designed to  
encourage good performance by TMAs and to  shift f r o m  a traditional vertical program toward modalities 
more consistent with the P L G O  2001. During 2004, the f i r s t  year, funds wil l be allocated through the 
Local  Government and Rural Development Department under a special PFC grant o n  the basis o f  TMA- 
specific investment plans for small-scale water supply schemes. In subsequent years, funds wil l b e  
allocated under a formula-based grant. 
Access to funds in any year wil l depend o n  T M A ’ s  compliance with “Basic Eligibility Criteria” that are 
applicable to a l l  TMAs. The criteria include: 
Compliance with PLGO 2001 requirements o n  Moni tor ing Committees. 
Strengthening o f  Counci l  secretariat and budget provisions made for continued t e c h c a l  capacity. 
Complaints cells and procedures established and l inked with intemal audit procedures. 
Act ion plans prepared, detailing h o w  Tehsils will transfer functions to  U n i o n  Administrations in 
accordance with P L G O  2001. 
Requirements allocating 25 percent o f  development budget for  C C B  projects observed by TMA, and 
efforts made to disseminate CCB guidelines and Rules o f  Business widely. 
Water Supply and Sewerage User Charges action p lan  prepared, for detection, disconnection and 
regularization o f  i l legal connections, and detail ing time-bound strategy for rationalizing water tariffs, 
improving collection efficiency. 
Other revenue-enhancement measures, including init iat ion o f  baseline survey to  determine revenue 
potential, incorporating licensing, encroachment, temporary tehbazari, parlung and transport stands. 
In the fol lowing years, the funds available to  a TMA will b e  determined by formula, and 
performance. 
T w o  sets o f  performance measures wil l be applied: 
Investment Project-Spec@ Performance Measures (IPPM). These include simple process measures to  be 
observed for the effective use o f  resources allocated to  ind iv idual  investment projects. Examples include 
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operations (staffing, equipping levels); community participation; compliance with physical progress 
targets; qual i ty o f  construction; observance o f  PLGO 2001 requirements o n  maintenance o f  accounts, 
tender and contracting rules; monitoring and evaluation. A minimum score for IPPM will be mandatory. 
The shares o f  T M A s  fai l ing to  meet the minimum performance standard wi l l  b e  credited to  an investment 
poo l  and made available for reallocation to  other TMAs based on  their perfonnance. 
Reform Implementation Performance Measures (RIPM). These measures wil l judge performance in 
carrying forward the reforms under the el igibi l i ty criteria. They include therefore, scoring systems that 
measure the functioning o f  complaints cells, the implementation o f  commitments for transfer o f  hnct ions 
to UCs; at least 80 percent o f  uti l ization o f  budget reserved for CCB projects, and so on. 
Supported by the W o r l d  Bank, the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program focuses o n  improving 
access through the rehabilitation o f  primary schools, and improving quality through teacher training and 
free textbook provision. The centerpiece o f  this program i s  a Terms o f  Partnership Agreement between the 
provincial government and participating districts. Based on  these accords, the province wil l provide 
conditional grants to districts in Account IV outside the PFC framework. These grants wil l b e  conditional 
o n  a number o f  items such as increased education expenditure allocations, meeting o f  re form and other 
education-indicator targets. 
Governments at a l l  three levels need to find ways to bring vertical programs under local- 
government planning and budgeting systems and to lay the ground n o w  for a shift to the kinds of 
formula-based grant systems envisaged in the Local Government Plan 2000. Since donor-funded 
projects represent the bulk o f  the province-local government vertical programs, reviewing the 
pipelines o f  donor projects i s  the logical place to start in identifying pragmatic opportunities to 
make this transition. 
In the various programs to  provide budget support to federal and province governments, donors 
should work with governments to ensure attention to the intergovernmental aspects o f  the 
linkages between their budget support-at federal or province levels-and the local governments. 
More  generally, in project aid, donors must ensure that project modalities do not weaken but 
rather support the linkages between elected leaders and citizens and with service providers. 
Frequently, the project a id modalities sidestep local policymakers through parallel institutional 
arrangements. As the study has revealed, a large share o f  donor project a id  i s  effectively outside 
the influence and, sometimes, the ken o f  the elected leaders responsible for  planning and 
delivering services in their jurisdiction. This separation creates great difficulties in planning and 
budget processes so that a fair and equitable distribution o f  resources i s  ensured and exacerbates 
the problems o f  local ownership and long-term recurrent financing o f  the facilities and services 
created. 
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Table 25: Devolution-Friendliness of  ADB and World Bank Projects in the Current Lending 
Program 
Average Scores (YO) 
Medium Term Impact 
8. W i l l  the project or program envisage a graduated increase in local 
government responsibility in the implementation o f  the project? 
9. W i l l  i t  encourage diversity wi th provincial devolution models to 
accommodate local needs and innovation? 
10. Will i t  envisage the use o f  conditions grants for major policy 
Dimensions Assessed 
olicy priorities, site 
48.5% 16.8% 34.7% 
14 8 6 
3 12 13 
7 5 16 
initiatives? 
Notes: ADB Proiects: SME Sector DeveloDment Promam; Decentralized Social Services, Sindh; Balochistan 
Average Scores (YO) 128.6% 1 29.8% 1 41.7% 
Road Sector DeGelopment Project; PunjabResource Management Program, Southern Punjab Basic Urban 
Services; FATA Rural Development Project; Sustainable Livelihoods in Barani Areas Project (Punjab); 
Balochistan Public Resource Management Program; Decentralized Social Services Program (Punjab); 
Restructuring o f  Technical Education and Vocational Training System; Rawalpindi Environmental Improvement 
Project; NWFP Road Sector and Sub-regional Connectivity; Industrial Efficiency and Environmental 
Improvement Project; Decentralized Social Services Program (Sindh 11). 
World Bank Projects: Highway Rehabilitation; Poverty Alleviation Project 11; Punjab Education SAC; Public 
Sector Capacity Building Project; Community Government Infra. (CIP 2); Sindh OFWM; Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit; PIFRA; Tax Adm. Reform Project; Punjab OFWM; Punjab Municipal Service Improvement 
Project; Community based Maternal and Child Health Project; NWFP SAC 11; Sindh SAC 11. 
Source: Responses from surveys of task team leaders in the World Bank and ADB undertaken in November and 
December 2003. 
As a preliminary step, this study has assisted the Wor ld  Bank and ADB to begin a review o f  
upcoming assistance to Pakistan. It i s  apparent that whereas some assistance may be assessed as 
devolution-neutral, that i s  supporting upstream institutional reforms, capacity-building or urgent 
service delivery improvements, the larger share o f  assistance would benefit f rom commitments to  
be devolution-encouraging. Table 25 summarizes an analysis conducted simultaneously on ADB 
and Wor ld  Bank lending for 2004-05. 
Act ion recommended: 
More comprehensive review o f  donor project portfolios and pipelines to ensure that 
a l l  projects are assisting in a phased migration away f rom vertical programs. 
Array of social indicator data available broadened and district data captured 
The quality o f  data available about service-delivery performance, f rom expenditure data al l  the 
way through to measurements o f  human-development outcomes, i s  weak at the district level. 
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Unless quality improves, i t  will not  be possible for federal government to  make reliable 
judgments about the impact o f  macroeconomic or poverty policy, for provinces to establish 
performance-based grant systems to buy better performance f rom local governments (Box 24), 
for  local governments to plan, or for the citizens o f  Palustan to gauge how well their elected 
leaders are doing and hold them accountable. 
Box 24: Data  Needs for Equalization or  Conditional Transfers 
“In selecting formulas for equalization transfer, a major consideration is the availabil ity o f  data. In many 
developing countries, data constraints force the central government to adopt relatively simple models with 
few variables. The central government agency in charge equalization transfer can use a variety o f  data 
sources. In most countries, the easiest source i s  the statistics provided by the central government’s 
statistical agency. In addition to  the central statistical agency, l ine ministries can often provide more 
detailed statistics o n  need indicators such as demographic composition, land areas, student enrollment rates, 
health indicators, length and quality o f  roads, electricity consumption, number o f  policemen, etc.. .Data o n  
local tax bases are often supplied by local tax authorities. In cases where the central and local governments 
share the same tax bases and the center i s  responsible for tax collection, tax base data can b e  easily 
obtained f r o m  the central tax authorities. In cases where local tax bases differ f r o m  central tax bases, local 
tax authorities should be required to  provide annual tax base figures to  the central government agency in 
charge o f  transfer. I t  i s  necessary to enact a l a w  or issue a central government ordinance o n  fiscal transfer 
that obliges local authorities to  submit accurate data o n  a t imely manner. Naturally, incentives exist for 
local governments to  under-report.. . in order to  receive more transfers. To prevent such practices, i t  i s  
necessary to  include penalty clauses o n  fraud in the l a w  o r  ordinance. Equally important i s  that the central 
government audits the statistical reports submitted by local governments (either by directly sending 
officials to  local governments or hiring independent auditors).” 
Source; (Ma: 1997). 
A range o f  data sources provides input, intermediate, and outcome indicators disaggregated at the 
district level (see the third volume, Annex 2-Technical Considerations, for  a survey o f  available 
data sources). In general, the administrative data sources, such as the MIS,  are not  as reliable as 
household survey data from PIHS. Presently, two survey data sources are representative at the 
district level: the CIET Social Audit and the MICS, and one in process, the CWIQ. Of  these, the 
CWIQ and the CIET appear to be the most promising, although it must be recognized that each 
provides different information to support different processes. CWIQ may be used to  support the 
definition o f  indicators for design o f  conditional grants and then to track expenditure and 
performance against process and output. CIET data, which cannot be used in the same way, 
provides a more qualitative gauge-what do citizens think-about particular service-delivery or  
cross-cutting issues. This additional source o f  information has great potential for  elected leaders, 
in particular, when it comes to budget-planning decisions or gauging the performance o f  
particular sector service-delivery staff. Provided that these methodologies can be adjusted to  
ensure local ownership, and that the requisite capacity i s  created for the surveys to be conducted 
regularly and properly, then they should be able to provide a range o f  indicators for  local 
government planning and budgeting, as we l l  as a basis for a conditional transfer mechanism. 
The success o f  a monitoring system and i t s  impact o n  pol icy critically depend o n  the institutional 
arrangements and the capacity within the monitoring institutions. Progressing f rom the I-PRSP, 
the PRSP published in December 2003 lays out an institutional setup in more concrete terms, 
specifying a general mechanism for tracking and reporting outcomes, with the National PRSP 
Secretariat as the coordinating interface. Clar i ty i s  s t i l l  lacking, however, o n  such key specifics as 
the mechanisms through which the data and reports generated by the monitoring institutions 
would provide timely feedbacks into the pol icy  process. On the issue o f  capacity, whi le the 
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document identifies four vital areas where capacity has to be developed at the Secretariat and 
other levels o f  government, n o  clear plan has yet been advanced to address this need. 
Specifically, the sustainability o f  the monitoring system, o f  which the CWIQ is  a part, will 
depend crit ically on the capacity o f  the Federal Bureau o f  Statistics (FBS) to conduct complex 
surveys effectively and o n  i t s  ability to function as an autonomous organization. The PRSP does 
not include a p lan for enhancing capacity at FBS or for insuring the autonomy that would enhance 
the credibility o f  its data. 
Act ion recommended: 
0 Set benchmarks and specifications for the Federal Bureau o f  Statistics to report o n  the data 
that wil l be available to for the 7th Award, at least 3 years before the anticipated end o f  the 
6th Award. 
Local Governments Held to Account 
Distr icts employ their own staff 
The challenge to managerial authority in the districts arises f i o m  the transfer o f  large numbers o f  
staff f rom provincial employment groups, particularly Rural Development, Local  Government, 
Health and Education.’’ These c iv i l  servants have a strong historical connection with the 
provinces and provide a convenient point o f  entry for provincial involvement in district affairs. In 
addition, some see the province as a logical next step in their career. 
Box 25: Administrative Devolution in Indonesia and Uganda 
In Indonesia, the 2001 decentralization saw a massive transfer o f  central government c i v i l  servants, 
government assets, and documentation to  regional governments. The transfer o f  c i v i l  servants proceeded in 
two phases. Personnel of 5 departments, some 150,000 people, were already reassigned to  the regional 
governments in 2000, when the departments they worked for were either abolished o r  converted into a state 
department without an apparatus in the regions. 
L a w  22/1999 gives the regions the r ight t o  hire and fire i ts c i v i l  service, but there are conflicting laws and 
other forms o f  implementing regulations that appear to  circumscribe this autonomy. The local right to  
manage the c i v i l  service i s  l imi ted in several ways. In contrast to L a w  22/1999, the c i v i l  service l a w  (Law 
43/1999) retains much  control at the central level. The central government s t i l l  determines to  a large extent 
c i v i l  service wages: base wage, position allowances and fami ly  and rice allowances are s t i l l  set by 
Presidential Instruction. In addition, the Ministry o f  Finance sets l i m i t s  t o  honoraria t o  b e  received by c i v i l  
servants for project management, and the l ike. And BKN, the c i v i l  service agency, i s  developing j o b  
classifications and accompanying qualif ication standards, which it wants to  see applied to  local c i v i l  service 
as we l l  as central c i v i l  service. Government regulations, which require nationwide advertising for certain 
posts, and local advertising for  others, further limit hiring procedures. 
Source; (World Bank: 2003b). 
In Uganda: “Before decentralization, l ine Ministr ies had direct control over staff work ing in Districts. L ine  
Ministries init iated the appointment, confirmation, promotion, training, discipline and the transfer o f  such 
staff. With decentralization, the above staff were transferred to  Districts and so were the functions 
previously exercised by the L ine  Ministries. Staff became employees o f  the respective Distr ict and Urban 
Councils and movement between Districts and between Districts and Ministr ies was minimized. 
s9 TMAs do not face the same problem as they inherited staff from the former urban councils, and from rural district 
councils but other than some PHED staff where these have been devolved, they inherited few provincial staff. 
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with decentralization, an officer can leave one Distr ict or U rban  Counci l  for another, and f r o m  a Distr ict or 
Urban Counci l  t o  a Ministry, if: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Source; (Republic o f  Uganda: 1999). 
There i s  an advertised post to which he or she applies and i s  appointed: 
H e  o r  she learns o f  a vacant post and applies to  (the respective council) t o  fill it.” 
Administrative devolution i s  always limited. Few sub-national governments have untrammeled 
authority t o  act autonomously as employers (see B o x  25 and the third volume, Annex 2- 
Technical Considerations). However, as B o x  26 illustrates, there i s  an urgent need to move 
significantly in this direction (World Bank: 2001, 2002a). 
Realistically, establishing the districts as the primary employers o f  their staff may not be a 
feasible single step for Pakistan District Governments. Staff f rom the federal occupational groups 
and senior staff f rom provincial groups would strongly resist such a move, fearing that their 
career paths had been unreasonably limited, restricting them to a few management positions in a 
small government. In fact, as local government develops, there i s  every reason to assume that a 
dynamic market in senior local government positions wil l develop, with pay and career options at 
least as attractive as those in the federal and provincial governments. However, in the short term, 
a two-part local government service could provide the senior staff in the district with the 
reassurance that they have both security and career prospects, while insuring that al l  staff in the 
districts, senior and junior, are managed only f rom within the district. 
I Box 26: Conflicting Lines o f  Management 
“The heated debate in the Peshawar District Counci l  o n  Tuesday when the elected members resented the 
non-implementation o f  the resolutions passed by the council, i s  not  particular to Peshawar. This i s  
happening a l l  over Pakistan in nearly a l l  the Distr ict Councils. The Peshawar Distr ict Counci l  had passed 
seventy-eight resolutions during the year 2003; the concerned departments responded to  on ly  fifteen. 
According to  the members o f  the council the Distr ict Coordinating Off icer failed to  do h i s  duty by no t  
sending the resolution to  the concerned departments.” 
“The crux o f  the whole matter i s  the plurality o f  authority under wh ich  the different cadres o f  employees 
work in the districts. Mos t  officials o n  senior posts in the districts are federal government appointees and 
their service rules and promotions are regulated by that government. They, however, work  in the provincial 
government departments. The provincial governments can influence them by writing adverse reports o n  
them and transferring them to  unattractive locations. These officers when placed in district departments are 
supposed to  do  the bidding o f  the district administration. But since the districts have n o  influence with them 
whatsoever, these senior officers do not  feel the urgency o f  fo l lowing the directions o f  the district nazimeen 
or members.” 
1 Source: “Governance Issues” electronic newsgroup-22 January 2004. 
One method for achieving this i s  to create a distinct Local  Government Career service comprising 
those staff at grade 16 or below, in which the district government assumes responsibility for  
preparing the salary budget, recruitment, career management and performance management for 
junior staff. They would thus be employed unambiguously by the district. In parallel, provincial 
staff could apply to j o i n  aprovincial  Local  Government Service. Districts wishing to f i l l  senior 
vacancies would interview and accept staff f rom the poo l  o f  eligible provincial Local  
Government Service members, who would serve in the district for fixed-term appointments while 
retaining their substantive appointment with the province.60 Table 26 summarizes this option. 
6o The Services Departments o f  the provincial govemments might need some assistance or capacity-building in order 
to manage the pool and to ensure that district govemments had access to career histories o f  staff in the Provincial 
Local Govemment Service pool. 
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Table 26: Possible Future for the Staff in District Governments 
Staff groups 
Staff from federal employment 
groups (primarily District 
Management Group (DMG) and 
the Audits and Accounts Group) 
Grades Formerly provincial 
17+ employment groups- particularly Public 
Health Engineering, 
Rural Development, Grades 
Local Govemment, 1-16 
and Education 
Employees who had earlier 
belonged to the rural district 
councils 
Provincial 
Local 
Government 
Service 
Local 
Government 
Career 
Service 
Appointment 
Federal or 
Provincial 
Government 
Appointed by 
the District 
Government 
Control 
over the 
salary 
budget 
Province 
District 
Establishment 
control 
With the 
province 
To be passed 
from the 
province to the 
district within 
one year 
Pay policy 
With the 
Federal 
Govemment or 
province 
With the 
province 
indefinitely 
Ideally control o f  the establishment, and ultimately authority over pay policy, would be devolved 
for the Local  Government Career Service, but realistically these are longer term options. Box 27 
sets out the more immediate steps. 
Box 27: Key Features of a Local Government Service 
K e y  features o f  the Provincial Local Government Service could be: 
0 
0 
0 
The Service i s  a voluntary poo l  that senior provincial staff can apply to jo in .  
Staff who had applied and been found suitable for district employment wou ld  remain in their 
provincial posts pending assignment. 
Poo l  staff could be accepted in to the district o n  clearly specified terms, with explicit perfonnance 
agreements. 
Staff members who  wished to  resign f r o m  the district service could, with the permission o f  the 
provincial government, retum to  the province. 
The district could terminate the appointment to  the district, with the staff member automatically 
retumed to the province, with the r ight  o f  appeal t o  the Provincial Public Service Commission in 
the event o f  unfair dismissal 
Key features o f  the Local Government Career Service wou ld  be: 
The Distr ict Service to  be established separately in each province by provincial legislation. 
Legislation to  ensure that a l l  districts within a province retain the same pay and grade structure. 
T o  cover grades 1-16 only. 
Recruitment to the districts to be at departmental level within the district, with the Provincial 
Service Commissions to  oversee the quality o f  the recruitment processes, but no t  t o  be involved 
directly in the recruitment. 
Transfer between districts wou ld  entail resignation f r o m  one and appointment by another. 
Transfer f rom districts to  provincial o r  federal government employment wou ld  entail resignation 
f r o m  the district. 
The enabling legislation could a l low for  the possibil i ty o f  small provincial quotas o f  new 
appointees to be drawn f r o m  the staff o f  districts. 
The legislation could also al low for the Loca l  Government Commissions to  establish small 
secretariats to  ensure consistency in personnel practices between districts within the province. 
Steps in transferring responsibility for managing the Loca l  Government Career service to  the districts: 
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Full control over the salary budget for the Local  Government Career Service would be passed to  
the district immediately-allowing for local determination o f  the size and composition o f  the 
district workforce. 
PFC transfers to  the districts would init ial ly be based o n  2003104 staffing figures, recognizing that 
disparities in district employment have arisen historically and are beyond the control o f  districts in 
the short term. 
PFC transfers to  the districts for salaries would move incrementally toward a formula-based 
transfer within 5 years that allowed for employment levels based o n  similar per capita ratios, with 
some allowance for the diseconomies faced by small districts and by remote rural districts. 
If, within 5 years, any comparatively overstaffed district could no t  reduce i t s  staffing norms 
through attrit ion to  those allowed in the NFC awards, then the province must offer the option o f  
transferring unwanted staff t o  a provincial surplus pool. 
In the short term, the province would maintain restrictions o n  the total headcount, while al lowing 
districts to determine staffing composition. Within one year, provinces would relinquish control 
over the district establishments completely, with discipline exercised o n  district employment 
practices through PFC provisions that penalize districts for staffing beyond provincial norms. 
If this or a similar arrangement i s  not  instituted in the short term, there i s  s t i l l  an urgent need to 
reduce the opportunity for  provincial micromanagement o f  district staff. In principle, APT 
authority for the devolved staff in the provinces has largely been passed to the districts. However, 
for staff in Sindh, Balochistan (health), and NWFP (health), the province has authority over APT 
down to  grade 16. At the very least, some rationalization o f  the APT authorities i s  necessary to 
make sure that the district has full authority over al l  staff at grades 19 and below. Enforcing this 
r u l e  in practice would remain challenging. One possibility for enforcement would be for intra- 
district and inter-district transfers o f  TMA staff at any grade to be subject t o  veto by the 
Mushawarat Committee, and for inter-district transfers o f  district staff at any grade to be subject 
to veto by the district council. 
Act ion recommended: 
Provincial governments to establish that the districts have full APT authority over a l l  staff at 
grades 19 and below. 
Options for the creation o f  a Provincial Local Government Service (comprising provincial 
employees wishing to work in local government), and a Local  Government Career Service 
(an autonomous local government cadre) to be set out in the White Paper. 
Districts maintain their own accounts 
The AGP and C G A  are in dispute over their respective authorities over staff. In reality, the cadre 
histories have resulted in the CGA having very l itt le managerial or professional authority over the 
accounting staff. That authority i s  h r the r  reduced by the dispute between the federal and 
provincial accounts cadres. The consequence i s  that district accounts are prepared by a 
combination o f  provincial accounts staff (who have few incentives to  fo l low the professional 
advice o f  the CGA) and federal accounts staff (who also have few incentives to fo l low the advice 
o f  the CGA, but in addition feel n o  need to cooperate with their lower-status provincial 
colleagues). 
Compounding the problem, the new accounting responsibilities o f  the District Accounts Officer 
coupled with the minimal capacity available has created a series o f  technical accounting 
problems. The consequence i s  that district-level accounts are poor ly prepared and maintained, 
largely by staff with n o  loyalty to the district. 
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I t  i s  necessary to  address three key issues to resolve the transitional problems. First, the various 
technical problems associated with the development o f  N e w  Accounting Model  and the transition 
to the new codes must be resolved. Second, ambiguities in the staffing responsibilities and 
reporting arrangements, including responsibility for preparation and maintenance o f  accounts and 
oversight and enforcement o f  compliance with accounting standards, must be addressed. Finally, 
there i s  a significant problem o f  capacity. 
The federal cabinet decision on 6 November 2002, requiring the provincialization o f  accounts by 
2006, sets a direction toward local responsibility for  account preparation. However, responsibility 
for administration o f  district accounts should eventually be fully transferred to a district cadre- 
as oversight and enforcement o f  compliance with accounting standards i s  transferred f rom the 
C G A  to the Provincial Accountants General. 
Establishing benchmarks as outlined in Table 27 would al low the federal govemment to create 
incentives, through conditional grants, for  provinces that are complying. 
Table 27: Steps toward Provincialization of  Accounts 
Issues to be resolved 
Technical issues 
Staffing 
responsibilities 
and reporting 
arrangements 
Development o f  
New Accounting 
Model 
Managing 
transition to new 
codes 
Responsibility for 
preparation and 
maintenance o f  
accounts 
Oversight and 
enforcement o f  
compliance with 
accounting 
standards 
Capacit y-building 
Near 
District 
Refine, based on 
piloting through 
PIFRA 
Modi fy  LG 
Accounts Code to 
NAM 
compliance. 
Roll-out NAM to 
all districts 
Federal- 
provincial 
(Federal Pakistan 
Audit and 
Accounts Service, 
the Provincial 
Treasury cadre) 
CGA designs 
system o f  
sanctions for 
noncompliance. 
Build capacity o f  
existing a) federal 
accounts and b) 
province treasury 
rm 
TMA 
Refine, based 
on piloting 
through PIFRA 
Mod i f y  
TMA (Tehsil 
Accounts 
Officer) 
Province 
designs system 
o f  sanctions for 
noncompliance. 
Train on 
existing system 
Medium teri 
District 
No action 
needed 
Review and 
debug 
systems 
following 
roll-out 
District 
CGA to 
impose 
sanctions for 
violations 
(but handing 
over to 
Provincial 
Accountant 
General post 
2006) 
Local 
govemment 
cadre 
responsible 
for accounts 
:to mid-2006) 
TMA 
N o  action 
needed 
Pilot test, then 
roll-out NAM 
to al l  TMAs 
TMA 
CGA to 
impose 
sanctions for 
violations (but 
handing over 
to Provincial 
Accountant 
General post 
2006) 
Retrain and 
induct 
qualified 
accountants 
into service 
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Act ion recommended: 
0 Federal government should be providing incentives for meeting benchmarks toward the 
provincialization o f  accounts as a first step toward complete district preparation and 
maintenance o f  their own accounts. 
Further Clar i fy  the SeDaration o f  Executive and Judicial Powers 
Devolution has abolished the executive magistracy and i t s  functions vested in the judiciary, 
executive (local governments) or police. Promulgation o f  the Police Order 2002 has lef t  many 
uncertainties in the respective responsibilities o f  the D P O  and nazimeen, including both district 
and tehsil levels, for the broad definition given to l aw  and order. There i s  a real r i s k  that failure to 
clarify these relationships, and ensure they are, adequately dealt with in the forthcoming Police 
Rules may jeopardize the entire reform effort. As noted, there i s  widespread public concern that 
police corruption and public safety have deteriorated since promulgation o f  the Police Order 
2002. Evidently, national leaders are acutely aware o f  public concern.61 B o x  28 suggests that 
some local action can be helpful. 
I Box 28: Improving Union-Level Police, Court  and Local  Government Relations 
The Loca l  Government Plan envisaged Public Safety Committees at un ion level, and a role for CCBs in 
police monitoring. By and large, th is  has no t  been part o f  the roll-out o f  the Police Order 2002. However, 
Tehreek, a Quetta-based NGO that works in preventive-health service delivery in UC Gawalmandi has 
taken t h i s  idea forward. Recognizing the high pr ior i ty  placed o n  public safety and justice issues, Tehreek’s 
dialogue with the UC nazim and local police-station and community leaders has l e d  to  formation o f  an 
Insaaf Committee and a Musalihat Committee. An off ice has been established to facilitate police- 
community liaison, the functions and responsibilities o f  the committees, as detailed in the LGO are 
displayed outside the office, and the init iative has been greatly appreciated by citizens. This init iative i s  
currentlv being redicated in other unions in Ouetta. 
The goal i s  to conclude the separation o f  powers with the result that external oversight and 
accountability o f  the police improve and workable arrangements are put in place for the 
enforcement o f  local and special laws, including the assignment o f  non-adjudicatory powers and 
supervision o f  pretrial detention to the executive.62 
Act ion recommended: 
0 
0 
Provincial governments to prepare and not i fy  the rules o f  business detailing the reporting 
obligations between the District Police Officer and the District N ~ z i m . ~ ~  
Provincial governments to assign non-adjudicatory powers and supervision o f  pre-trial 
detention to the local government executive, reducing the burden o n  the subordinate 
courts, and updating fines and fees for violation o f  local and special laws, and municipal 
regulations. 
Federal Judicial Academy (FJA) to  train a l l  Judicial Magistrates in their new jurisdictions 
under criminal and local laws especially to protect citizens f rom abuse o f  power and 
harassment. In particular, where writ o f  habeas corpus i s  issued, the court should also 
order action against the officials concerned and report the same to  the High Court for 
0 
On 27 January 2004, the President and Prime Minister jointly presided over a further meeting with senior cabinet 
officials and the Province Chief Ministers to set a renewed deadline for “full implementation o f  the Police Order 
2002 in letter and spirit.” Dawn 28 January 2004, “August 14 Deadline for Police Reforms Fixed.” 
T h i s  refers to the nazim’s power to visit police stations and demand the release o f  persons illegally detained and 
not the judicial powers pertaining to the grant o f  custody or remand o f  the accused to police. 
T h e  14 April 2004 meeting (see footnote 16.) reportedly reaffirmed the nazim’s responsibility to initiate the 
DPO’s ACR in respect of law and order. Police rules have not yet been prepared. 
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follow-up by the Registrar with those actions reported in the annual report o f  the High 
court .  
High Courts publicly reaffirm their commitments to monitor any adverse action taken 
against subordinate judges who bar unlawful behavior o f  officials, particularly the police. 
The declaration should include a commitment to exercise i t s  powers o f  contempt against 
the highest officials concerned. 
High Courts should expedite the establishment o f  separate c iv i l  and criminal courts and 
lighten the administrative and supervisory burden o f  the district and session judge by 
appointing a Senior Judicial Magistrate in each district to assist with administrative 
matters relating to the exercise o f  criminal jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. 
Each Provincial govemment to establish an independent prosecution service with offices 
at district level, and strengthen arrangements for supervision by judiciary and local 
government officials o f  pre-trial detention and supervision o f  investigation. 
0 
0 
0 
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Appendix 1: Background to ADB/DfID/WB DSD Dataset 2 
This dataset comprises: provincial receipts and expenditures; fiscal transfers to the districts; and 
district government receipts and expenditures-as known at the end o f  FY 2003. 
This dataset has been constructed f rom a range o f  sources: 
0 
0 
0 
Annual budget statements o f  each province for FY 2004 and revised estimates. 
Budget notifications o f  the Departments o f  Finance in each province showing the 
budgeted share o f  individual district government o f  each province were used. 
Month ly  actual transfers to each district government f rom the Department o f  Finance o f  
each Province were used, drawing o n  notifications issued to the State Bank o f  Pakistan 
for release into account IV. 
Month ly  Detail Books o f  account IV f rom the Provincial Accountant General’s office. 
These are available centrally at the office o f  accountant general o f  each province. 
0 
Table 29 provides details o f  the data sources. 
Data drawn f rom district budget documents alone are unreliable for  two principal reasons: 
1. Budget estimates are only rough proxies o f  actuals. During this transition period the 
estimates have been prepared by adding a percentage onto the previous years’ budgets. 
These are therefore inexact pictures o f  actual expenditures. 
2. Presentation o f  the district budgets does not  fo l low a set format and can vary f rom 
individual district to district, creating problems for comparability. 
Aggregate data o f  DAOs are also unreliable, as reports o f  Provincial Consolidated Fund revenues 
include a l l  revenues collected in a district without differentiating between Account I provincial 
levies and de jure district revenues deposited in error or temporarily in Account I (see Table 28). 
Depending upon the level o f  aggregation at times they can include federal revenues as well. As 
such they provide a false picture o f  district government revenues and often are not even a close 
proxy. Obvious errors resulting f rom this approach are inclusion o f  the following revenue items 
in the district revenues: agriculture income tax, collection fees o n  arrears o f  land revenue, the sale 
o f  non-judicial stamps and papers, motor vehicle tax, entertainment tax, and so forth. 
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Table 28: State of the Provincial Accounting Records 
Punjab 
The accounting records in 
AG Punjab are- 
computerized and monthly 
Detail Books were 
available showing the 
details o f  expenditures and 
receipts o f  the Account IV  
and Account I o f  each 
district. 
NWFP 
In A G  NWFP, the records 
were not yet computerized. 
DAOs from each district 
accounts office submit 
monthly cash accounts and 
civ i l  accounts o f  the 
transactions incurred 
during the period. 
Balochistan 
Accounting records in AG 
Balochistai are 
computerized and monthly 
Detail Books were 
prepared monthly showing 
the expenditures and 
receipts o f  the districts. 
Sin& 
DAOs in Sindh were not 
able to record the 
transactions o f  Account IV 
separately. As  with NWFP, 
DAOs from each district 
accounts office submit 
monthly cash accounts and 
civ i l  accounts o f  the 
transactions incurred 
during the period, but these 
contain many errors. 
Expenditures from 
Account IV and Account I, 
are often recorded in the 
same document. As a 
result, a reliable database 
o f  receipts and 
expenditures for province 
o f  Sindh could not be 
constructed. 
The accounting records used to construct the database are the records o f  transactions at the point 
at which they are incurred. These records are reconciled with each authority responsible for  
incuning expenditure or recording receipts. As standard accounting formats are used, the 
accounting records are comparable. 
The process o f  building the dataset took the fol lowing into account: 
1. Different provinces are at different stages o f  transition to preparation o f  district accounts. 
The transition f rom provincial accounting formats to district level accounts i s  s t i l l  not  
complete. This means that the actual decentralized functions and revenue items have been 
changing by jurisdiction, by province, and over time. This required numerous revisions in 
data collection and datasets. N e w  codes for district accounts were only not i f ied in 
January 2004 (with implementation o f  NAM these will change once again). N o  district 
accounts have been prepared to  date. District-level data remains embedded in provincial 
accounts. 
2. Many  o f  the revenues which should be booked under Account IV are s t i l l  being recorded 
in Account I. District expenditures appear in the aggregate Province Consolidated Fund 
boolungs in the DAO and later AG’s records. T o  adjust for these difficulties a mapping o f  
statutory assignments over the codes o f  classification was carried out. M i n o r  heads in 
case o f  revenue items and function codes in case o f  expenditures were selected f rom the 
Chart o f  Classification and used to map onto corresponding assignment o f  functions and 
revenues in accordance with the four LGOs. These were then each tracked month by 
month in the accounting records. 
3. Appropriate amendments were made for shared taxes. For instance urban property tax 
collected in a district i s  n o w  a tax to be shared between district government and TMAs in 
the ratio o f  15:85 with the latter returning to point o f  collection. For this purpose the 
district level data used in the paper depicts the total collection and then counts only 15 
percent o f  the tax for  district governments. 
This process led to some delays as the staff in the offices o f  the Accountants General were 
init ially reluctant to hand over data. I t  was only toward the end o f  the fiscal year, after repeated 
attempts, that data for a l l  the districts in Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh were available with the 
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respective AGs. Data were flowing in from districts in f i t s  and starts at times with errors. Data 
f rom the AG office o f  Punjab and Balochistan was easy to collect. I t  was diff icult to obtain data 
f rom AG NWFP as the records in this office were not computerized and cash accounts and c iv i l  
accounts were obtained and photocopies were made from these accounts. 
Provincial AGs will be finalizing appropriation and finance accounts by the end o f  third quarter 
o f  the current year for  fiscal year 03. The data will be updated and any errors that are found at this 
stage will be corrected. 
Table 29: Data Sources for the Tables in DSD2 
Data source 
Provincial Receipt and 
Expenditures 
Fiscal Transfer Data Tables 
District Govemment receipts 
District Government 
expenditures 
Punjab I NWFP I Balochistan 
Annual budget statements o f  each province for FY 2004. Revised estimates have 
been used 
For the budgeted share o f  each district govemment, the budget notifications o f  the 
Departments o f  Finance in each province showing the budgeted share o f  individual 
District Govemment o f  each province were used. 
For actual transfers, the statements depicting monthly actual transfer to each district 
govemment f rom the Department o f  Finance o f  each Province were used, drawing on 
notifications issued to the : 
Monthly Detail Books o f  
Account IV were used 
from the Accountant 
General’s office. Where 
needed the required 
codes have been 
disaggregated from 
Account I records 
Monthly Detail Books o f  
Account IV from the 
Accountant General 
office were used to 
construct the expenditure 
table. 
ite Bank o f  Pakistan for re 
A l l  receipts are being 
deposited in Account I 
therefore, monthly cash 
accounts o f  Accountant 
General’s office were 
used to construct the 
receipts tables. T h e  
required codes have been 
disaggregated from 
Account I records 
Monthly c iv i l  accounts 
o f  Accountant General’s 
o f i c e  were used to 
construct the expenditure 
tables 
- 
ise into Account IV. 
A l l  receipts are being 
deposited in Account I 
therefore, the monthly 
Detail Books o f  Accountant 
General’s office were used 
to construct the receipts 
tables. The required codes 
have been disaggregated 
f rom Account I records 
T h e  expenditure o f  each 
district govemment has 
been collected from 
monthly Detail Books 
collected from the office o f  
the Accountant General. 
The photocopied records 
were used to construct 
district by district 
expenditures 
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Appendix 2: Assessment Frameworks Developed for the Study 
Provincial efficiency 
incentives 
Despite the voluminous research and practitioner literature, enormous conceptual and practical 
difficulties remain in assessing the pace and depth o f  devolution. This study has developed three 
key frameworks that could, with adaptation, be used for extending an assessment o f  devolution to  
other settings. 
Budgetary certainty 
Enhanced autonomy in preparing the budget 
Incentives for local revenue-raising 
First, the study uses a schema for focusing on a key set o f  incentives at local government level, 
for  which there i s  ample justification in the theoretical and research literature, as key to the 
success o f  devolution initiatives, and which can provide a test o f  the degree to which devolution 
i s  beginning to “bite” by creating appropriate incentives for efficient and responsive services 
within local government. These are summarized in Table 30, but were set out in more detail in 
Table 10 above. The second volume (Annex 1-Recent History) illustrates h o w  these tests were 
applied in practice. 
Citizen power o r  
voice 
Table 30: Assessing Institutional Changes within Local Government 
Councilors motivated to l i s ten  to citizens 
The pull f r o m  councilors i s  stronger than that f r o m  the 
Provinces 
Incentives for 
Nazimeen and senior 
staff  
Client power 
Adequate deployment o f  staff 
Cit izen dispute resolution 
Incentives for service I Managerial power I Staff work ing in the district are employed by the district 
providers I Nazimeen authority over senior staff External oversight 
I I Communitv management o f  facilities I 
Second, within this overall schema, the study also has employed a distinctive approach to 
measuring the degree to  which staff are formally employed by local gove rnmen t4 f fe r i ng  some 
precision to the nebulous assessment o f  administrative devolution. This i s  set out in detail in the 
third volume (Annex 2-Technical Considerations), but i s  summarized in Table 3 1. 
105 
Table 31: Assessing the Location of  the Employer Function 
Dimensions of “Employership” 
Budget Control 
Establishment Control 
Recruitment 
Career Management 
Performance Management 
Pay Policy 
I s  the local government responsible for: 
Paying staff from i t s  own budget 
Determine the wage envelope 
Authority to dismiss surplus staff 
Control overall staffing numbers 
Control staffing numbers in local offices and facilities 
Formal employer 
Authority to hire 
Independent merit-based recruitment mechanism (for example, PSC) 
Promotion 
Transfers within local government 
Horizontal mobil ity 
Direct and supervise activities and tasks 
Conduct evaluations 
Financial rewards or promotion 
Abi l i ty  to discipline or f i re  
Set overall wage rates 
Set local hardship or remoteness allowances 
Third, the study sets out a new approach for assessing the degree to  which conditional grants 
represent deconcentrated expenditures, with damaging consequences for local ownership and 
accountability-and corresponding progress toward instituting decentralized expenditures in the 
form o f  unconditional b lock grants. T h i s  i s  set out in detail in Table 19 above, and summarized in 
Table 32. 
Deconcentrated 
expenditures 
Table 32: Assessing “Verticalness” o f  Conditional Grants 
Delegated Decentralized expenditures 
expenditures 
Conditional grants I Unconditional 
Shown in the 
budget of: 
Conditioned on: 
Expenditure 
control and 
accountability 
arrangements: 
Awarded through: 
Vertical programs 
Higher level ~ Sub-national 
govemment i government : (butmight 
j require pre- 
i authorization 
i by higher level 
! ovemment) ......................................................................... i ..... g .................................................. 
No t  conditional- , Inputs 
based on project I (earmarking), 
..agreement: ............................... ..: i or processes 
Parallel project Sub-national 
........................................................ 
facility managed 
by higher level 
government 
govemment- 
but with 
special 
arrangements 
(local imprest 
with either ex 
ante or ex post 
controls) 
Individual ministries or deDartments 
I 
block grants 
Sub-national government 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
Processes, outputs ~ No t  conditional 
or outcomes 
Rely on existing provincial or local 
govemment accounts control 
N F C P F C  
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Anjuman 
Challan 
Gully koocha 
Gram panchayat 
Insaaf 
Insaaf Committee 
Jirga 
Kotwal 
Kutche y 
Majlis-i-Shoora 
Madrassah 
Markaz 
Mohtasib 
Muk mu-ka) 
Musalihat 
Musalihat Anjuman (or 
Anjuman-i-Musalihat) 
Naib Nazim 
Nazim 
Nazimeen 
Panchayat 
Qazi 
Shariat 
Sifarish 
Taluka 
Tehbazari 
Tehsil 
Thana 
Zakat 
Zila 
Ziladar 
Glossary 
Society or organization 
Indictment 
Street and neighborhood 
Local  council (India) 
Justice 
Loca l  committee whose function i s  t o  help citizens pursue complaints 
about the functioning o f  subordinate courts 
Traditional or tribal council 
Police officer in M o g h u l  times 
Loca l  magistrate courts 
Consultative council 
Islamic religious school 
Headquarters or center 
Ombudsman 
An arrangement; reference to  corrupt deals made by police 
Reconcil iation 
Society, organization, or committee for reconcil iation 
Deputy mayor 
Mayor  
Mayors 
Counci l  
Judge under Islamic l a w  
Islamic l a w  
Recommendation o f  a patron 
T o w n  (same meaning as tehsil, but used solely in Sindh) 
Use o f  pedestrian walkways for the selling o f  merchandise 
T o w n  
Police station 
A l m s  
Distr ict 
Distr ict officer (historical term) 
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